Sallie v. State, S02P1702.
| Decision Date | 24 March 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. S02P1702.,S02P1702. |
| Citation | 578 S.E.2d 444,276 Ga. 506 |
| Parties | SALLIE v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Christopher M. Johnson, Palmer C. Singleton, III, Atlanta, for appellant.
Richard E. Currie, Dist. Atty., Alexander A. Markowich, Dist. Atty., Waycross, Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Patricia A. Burton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. SEARS, Presiding Justice.
A jury found William C. Sallie guilty of malice murder, felony murder, burglary, aggravated assault, two counts of kidnapping with bodily injury, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The jury recommended a death sentence after finding beyond a reasonable doubt three aggravating circumstances: that the offense of murder was committed while Sallie was engaged in the commission of a burglary; and that the offense of murder was committed while Sallie was engaged in the commission of the kidnappings with bodily injury of the murder victim's two daughters.1 Sallie appeals and we affirm.2
1. The evidence presented at trial showed the following: William Sallie and his wife, Robin, separated in December 1989 and Robin sought a divorce. Sallie had been physically abusive to Robin during their marriage and his striking her with a belt had precipitated the separation. They had a two-year-old baby named Ryan. Robin and Ryan went to live with her parents, John and Linda Moore, in their rural house in Bacon County. Robin's seventeen-year-old sister, April, and her nine-year-old brother, Justin, also lived there. Shortly thereafter, under the pretense of seeing Ryan at the Moores' house, Sallie abducted Ryan and went to Illinois, where he lived. However, an Illinois court awarded temporary custody of Ryan to Robin, and she returned with him to the Moores' house in February 1990.
In March 1990, Sallie returned to Georgia and rented a mobile home in Liberty County using the name Bill Simons. Also in March, he had a friend purchase a nine millimeter pistol for him in Illinois. On March 28, 1990, Sallie dressed in green camouflage and went to the Moores' house at night; he carried the pistol, a roll of duct tape, and four sets of handcuffs. At approximately 10:00 p.m., April was talking to her boyfriend when the phone line went dead. She did not think this was unusual and went to bed. It was later discovered that Sallie had ripped the wires from the phone box on the outside wall. At 12:45 a.m., after everyone inside was asleep, Sallie pried open the back door and entered the house. He went immediately to the master bedroom, flicked on the lights, and shot John and Linda Moore as they lay in bed. John was struck by six bullets, including two that damaged his heart. He tried to get out of bed, but he collapsed, fell on the floor, and died. Linda was shot in the thumb, the shoulder, and both thighs. Sallie then fled outside and reloaded. When Robin and April were in the master bedroom trying to help their parents, Sallie fired two more shots through the bedroom window, hitting no one. They doused the light and pleaded with Sallie to let them get help for their parents. April tried to leave the house to get help (the nearest neighbor was 1/4 of a mile away), but Sallie confronted her on the porch and told her to stay in the house or he would blow her head off. Sallie eventually re-entered the house and handcuffed Justin and Linda, who was still bleeding from her wounds, to each other and to a bed rail. He bound Robin and April to each other with handcuffs and duct tape, and he abducted them to his Liberty County mobile home where he raped them both. He left his two-year-old son in the master bedroom. After a few hours, Linda and Justin managed to extricate themselves from the bed rail and reach a neighbor, who summoned the police. Sallie released Robin and April in Bacon County the night of March 29 after asking them not to press charges. He was arrested shortly thereafter. The police found the murder weapon in his mobile home.
The evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Sallie guilty of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt.3 The evidence was also sufficient to enable the jury to find the existence of the three statutory aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.4
2. Sallie argues that the trial court erred by refusing to excuse two prospective jurors for cause due to their bias in favor of the death penalty. 5 A prospective juror who has an unwavering bias in favor of one of the possible sentences authorized by law, to the exclusion of at least one of the other possible sentences, is not qualified to serve.6 We view the record as a whole to determine support for the trial court's findings, and we pay deference to the trial court's resolution of any conflicts or equivocations in the prospective juror's voir dire responses as well as its ultimate determination of a juror's qualification.7 "Whether to strike a juror for cause is within the discretion of the trial court and the trial court's rulings are proper absent some manifest abuse of discretion."8
(a) Prospective juror Harper stated that if someone committed murder he should get the death penalty and that he believed in an eye for an eye. However, he could also consider both life imprisonment options for someone guilty of murder, and he could vote for them in "[c]ertain situations." When asked by defense counsel to explain his eye for an eye belief, Mr. Harper stated, He acknowledged that not all murderers get the death penalty under Georgia law, and he also acknowledged, in response to questioning by defense counsel, that if the trial reaches the penalty phase the jury would have ruled out accident or self-defense. Mr. Harper said that he would consider the circumstances of the crime when considering punishment, and not evidence about the defendant's background. He later stated, however, that he could consider mitigating evidence about a defendant's life experiences and background and that it could sway his vote. Before jury selection, Mr. Harper reaffirmed that he could consider all three sentencing options and mitigation evidence about a defendant's background. Viewing the prospective juror's responses as a whole, this Court finds no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of Sallie's motion to excuse Mr. Harper for cause.9 Although he leaned toward a death sentence, Mr. Harper did not have an unwavering bias in favor of the death penalty; he could consider and vote for all three punishment options.10
(b) Prospective juror Chasteen indicated that he could vote for all three sentencing options for someone convicted of murder. Mr. Chasteen said he did not know if he could consider a defendant's life history and background before making a decision as to sentence, but he then said, When defense counsel later asked him if he would consider facts about the defendant not having anything to do with the murder when determining punishment, Mr. Chasteen said he did not think so. He later stated that he would consider all the evidence presented in the case, including mitigating evidence about the defendant's background, before making a sentencing decision. Viewing Mr. Chasteen's voir dire responses as a whole, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by qualifying him to serve on the jury. The record shows that Mr. Chasteen was willing to listen to the defendant's mitigation evidence and meaningfully consider all three possible sentences.11
3. The trial court did not improperly restrict Sallie's voir dire questions. Sallie sought to ask some prospective jurors a number of questions that involved technical, legal issues or that called for prejudgment on the part of the prospective jurors. Some examples of the denied voir dire questions were:
" "12 Questions of a technical legal nature and questions that call for prejudgment are improper in a voir dire examination.13 Since there is often a fine line between asking potential jurors how they would decide the case and questions that merely seek to expose bias or prejudice, the scope of the voir dire examination, of necessity, must be left to the sound discretion of the trial court.14 After viewing the record, we conclude that the lengthy voir dire in this case was sufficient to ascertain the fairness and impartiality of the prospective jurors.15 We find no abuse...
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