Salstrom v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc.
Decision Date | 15 November 1995 |
Docket Number | Nos. 94-35816,94-35849,s. 94-35816 |
Citation | 74 F.3d 183 |
Parties | 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 356, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 565 Michael L. SALSTROM, et al., Plaintiffs, and Gregory Lamont Gudger, Appellant, v. CITICORP CREDIT SERVICES, INC.; Financial Assistance Incorporation, a Washington corporation; Continental Credit, a Washington corporation; Larry Aldi; Gus Carlson; Citibank (South Dakota) NA, a South Dakota corporation, Defendants-Appellees. Michael L. SALSTROM, et al., Plaintiffs, and Dean Browning Webb, Appellant, v. CITICORP CREDIT SERVICES, INC.; Financial Assistance Incorporation, a Washington corp., Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Thomas W. Sondag, Lane Powell Spears Lubersky, Portland, Oregon, for appellant Gregory L. Gudger.
Alfredo Wheelock, Portland, Oregon, for appellant Dean Browning Webb.
John L. Langslet and Julie K. Bolt, Martin, Bischoff, Templeton, Langslet & Hoffman, Portland, Oregon, for defendants-appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon.
Before: BROWNING, RYMER, and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Gregory Lamont Gudger and Dean Browning Webb appeal the district court's order imposing monetary sanctions under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1927 and nonmonetary sanctions under the court's inherent power. Their primary argument is that denial of Rule 11 sanctions forecloses sanctions under Sec. 1927. We disagree, and affirm.
Gudger and Webb contend that because the district court declined to impose sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, the court is precluded from imposing sanctions under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1927. This argument fails because a court's findings under Rule 11 have no legally binding effect upon that court's subsequent ability to impose sanctions under Sec. 1927. See Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 830 (9th Cir.1986) (, )abrogated on other grounds in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990).
Gudger and Webb direct us to N.A.A.C.P.--Special Contribution Fund v. Atkins, 908 F.2d 336 (8th Cir.1990), in which the Eighth Circuit stated that while Rule 11 requires only a finding of objectively unreasonable behavior, "[t]his court has indicated that the language of Sec. 1927 appears to require both a finding of objectively unreasonable behavior and a finding of bad faith." Id. at 340. Our colleagues concluded that where the district court had not found objectively unreasonable behavior under Rule 11, it could not subsequently find objectively unreasonable behavior under Sec. 1927; therefore, the imposition of Sec. 1927 sanctions was improper. Id. Gudger and Webb's reliance on N.A.A.C.P. is misplaced because, unlike the Eighth Circuit, we have not interpreted Sec. 1927 to require a finding of objectively unreasonable behavior; a finding of subjective bad faith is sufficient. See, e.g., MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Moore, 952 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir.1991) ( ).
Accordingly, the court's decision to impose Sec. 1927 sanctions after having declined to impose Rule 11 sanctions was not an abuse of discretion.
Gudger and Webb next contend that the district court lacked a sufficient basis for its finding of bad faith. Such a finding is required both for the imposition of monetary sanctions under Sec. 1927, MGIC, 952 F.2d at 1122, and for the imposition of nonmonetary sanctions under the court's inherent power, Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 2464, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980).
The court made its finding of bad faith on the basis of three factors: the number and length of the pleadings, the timing involved in many of the filings, and the substance of the claims asserted. Gudger and Webb's argument that no single factor, considered alone, would justify a finding of bad faith simply misses the point: It was the combination of these factors, converting a "simple straightforward debt collection action into a full-fledged assault," that prompted the court to impose sanctions. This finding is supported by the record and does not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Gudger and Webb contend that the Sec. 1927 sanctions constitute impermissible postjudgment retribution, relying primarily on In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, amended on other grounds, 803 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir.1986). They read Yagman to prohibit the district court from waiting until the end of trial to impose sanctions. Although Yagman does endorse the imposition of sanctions as soon as the misconduct occurs, it goes on to note that Id. at 1183. Such is necessarily the case where, as here, the sanctions are based upon the cumulative effect of the attorneys' conduct.
Nor did the district court run afoul of Yagman in concluding that it would be impossible to determine with mathematical precision the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Terrebonne, Ltd. of California v. Murray
...or a meritorious position for the purpose of harassing an adversary. See In re Keegan, 78 F.3d at 436; Salstrom v. Citicorp Credit Serv., Inc., 74 F.3d 183 (9th Cir.1996), cert. denied, sub nom, Webb v. Citicorp Credit Serv. Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 60, 136 L.Ed.2d 23 (1996); MGIC Inde......
-
Bank of Hawaii v. Kunimoto, 20575.
...22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 6 L.Ed. 152 (1824); D.H. Overmyer Co. Inc. v. Robson, 750 F.2d 31, 33 (6th Cir.1984); Salstrom v. Citicorp Credit Serv. Inc., 74 F.3d 183, 185 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 813, 117 S.Ct. 60, 136 L.Ed.2d 23 (1996); In re N. Ohio Tireworkers, 92 Ohio App.3d 69, 6......
-
Calop Bus. Sys., Inc. v. City of L. A.
...suffices for § 1927, but bad faith is required for sanctions under the court's inherent power”). But see Salstrom v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc., 74 F.3d 183, 184 (9th Cir.1996) (“[A] finding [of bad faith] is required both for the imposition of monetary sanctions under § 1927, and for t......
-
Arnold v. Cnty. of El Dorado
...standard is subjective bad faith, and the court need not find objectively unreasonable behavior as well. Salstrom v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc., 74 F.3d 183, 184 (9th Cir.1996). The undersigned now turns to the legal standards which guide this court's determination, if, in fact, perjury......
-
Motions
...for the procedures used, and other circum- stances involving timing and motives. Salstrom v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc. , 74 F.3d 183 (9th Cir. 1996). Unlike Rule 11, the wrongful conduct by the attorney that may be sanctioned pursuant to this provision is not limited to signed papers f......
-
Table of Cases
...§7:03 Salomon S.A. v. Scott USA Ltd. Partnership , 117 F.R.D. 320, 321 (D. Mass. 1987), §7:76 Salstrom v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc., 74 F.3d 183 (9th Cir. 1996), §7:201 Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana , 915 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 815 (1991), §2:30 Sanchez v. Denv......