Salmeron v. State, A05A0636.
| Decision Date | 20 April 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. A05A0636.,A05A0636. |
| Citation | 273 Ga. App. 55,614 S.E.2d 177 |
| Parties | SALMERON v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Ricky W. Morris, Jr., Joseph S. Key, Sexton & Morris, P.C., Stockbridge, for Appellant.
Tommy K. Floyd, District Attorney, Blair D. Mahaffey, Assistant District Attorney, for Appellee.
Following a bench trial, the court found Omar Salmeron guilty of trafficking in cocaine. On appeal, Salmeron contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. For reasons that follow, we disagree and affirm.
"On appeal from a denial of a motion to suppress, we construe the evidence in favor of the trial court's ruling, and the trial court's application of law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo review."1 Viewed in this manner, the record shows that on December 11, 2002, Henry County Police Officer Mike Freeman was patrolling traffic on I-75 when he saw a Chevrolet Malibu that was following another vehicle too closely. According to Freeman, after the driver "mashed the brakes," he noticed that one of the Malibu's brake lights was not functioning. Thus, Freeman pulled the car over.
Freeman asked the driver, Salmeron, for his driver's license and insurance information, which Salmeron provided. As he does with all individuals he stops for traffic violations, Freeman asked Salmeron to exit the car for safety purposes. Salmeron walked with Freeman to the rear of the car, and Freeman began filling out the citation. While writing the citation, Freeman engaged in "some small talk" with Salmeron, asking him about his travel plans. According to Freeman, Salmeron said that he had family in Atlanta, which he had been visiting for a few days.
Freeman was somewhat suspicious about Salmeron because the Malibu had been so heavily sprayed with various air fresheners that it made Freeman's nose burn. Freeman thought Salmeron might have used the air freshener to mask the smell of alcohol or narcotics in the car. So, while Freeman was completing the citation and before checking the status of Salmeron's license, he asked Salmeron for consent to search the car. Salmeron acquiesced, and Freeman began searching the car. One of the rear seats in the Malibu was tilted as though it was not fastened properly. Freeman pulled the seat out and discovered two kilograms of cocaine. An additional kilogram of cocaine was subsequently discovered elsewhere in the car.
Salmeron moved to exclude the cocaine evidence, asserting that Freeman improperly expanded the traffic stop. Salmeron also argued that he was unable to consent because he does not speak English and did not understand Freeman's request. The trial court denied the motion, finding, inter alia, that Freeman asked for permission to search the car while Salmeron was still validly detained for the traffic infraction. The trial court also found that Freeman obtained consent to search the vehicle. This appeal ensued.
1. On appeal, Salmeron contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because Freeman unlawfully expanded the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Under Salmeron's version of the facts, Freeman asked for consent to search after issuing the traffic citation and thus impermissibly expanded the traffic stop. He bases this argument on Freeman's testimony that he "pulled [Salmeron] straight out of the car, asked him where he was coming from while writing him a citation, then ... asked for consent to search."
However, this one statement cannot be viewed in a vacuum. Freeman made this statement in response to a question about how much time passed before Salmeron consented to the search.2 Freeman was merely recounting what had transpired in the context of figuring out how long it might have taken. Prior to making this statement, Freeman testified unequivocally that he asked for consent to search before completing the traffic citation and obtaining information on the status of Salmeron's license. The trial court found that consent was obtained during the traffic stop rather than afterward, which is permissible.3 Thus, Salmeron's argument that the traffic stop was unlawfully expanded is not well founded.4
2. In a related claim, Salmeron contends that he did not give valid consent for the search. In his motion to suppress, Salmeron noted that his native language is Spanish, not English. And, during the hearing on the motion to suppress, Salmeron's attorney argued that Salmeron "didn't really understand what [Freeman] was saying" because he "has very little command of the English language." On appeal, Salmeron contends that the trial court never ruled on whether he understood English or whether he consented to the search. Salmeron implies that, given the language barrier, there is no evidence that he consented to the search. We disagre...
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...and the briefcases. Judgment affirmed. ANDREWS, P.J., and PHIPPS, J., concur. 1. (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Salmeron v. State, 273 Ga.App. 55, 614 S.E.2d 177 (2005). 2. It was established at trial that the chunks of methamphetamine weighed 35.82 grams and 15.64 grams, respectively.......
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Salmeron v. State, No. S05G1394.
...the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's denial of Salmeron's motion to suppress, and affirmed his conviction. Salmeron v. State, 273 Ga.App. 55, 614 S.E.2d 177 (2005). We granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred by holding that law enforcement did not violate......
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