Salto v. Empire Transp. Servs.

Docket NumberD080075
Decision Date31 July 2023
PartiesCASSANDRA SALTO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. EMPIRE TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, INC. et al., Defendants and Respondents
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County Nos. RIC1706150, RIC1808500 L. Jackson Lucky, IV, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Offices of Jacob Emrani and John F. Gerard for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Horvitz &Levy, Eric S. Boorstin and John Barrow Sprangers; Booth and Hillary Arrow Booth for Defendants and Respondents.

O'ROURKE, J.

Plaintiff and appellant Cassandra Salto appeals from a judgment in favor of defendants and respondents Empire Transportation Inc. (Empire)[1]and Stephanie Caceres following a bench trial on Salto's negligence action arising from a multi-vehicle collision that occurred when a police officer engaged in an high-speed pursuit collided with a bus driven by Caceres while in Empire's employ. The police vehicle entered an intersection and struck the bus, which pushed the bus into Salto's stopped vehicle, causing Salto personal injuries. Before trial, on an unopposed motion, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Riverside (City) and the officer involved in the chase on grounds they were immune from liability under Vehicle Code sections 17004 and 17004.7, as well as Government Code section 815.2. The court later determined that its summary judgment ruling did not bar litigation of the police officer's comparative fault under collateral estoppel or res judicata. Following trial on the merits, the court found Caceres was not negligent per se based on an asserted violation of Vehicle Code section 21806. It found Caceres was negligent in that she did not look to her right before she entered the intersection, but that her negligence was not a substantial factor in causing Salto's injuries, and thus defendants were entitled to judgment in their favor. Alternatively, it found Caceres was only one percent at fault, and the officer was 99 percent at fault.

On appeal, Salto contends the court erred by failing to apply collateral estoppel or res judicata to bar evidence and argument of the police officer's negligence during the pursuit. She further contends the court misapplied the burden of proof on her claim that Caceres was negligent per se. Because the trial court relied on dash camera video evidence of the incident (trial exhibit Nos. 1 and 2) as support for some of its findings, Salto asks this court to review that evidence, arguing we "can determine for [ourselves]" Caceres's negligence and causation.

We hold Salto's causation arguments misperceive the applicable standard of review. As we explain below, the court weighed and drew inferences from the video and other evidence in reaching its conclusions about the absence of causation, so we must engage in sufficiency of the evidence review. Salto has not demonstrated the court's findings on causation are unsupported by substantial evidence or are otherwise legal error. Salto's additional arguments fail to demonstrate prejudice because of this deficiency and others. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND[2]

In June 2016, Salto was involved in a collision with a shuttle-type bus being driven by Caceres for Empire. At the time, Caceres was traveling in the rightmost southbound lane of traffic through an intersection on a green light, when then Riverside Police Department Officer Eric Hibbard (now retired), driving eastbound and engaged in a high-speed pursuit of a suspected shoplifter driving a stolen vehicle, went through the red light and cross-traffic in the intersection, hitting the bus. Hibbard's police car pushed the bus into Salto's vehicle, which hit another vehicle, during which Salto sustained injuries. Hibbard had lights and sirens activated on his vehicle during the pursuit. Caceres was familiar with the busy intersection where the accident occurred; she was aware vehicles ran through the red light so she would have to be extra careful crossing there.

Following the incident, two bus passengers sued Empire, City, and the Riverside Transit Agency (RTA) for personal injuries. Empire answered, as did City, which also filed a cross-complaint against Empire and RTA for equitable indemnity, contribution and a judicial declaration of its right to such relief. Empire and RTA filed their own equitable indemnity and contribution cross-complaint against City and Hibbard.

Salto also filed a personal injury action against City, Hibbard, and Caceres; she later named Empire as an additional defendant. The court consolidated Salto's and the passengers' actions.

In January 2019, City and Hibbard moved for summary judgment on the consolidated personal injury actions and on Empire/RTA's crosscomplaint. They argued that as a matter of law they were immune from liability and civil damages under Vehicle Code sections 17004 and 17004.7, as well as Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (b), because City had adopted, promulgated and trained on a pursuit policy meeting Vehicle Code section 17004.7 requirements, and Hibbard had acknowledged and complied with the training requirements. City and Hibbard argued this result was compelled by Ramirez v. City of Gardena (2018) 5 Cal.5th 995.

Neither Salto nor the bus passenger plaintiffs opposed the summary judgment motion.[3] Salto agreed to dismiss her complaint against City and Hibbard. Thereafter, the court granted the motion for summary judgment as to the consolidated complaints. It based its ruling on "uncontroverted evidence . . . that . . . Hibbard was driving a marked police car, with active lights and siren, chasing a suspect car when his car got in a collision with an RTA bus"; that Hibbard had attended Riverside Police Department annual pursuit policy training six months before the incident; and that the Riverside Police Department's adopted pursuit policy, which it incorporated into a policy manual, complied with statutory requirements.

The case proceeded to trial on Salto's personal injury complaint and negligence claims against Empire and Caceres. At trial, defendants' theory in part was that Hibbard solely caused the accident. They argued: "It is clear that he was negligent. He was going way too fast. He violated Riverside police policy. He violated . . . all rules and regulations applicable to speed, pursuit, and the regulations that bind . . . Hibbard as well as the Riverside Police Department." They argued Caceres was "alert and attentive" and conducted herself reasonably. According to defendants, Caceres did not see or hear the police vehicle just as no other cars saw or heard it.

Caceres testified that before she began to move forward into the intersection that day, she did not see any car running the red light, nor did she see the police vehicle or hear its siren before the impact. However, right as the impact occurred she reacted by trying to steer the bus out of the way. She acknowledged that she told an investigating police officer that she saw the stolen car pass in front of her at a high rate of speed, heard the sounds of an emergency siren, looked to her right and observed the police car about to hit her, but testified her memory was impacted by the accident. Caceres testified she intended to be truthful when speaking to the investigating officer. Salto and another person who had stopped at the intersection in their vehicles testified they heard a chasing helicopter and emergency sirens before the light turned green for them to proceed. Salto testified that as a result, she did not move forward into the intersection. Salto heard the noises coming from her left and saw the police car "right after the [stolen car] passed through the intersection." Salto's driver's side window was down at the time, as was the other driver's.[4] Salto agreed the entire incident-the suspect's speeding car passing her, the police car hitting the bus, and the bus being pushed into her car-happened in seconds.

Following the close of testimony, the court issued a statement of decision explaining the factual and legal bases for its decision. (Slavin v. Borinstein (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 713, 718 [statement of decision "provides the trial court's reasoning on disputed issues and is [the] touchstone to determine whether or not the trial court's decision is supported by the facts and the law"]; see also Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981 [statement of decision explains" 'the factual and legal basis for its decision as to each of the principal controverted issues at trial' "].)[5] The court rejected Salto's theory that Caceres was negligent per se for violating Vehicle Code section 21806,[6] stating that to prove that theory, Salto had to establish under City of Sacramento v. Hunger (1926) 79 Cal.App. 234 that Caceres saw the police vehicle's lights or heard the siren. The court found Salto failed to meet her burden; that "[n]othing impeached" Caceres's testimony denying seeing the police car's lights or hearing the siren. It stated: "Caceres testified the bus was loud and she was accelerating, so she didn't hear the siren until just before Hibbard drove into her bus." The court explained how the actions of drivers and others depicted in the bus dash camera video (trial ex. No. 2) corroborated Caceres's testimony.[7]

The court further found that while Caceres was negligent for failing to look to her right before entering the intersection, that failure on her part was not a substantial factor[8] in causing the collision. It explained in detail based on the position of Caceres's bus, the traffic patterns, and expert testimony concerning the timing of the accident, why there was "no persuasive...

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