Salmeron v. Dist. of Columbia

• Decision Date: 16 June 2016
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 13-1615 (RBW)
• Citation: 195 F.Supp.3d 153
• Parties: Catalina SALMERON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

195 F.Supp.3d 153

Catalina SALMERON, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 13-1615 (RBW)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed June 16, 2016

Douglas Tyrka, Tyrka & Associates, LLC, McLean, VA, for Plaintiffs.

Tasha Monique Hardy, Office of Attorney General, Veronica A. Porter, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

REGGIE B. WALTON, United States District Judge

The plaintiffs¹ bring this action against the District of Columbia ("the defendant" or "the District") under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA").² Currently pending before the Court are the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Pls.' Mot."), and the defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment ("Def.'s Mem."). Upon careful consideration of the parties' submissions and the entire record in this case, the Court concludes that it must grant in part and deny in part the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and grant in part and deny in part the defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment.³

I. BACKGROUND

The plaintiffs initiated this action to recover "legal fees and costs incurred in successful litigation under the [IDEA]," Am. Compl. ¶ 1. The plaintiffs each allege that they "prevailed in IDEA [administrative] litigation, receiving final relief ordered in [several] "[h]earing [o]fficer's Determination[s] )." Id.¶ 10. At the seven underlying IDEA administrative proceedings ("proceedings" or "due process hearings"), the plaintiffs were represented by Kiran Hassan, who states that she is "the sole owner of Hassan Law Firm, LLC, the law firm that served as counsel for the [p]laintiffs in the administrative proceedings in this matter." Pls.' Mot., Exhibit ("Ex.") 3 (Verified Statement of Kiran Hassan ("Hassan Statement")) ¶ 2. Juan Fernandez, who, according to Hassan, "received his [J]uris [D]octorate [degree] from Catholic University in 1999 ... [and] has been specializing in IDEA litigation ... since 2001," id.¶ 12, also participated in the due process hearings subject to this litigation, see, e.g., Pls.' Mot., Ex.1 (Determinations) at 54 (describing Fernandez as an "[e]ducational [a]dvocate").

On October 16, 2015, the plaintiffs filed their motion for summary judgment. In their motion, the plaintiffs ask the Court to award them "attorneys' fees ... incurred in the underlying administrative litigation in the amount of $528,256.00." Pls.' Mot. at 1. The plaintiffs assert that their evidence, including a "detailed itemization of tasks performed [and the] hours expended [on them]," Pls.' Mem. at 4, demonstrates that "the [number of] hours claimed are reasonable," id. at 5. Further, the plaintiffs assert that the Court must determine their hourly fees in accordance with "an updated version of the Laffey[M]atrix." Id. at 11. According to the plaintiffs, the updated Laffey Matrix is the appropriate benchmark of a reasonable hourly rate because, supposedly, they "presented the declarations of lawyers attesting to their ability to negotiate and earn these rates on the open market." Id. at 12. Additionally, the plaintiffs assert that the Court "should award current hourly rates," id. at 13, and explain that, "[b]y 'current,' [they] ... refer to 2013 rates," id. n.5, i.e., the rates in effect when they commenced this action.

The plaintiffs also ask the Court to "order a fee petition from the [p]laintiffs at the conclusion of this litigation," id. at 13, asserting that plaintiffs who successfully litigate a case for attorney's fees and costs under the IDEA may also recover "additional fees for time reasonably devoted to obtaining attorney's fees," id.(citing Kaseman v. District of Columbia, 444 F.3d 637, 640 (2006) ). Finally, the plaintiffs request the Court to "order that the District pay an additional $4,000.00 for each delay of a month or part thereof in payment [of attorney's fees]," id. at 14 (citation omitted), alleging that the District has a "long history of ignoring the timelines of orders for payment of IDEA attorneys' fees," id.(citations omitted).

On November 13, 2015, the defendant filed its cross-motion for summary judgment. The defendant argues that the plaintiffs have failed to "offer ... relevant evidence supporting the prevailing rate in the community for the type of work done by their attorneys in this case," Def.'s Mem. at 2, and that the plaintiffs' "requested enhanced Laffey rates are not warranted," id. at 3 (citation omitted). Instead, the defendant asserts that "[t]hree-fourths of the [lower] [United States Attorneys' Office] Laffey rate is the maximum appropriate rate for this case." Id. at 6. As support for this position, the defendant states that "[s]everal judges in this Court have held the Laffey[M]atrix to be inapplicable and have instead compensated attorney['s] fees at a rate equal to three-quarters ... of Laffey or less." Id. at 8 & n.3 (citing cases). "Given the number of cases in which a rate less than Laffey has been awarded to [p]laintiffs' counsel in IDEA actions," the defendant opines, "it is clear that the [C]ourt need not award Laffey rates as a matter of course in order to convince competent counsel to take IDEA cases." Id. at 9. The defendant disputes the plaintiffs' claim that the updated Laffey Matrix is the appropriate benchmark of a reasonable hourly rate, asserting that the plaintiffs "have given no indication of a market rate, other than their own self-serving affidavits." Id. at 10.

The defendant raises a more specific challenge to the reasonableness of Hassan's requested hourly rate, contending that it "is not reasonable because" she "billed ... at a rate higher than her experience level." Id. at 13. To bolster this contention, the defendant states that, although "Hassan graduated from law school in 2001, and has been specializing in special education matters since 2012," id."she did not start practicing law until May 2004," id.(citation omitted).

The defendant also advances several additional arguments. First, the defendant notes that "Courts in this District often reduce awards of attorney['s] fees under the IDEA based on partial success," id. at 15 (citing cases), and asserts that the plaintiffs' fees "should be reduced by at least 50%," id. at 19, because the plaintiffs "did not receive all of the requested relief" at the due process hearings, see id. at 16; see also id. at 15–19. Second, the defendant states that the plaintiffs "should not [be able to] bill the District for services rendered by an educational advocate or consultant," id. at 19 (citing Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 300, 126 S.Ct. 2455, 165 L.Ed.2d 526 (2006) ), and asserts that "Juan Fernandez ... served as [an] educational advocate[ ] in each of the hearings comprising this action," id. at 20, concluding that "[a]ll fees by [him] should be deducted from [the] [p]laintiffs' invoice," id. Third, the defendant disputes that the plaintiffs "are entitled to payment at the firm's current rates," id. contending that "case law dictates that [a]n appropriate award of attorney's fees against the government must be based on billing rates at the time that work was performed," id.(citations omitted). Finally, the defendant characterizes the plaintiffs' assertion that it has a "long history of delaying payments" as "baseless and without merit," id. at 21, asserting that the plaintiffs have offered "scant evidence demonstrating that the District either has previously been or is now likely to be recalcitrant in paying the fees ordered by the Court," id.(citation omitted).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Before granting a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a court must find that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A fact is material if it 'might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,' and a dispute about a material fact is genuine 'if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.' " Steele v. Schafer, 535 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C.Cir.2008) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ).

When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citation omitted). "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are ... not ... [decisions for] a judge ... [to make when] ruling on a motion for summary judgment ...." Id. The movant has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that the non-moving party "fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party ... bear[s] the burden of proof." See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

In responding to a summary judgment motion, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the nonmoving party must not rely on "mere allegations or denials ... but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there [are] genuine [disputes of material fact]." See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party's] position [is therefore] insufficient" to withstand a motion for summary judgment." Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

III. ANALYSIS

The plaintiffs seek...