Sally v. Sally by Magee
| Decision Date | 07 March 1996 |
| Citation | 638 N.Y.S.2d 832,225 A.D.2d 816 |
| Parties | Peter SALLY, Appellant, v. Mildred SALLY, by Niki MAGEE, as Conservator, Respondent. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Eggleston & Eggleston (John D. Eggleston, of counsel), Saratoga Springs, for appellant.
James G. Snyder, Guardian ad Litem, Saratoga Springs, for Mildred Sally, respondent.
Niki Magee, Granada Hills, California, respondent in pro. person.
Before CARDONA, P.J., and MERCURE, CREW, WHITE and CASEY, JJ.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Mycek, J.), entered November 10, 1994 in Saratoga County, which partially granted defendant's motion to, inter alia, direct plaintiff to pay for health insurance coverage for Mildred Sally.
At issue in this appeal is whether Supreme Court erred in interpreting the provisions of a stipulation entered into in a prior divorce action. Plaintiff originally obtained a default judgment in the divorce action, but the judgment was set aside due to the mental incompetency of plaintiff's wife. Defendant was appointed as the wife's conservator, and the parties entered into an oral stipulation in open court which modified a separation agreement that had been previously executed by plaintiff and his wife. Based upon the grounds specified in Domestic Relations Law § 170(6), a judgment of divorce was thereafter entered. The separation agreement, as modified by the terms of the oral stipulation, was incorporated but not merged in the judgment.
When a dispute subsequently arose regarding plaintiff's obligation to provide medical insurance coverage for his former wife pursuant to the terms of the stipulation, plaintiff commenced this plenary action for declaratory relief. Defendant sought, inter alia, enforcement of the judgment of divorce and an order holding plaintiff in contempt for failing to obey the judgment. Supreme Court denied defendant's motion for contempt, but directed that plaintiff pay for health insurance coverage for his former wife. The order also specified the extent of the coverage. Plaintiff appeals.
When the oral stipulation was placed on the record in the prior divorce action, plaintiff's employer provided health and hospitalization insurance which covered plaintiff's wife as a dependent. In its original form, the stipulation clearly and unambiguously provided that if plaintiff and his wife are divorced and if the insurance coverage provided by plaintiff's employer is no longer available to the wife for any reason, "subsequent policies covering [the wife] having the same coverage as heretofore provided, shall be initiated and * * * [p]laintiff will be required to pay the requisite premiums which shall be considered as maintenance". In a purported effort "to elaborate and elucidate the stipulation that was read into the record with regard to health and hospitalization coverage", the parties added the following language to their stipulation:
[I]t is acknowledged by the parties that COBRA is a protection for divorced spouses wherein for three years following the entry of any judgment of divorce, the responsible spouse will be required to maintain what is in effect a major medical insurance policy.
Under those circumstances * * * [p]laintiff herein acknowledges that responsibility and will be solely responsible for the payment of that premium for the three-year period.
With regard to the standard hospitalization policy that was referred to in the stipulation * * * [p]laintiff will be solely responsible for the payment of those premiums up to 13 years, which is the length of time of the marriage, or until the remarriage of the [wife], whichever event shall first occur.
COBRA refers to Federal legislation which was enacted to provide employees and qualified beneficiaries who are covered by an employment-related group health care plan with the opportunity to elect continuation of the coverage at the group rate after some qualifying event, including divorce (see, 29 U.S.C. § 1161). Both parties contend that the stipulation is clear and unambiguous. According to plaintiff, his obligation to provide health insurance coverage for his former wife terminated at the end of the three-year COBRA period and thereafter his only obligation was to provide a standard hospitalization policy for an additional 10 years. Defendant contends that pursuant to the original language of the stipulation, plaintiff was obligated to obtain "subsequent policies covering [his former wife] having the same coverage as heretofore provided". According to defendant, the COBRA coverage was a subsequent policy and upon termination of...
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