Salt Lake City v. Carrera

• Citation: 2015 UT 73,358 P.3d 1067
• Decision Date: 14 August 2015
• Docket Number: No. 20130800.,20130800.
• Parties: SALT LAKE CITY, Respondent, v. Ricardo Enrique CARRERA, Petitioner.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

358 P.3d 1067

2015 UT 73

SALT LAKE CITY, Respondent

v.Ricardo Enrique CARRERA, Petitioner.

No. 20130800.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Aug. 14, 2015.

Padma Veeru–Collings, Steven L. Newton, Salt Lake, for respondent.

Richard G. Sorenson, Salt Lake, for petitioner.

Justice PARRISH authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice DURRANT, Justice DURHAM, and Justice HIMONAS joined.

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

Justice PARRISH, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 On certiorari, Ricardo Enrique Carrera challenges the court of appeals' ruling affirming his conviction for unlawfully possessing another's Social Security card. Mr. Carrera asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support a reasonable inference that he knew he was not entitled to possess the card. We agree and reverse the court of appeals.

FACTS

¶ 2 In December 2010, in response to a call reporting a potential crime, Salt Lake City Police Officer Jonathan Dew began a search of the house where Mr. Carrera rented a room. During his search, Officer Dew identified himself as a police officer and asked Mr. Carrera to come out of his bedroom. After being asked several times, Mr. Carrera finally joined Officer Dew in the living room.

¶ 3 Upon entering the living room, Mr. Carrera took an aggressive stance against Officer Dew as if preparing to attack him. Believing that Mr. Carrera may assault him, Officer Dew ordered Mr. Carrera several times to sit down. Mr. Carrera ignored him. Because of Mr. Carrera's noncompliant behavior, Officer Dew attempted to place Mr. Carrera in handcuffs. Mr. Carrera pulled away and resisted arrest. Eventually, Mr. Carrera complied with Officer Dew's orders to get on the ground, and Officer Dew handcuffed him.

¶ 4 Officer Dew placed Mr. Carrera under arrest and then conducted a search incident to that arrest. The search uncovered Mr. Carrera's wallet. Officer Dew searched the wallet and found an unsigned Social Security card bearing the name of a Ms. Alvin. Officer Dew asked Mr. Carrera to whom the card belonged and whether he knew Ms. Alvin. Mr. Carrera responded that he did not know her.

¶ 5 The State charged Mr. Carrera with interference with an arresting peace officer and unlawful possession of another's identification documents. See Utah Code § 76–8–305 (interference with arresting officer); id. § 76–6–1105(2)(a) (unlawful possession). A jury found Mr. Carrera guilty of both charges, and he timely appealed his conviction for unlawfully possessing another's identifying document. The court of appeals affirmed his conviction, and we granted certiorari. We have jurisdiction pursuant to section 78A–3–102(3)(a) of the Utah Code.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 6 On certiorari, we review the court of appeals' decision for correctness. Ramsay v. Kane Cnty. Human Res. Special Serv. Dist., 2014 UT 5, ¶ 7, 322 P.3d 1163. We do not review “the decision of the trial court.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In evaluating sufficiency of the evidence claims, “we review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict.” State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ¶ 15, 63 P.3d 94.

ANALYSIS

¶ 7 Mr. Carrera argues that there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to decide beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew he was not entitled to possess the Social Security card. The City contends that reasonable inferences drawn from Mr. Carrera's behavior, his admission that he did not know Ms. Alvin, and the location of the card are sufficient to conclude that Mr. Carrera knew he was not entitled to possess the Social Security card. We disagree. We conclude that the City failed to present sufficient evidence to establish Mr. Carrera's mental state and accordingly reverse.

¶ 8 Mr. Carrera was convicted of unlawfully possessing another's identification document. Under Utah law,

a person is guilty of [unlawful possession of another's identification document] if he ... obtains or possesses an identifying document with knowledge that he is not entitled to obtain or possess the identifying document.

Utah Code § 76–6–1105(2)(a). Mr. Carrera does not dispute that he possessed the Social Security card. But he argues that the City did not present sufficient evidence to establish the required mens rea—that he knew he was not entitled to possess the Social Security card.

¶ 9 Before we can determine whether the evidence sufficiently established the mens rea element, we must determine what that element requires. We begin by recognizing that the Legislature did not make mere possession of another's identifying document unlawful. Instead, it requires the City to prove that Mr. Carrera had “knowledge that he [was] not entitled to obtain or possess the identifying document.” Id. The City's arguments equate entitlement with permission, asserting that because Mr. Carrera did not know the owner of the card he could not have reasonably believed that he was entitled to possess it. Mr. Carrera points to the case of a so-called Good Samaritan who finds a lost Social Security card and picks it up to return it or a police officer who seizes a stolen card for the same reason. Neither the Good Samaritan nor the police officer knows the person to whom the card belongs. They therefore both possess the card without permission from its owner. Although the statute does not provide any liability exception for such circumstances, the Legislature certainly did not intend for either to be subject to prosecution. Accordingly, knowledge that a person is not entitled to possess a Social Security card requires more than the mere knowledge that the person is holding the card without permission from its owner. It must be knowledge of the absence of permission plus something else. That something else may be an indication that the card was stolen, that the person in possession had kept the card beyond the time in which a reasonable person would have returned it, that the person intended to use or had used the card, or that the card was forged. There are any number of additional pieces of evidence that would distinguish a Good Samaritan or a police officer from an identity thief even though all possess the card without permission.

¶ 10 Having determined what the mens rea element requires, we turn to the question of whether the evidence was sufficient to meet that requirement in this case. In assessing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, “we do not examine whether we believe that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 18, 10 P.3d 346. Rather, we will overturn a conviction when “the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for which he or she was convicted.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 11 “[I]t is a well-settled rule that circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused.” State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah 1986). Circumstantial evidence is particularly useful in establishing intent because direct evidence of intent is rarely available. We allow juries to rely on circumstantial evidence to find intent on the basis of reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence.See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 21, 10 P.3d 346. However, jury verdicts decided on the basis of “remote or speculative possibilities of guilt” are invalid. State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993). Mr. Carrera's appeal turns on the distinction between a reasonable inference and speculation.

¶ 12 This is a difficult distinction for which a bright-line methodology is elusive. An ‘inference’ is a “conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them.” SeeBlack's Law Dictionary 847 (9th ed.2009). On the other hand, ‘speculation’ is the “act or practice of theorizing about matters over which there is no certain knowledge” at hand. Id. at 1529. In short, the difference between an inference and speculation depends on whether the underlying facts support the conclusion. A jury draws a reasonable inference if there is an evidentiary foundation to draw and support the conclusion. In the case of speculation, however, there is no underlying evidence to support the conclusion. With this distinction in mind, we turn to the evidence in Mr. Carrera's case.

¶ 13 At trial, the City argued that Mr. Carrera's knowledge may be inferred from the fact that Mr. Carrera did not know Ms. Alvin. The City argued, “It's a reasonable inference and it's a reasonable conclusion that if someone does not know someone, they're not entitled to have anything of the person's ever.” And the City contends that on the basis of this evidence, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Mr. Carrera knew that he did not have permission from Ms. Alvin to possess the card. But as we have indicated, Mr. Carrera's lack of permission does not equate to knowledge on his part that he was not entitled to possess the card. Indeed, Officer Dew also possessed the card without permission from Ms. Alvin, yet he is not subject to prosecution. In short, something more—such as evidence suggesting a nefarious intent—is required under the statute. We turn now to the remaining evidence to look for such a suggestion.

¶ 14 Nothing about the location of the card in Mr. Carrera's wallet provides an indication of a nefarious intent. It is only logical that any person coming into possession of a Social Security card would place it in his wallet for safe keeping regardless of his innocent or malicious intent. Since placing the card in a wallet does not show culpability any more than it shows innocence, it cannot be the basis for a reasonable inference that Mr. Carrera had a nefarious intent.

¶ 15 Mr. Carrera's behavior towards Officer Dew is likewise inconclusive. The jury may have inferred from Mr. Carrera's hostility and defensiveness that he was feeling guilty....