Salter v. St. Jean

Decision Date29 December 1964
Docket NumberNo. 64-517,64-517
Citation170 So.2d 94
PartiesAnn SALTER, Appellant, v. Harvey J. ST. JEAN, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Arthur D. Frishman, Miami Beach, for appellant.

Joseph Pardo, Miami, for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, C. J., and TILLMAN PEARSON and HENDRY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

By this appeal the appellant challenges a final decree which upheld a contingent fee contract between her and the appellee, an attorney, relative to the recovery of her separate property in prior litigation.

The appellant contends that this court's opinion in Sobieski v. Maresco, Fla.App.,App.1962, 143 So.2d 62, declared such agreements to be against public policy and void. In his decree, the chancellor distinguished the Sobieski case as follows:

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'* * * The instant case appears distinguishable from Sobieski * * * and the authorities cited therein, which appear to relate exclusively to awards for alimony or sums in lieu thereof. In the case at bar, the monies recovered for the plaintiff were those which constituted her separate property and it is clearly indicated in the provisions of the employment agreement, * * * that the plaintiff was desirous of seeking the return of her separate property regardless of the outcome of the divorce proceedings, * * *'.

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We approve the distinction made by the chancellor and specifically hold that contingent fee agreements in domestic relations litigation are against public policy and unenforceable as they relate to alimony or support or property settlement in lieu thereof, but that same are enforceable when they relate to the return of a wife's separate property. See: Article XI of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A. and Ch. 708, Fla.App.,Stat., F.S.A.

It is further noted from this record that even if the agreement had been void as against public policy, the attorney would be entitled to a fee based on quantum meruit, which services (from the pleadings and the evidence adduced before the chancellor) appear to have been worth at least what was awarded by the final decree. See: Estate of Sylvester v. Tesdell, 195 Iowa 1329, 192 N.W. 442, 30 A.L.R. 180; McCurdy v. Dillon, 135 Mich. 678, 98 N.W. 746; Ownby v. Prisock, (1962) 243 Misc. 203, 138 So.2d 279; 7 Am.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 229.

Therefore, for the reasons stated, the chancellor's action is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

TILLMAN PEARSON, Judge (concurring specially).

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12 cases
  • Singleton v. Foreman
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • 1 Diciembre 1970
    ...the divorce settlement. Contracts for a contingent fee in divorce cases are void and unenforceable under Florida law. Salter v. St. Jean, Fla.App. 1964, 170 So.2d 94; Sobieski v. Maresco, Fla.Ct.App.1962, 143 So.2d 62. Although Florida follows the general rule that courts will not aid eithe......
  • Meyers v. Handlon
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 20 Junio 1985
    ...marriage. See e.g. Olivier v. Doga (1979), La., 384 So.2d 330; Burns v. Stewart (1971), 290 Minn. 289, 188 N.W.2d 760; Salter v. St. Jean (1964), Fla.App., 170 So.2d 94. In Indiana it is firmly settled that a decree of divorce by a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the par......
  • Valparaiso Bank & Trust Co. v. Sims
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 29 Marzo 1977
    ...Moreover, contracts for contingent fees are prohibited in domestic litigation by public policy and by judicial canon. Salter v. St. Jean, 170 So.2d 94 (Fla.3d DCA 1964); Sobieski v. Maresco, 143 So.2d 62 (Fla.3d DCA 1962); Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 2, Disciplinary Rule 2--1......
  • McDearmon v. Gordon and Gremillion
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • 13 Octubre 1969
    ...word, 'alimony,' is also used to include a division of the property owned by the husband and wife.8 In 1965, the same court in Salter v. St. Jean, 170 So.2d 94, held that an employment agreement between attorney and client which related only to the recovery of her separate property was vali......
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