Sallis v. University of Minn.

• Decision Date: 07 July 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-2784.,04-2784.
• Citation: 408 F.3d 470
• Parties: James H. SALLIS, Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

408 F.3d 470

James H. SALLIS, Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, Appellee.

No. 04-2784.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: February 14, 2005.

Filed: May 20, 2005.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied July 7, 2005.^*

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Damon L. Ward, argued, Minneapolis, MN (Lateesa T. Ward, Minneapolis, MN, on the brief), for appellant.

Brian Jeffrey Slovur, argued, Minneapolis, MN, for appellee.

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, RILEY, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

James Sallis appeals from a decision of the district court¹ granting summary judgment in favor of the University of Minnesota. For reversal, Sallis argues that the district court improperly dismissed his Title VII claims and that the district court abused its discretion by limiting the scope of discovery. We affirm.

I. Background

In 1993, the University of Minnesota (UM) hired James Sallis as a delivery person working in University Stores. A year or so later, UM transferred Sallis to the Parking and Transportation Building. In 2000, UM told Sallis that he would be laid off because his position as a custodian was being abolished. However, UM later rescinded the layoff notice because Sallis, as a member of the Teamsters Union, was covered by its collective bargaining agreement requiring that a worker with less seniority be laid off first. Instead, UM reassigned Sallis to UM's Fourth Street Parking Ramp under the Department of Parking and Transportation Services. After the transfer, UM placed Sallis on a third-shift work schedule based on his "clock-time" seniority.²

After being transferred to the 4th Street Parking Ramp, Sallis sought, but did not receive, three positions at UM. In September 2000, Sallis and four others applied for an opening as third-shift general maintenance supervisor. UM's selection process included a panel consisting of the general maintenance supervisor for the Ramp, the parking area supervisor for UM who was an African-American, and the maintenance manager asking all applicants the same interview questions. The questions were in five categories: supervisory experience; education and training; maintenance and custodial experience; familiarity with computers; and a general question category. The panel assigned a weighted numerical score in each assessment category based on the applicant's answers. The three interviewers rated Sallis 44, 51, and 56 out of a possible score of 80. UM hired the applicant who received the highest interview score with 51, 60, and 64.

In November 2000, a third-shift maintenance and operations mechanic position opened which required some technical knowledge and skills. Sallis and another candidate were interviewed for the job. The hiring committee asked the interviewees twelve technical questions. Sallis answered two correctly, while the other candidate answered all twelve correctly. Additionally, the other candidate had 133 to 140 hours of training time and 720 hours of field experience while Sallis had only 19 hours of training time and no field experience. Lastly, Sallis applied for the position of athletic equipment worker with the UM football team but was not hired. Sallis contended the denial was based on his race.

While working at the 4th Street Parking Ramp, Sallis's direct supervisor called him "tan" in front of the maintenance manager. Sallis considered his supervisor's remark that he was a "particular person" to be a negative racial remark. Sallis also stated he heard a parking attendant talking about "niggers" and that a former worker would consistently talk about "all of the damn Somalians."

In December 2000, Sallis filed a discrimination charge with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights (MDHR) and with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)³ in which he alleged that UM's disciplinary actions, UM's failure to promote him, and other UM actions were on account of race and for reprisal. MDHR investigated and found that there was no probable cause to believe UM had discriminated against Sallis. MDHR dismissed the charge. The EEOC adopted the findings of the MDHR and closed Sallis's file.

Sallis filed a Title VII action based on racial discrimination in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. Sallis sought discovery from the entire UM system and UM objected. At a hearing, a magistrate judge found that Sallis's discovery requests were overly broad and unduly burdensome. The magistrate's recommended order, which the district court adopted, restricted discovery to the Department of Parking and Transportation Services.

UM moved for summary judgment, contending that Sallis had not established a prima facie case of racial discrimination for failure to promote, disparate treatment, hostile work environment or retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of UM, assuming that Sallis made a prima facie case of racial discrimination for failure to promote, but found that UM set forth legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its decisions. The district court concluded that Sallis failed to show UM's reasons were pretextual. The district court also determined that Sallis failed to establish a prima facie case in each of his other claims. Sallis now appeals.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

We review a district court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Grey v. City of Oak Grove, Mo., 396 F.3d 1031, 1034 (8th Cir.2005). Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c):

mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation there can be `no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is `entitled to a judgment as a matter of law' because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [his] case with respect to which [he] has the burden of proof.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party must demonstrate that there are no disputed material facts. Id. The court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Graves v. Arkansas Dep't of Fin. & Admin., 229 F.3d 721, 723 (8th Cir.2000). The nonmoving party must show by admissible evidence that specific facts remain which create a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Krenik v. County of LeSueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir.1995).

B. Dismissal of Sallis's Title VII Race Claim

Sallis argues that he proffered enough evidence to defeat summary judgment and that the district court misapplied Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003). Specifically, Sallis contends that the district court failed to view the facts in a light most favorable to him, but instead, "made credibility determinations and weighed the evidence." Sallis avers that paragraph 16 of his statement of facts contained undisputed facts showing that he had more supervisory experience than did the candidate who was given the third-shift supervisor position.

Title VII race discrimination cases are tested on summary judgment under either McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), or in a mixed-motive case, under Price-Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 269-70, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) and Desert Palace. The district court struggled to harmonize Desert Palace with McDonnell Douglas, ultimately deciding that it "would reach the same conclusion under any conceivable reading of Desert Palace." We hold that Desert Palace is inapplicable under the facts of this case.⁴

In Desert Palace the Supreme Court held that, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, direct evidence of discrimination is not required in order for a plaintiff to obtain a mixed-motive jury instruction. Mixed-motive cases are those in which a plaintiff's evidence shows that an employer's decision was motivated, at least in part, by discrimination. This is not such a case. Sallis produced no convincing evidence, circumstantial or direct, that race motivated UM's decisions not to promote him. We therefore proceed under McDonnell Douglas.⁵

Under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas, the complainant has the burden of establishing a prima facie case, "showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applications from persons of complainant's qualifications." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817.⁶ The burden then shifts to the employer who must "articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." Id. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. If the employer meets this burden, the presumption of discrimination fails and the complainant must show that the employer's nondiscriminatory reason is, in reality, a pretext. Id. at 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817. Sallis's claim fails under McDonnell Douglas.

The district court made no finding whether Sallis established a prima facie case of race discrimination. Instead, the court assumed arguendo that he did, and proceeded to analyze the case with the burden of production shifting to UM to show it had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its hiring decisions. We agree that UM's proffered reasons for not hiring Sallis were legitimate. UM chose applicants which it deemed...