Samaha v. Scott's Const., Inc.

• Decision Date: 22 February 2008
• Docket Number: No. 2:05-cv-315.,2:05-cv-315.
• Citation: 543 F.Supp.2d 341
• Parties: Stephen SAMAHA, as Administrator for the Estate of Rene Lavigne, Plaintiff, v. SCOTT'S CONSTRUCTION, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Vermont

543 F.Supp.2d 341

Stephen SAMAHA, as Administrator for the Estate of Rene Lavigne, Plaintiff, v. SCOTT'S CONSTRUCTION, INC., Defendant.

No. 2:05-cv-315.

United States District Court, D. Vermont.

February 22, 2008.

John F. Evers, O'Neill Kellner & Green, Burlington, VT, Francis G. Murphy, Hall, Stewart & Murphy, P.A., Manchester, NH, for Plaintiff.

Patricia S. Orr, Powell Orr & Bredice, PLC, Williston, VT, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

WILLIAM K. SESSIONS III, Chief Judge.

Stephen Samaha, the Administrator for the Estate of Rene Lavigne filed suit against Scott's Construction, Inc. ("SCI") on October 17, 2006. Samaha alleges that SCI is vicariously liable for the negligent training and supervision its employees provided Rene Lavigne on the day of his death. Before the Court are the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 33). For the reasons set forth below, the motions are GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

For the purposes of this motion, the Court accepts as true the allegations set forth in the Complaint. Rene Lavigne was fatally injured while working for Scott's Construction, Inc. ("SCI") on a construction project in Saxtons River, Vermont on October 20, 2004. The construction project involved placing concrete "wing walls" at both sides of a large culvert. The crew excavated large trenches and used trench boxes to facilitate the placement of the wing walls. The trench boxes consisted of two large side walls, each twenty-four feet long and eight feet wide, and cross braces, or spreaders, which connected the two sides of the box. Each spreader was ten feet long and weighed approximately 400 pounds. Lavigne's accident occurred when the construction crew attempted to remove some of the spreaders while retaining the side walls. The crew used two excavators to pull the spreaders away from the side wall. Lavigne was in the trench when a spreader suddenly came loose and struck him in the head. After several days in the hospital, Lavigne died. SCI's workers' compensation carrier paid over $75,000 in medical bills related to Lavigne's accident. (Answer to Am. Compl. ¶ 47.) In addition, Lavigne's father received $5,500 pursuant to 21 V.S.A. § 632 as partial reimbursement for funeral expenses. Lavigne's only son and heir Jamie Lavigne did not receive any compensation. He was not a dependent at the time of the accident and was therefore not entitled to any benefits under 21 V.S.A. § 632.

Stephen Samaha, the administrator of Rene Lavigne's estate, has filed suit for wrongful death against SCI. Samaha alleges that SCI is vicariously liable for its employees' negligent supervision and training of Rene Lavigne. SCI has filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). SCI argues that Samaha is barred from bringing suit because the Vermont Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act") prohibits injured employees and their next of kin from suing employers for negligence or wrongful death. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 622.

Samaha contends that the Act violates Article 7 of the Vermont Constitution as it is applied to the estates of workers who die without dependents. He has requested that the Court certify the question to the Vermont Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 14 of Vermont Appellate Procedure.

II. Certification to the Vermont Supreme Court

Samaha argues that the question of the constitutionality of the exclusivity provision is a question of state law which should be certified to the Vermont Supreme Court. Rule 14 of Vermont Appellate Procedure allows for the certification of questions from federal court to the Vermont Supreme Court. However, certification is only appropriate if there are no controlling precedents. Vt. R.App. P. 14. Since the rule's adoption, only four cases have been certified to the Vermont Supreme Court. See Preseault v. City of Burlington, 180 Vt. 597, 908 A.2d 419 (2006), Travelers Insurance Co. v. Carpenter, 313 F.3d 97 (2d Cir.2002), Egri v. U.S. Airways Inc., 174 Vt. 443, 804 A.2d 766 (2002), Mortgage Lenders Network, U.S.A. v. Sensenich, 177 Vt. 592, 873 A.2d 892, 896 (2004).

In the present case, the Court does not write on a blank slate. The Vermont Supreme Court has already laid out the standard of review for analyzing Article 7 questions. Baker v. State of Vermont, 170 Vt. 194, 744 A.2d 864, 878-79 (1999). Baker provides this Court a clear framework from which to analyze the exclusive remedy provision under Article 7. In addition, although the Vermont Supreme Court has not addressed this particular aspect of the exclusive remedy provision, it has ruled on the constitutionality of the provision in other contexts. See Sienkiewycz v. Dressell, 151 Vt. 421, 561 A.2d 415 (1989); Lorrain v. Ryan, 160 Vt. 202, 628 A.2d 543 (1993). These cases along with the Baker analysis provide the Court with the clear and controlling precedents necessary to decide this question. Therefore, certification to the Vermont Supreme Court is unnecessary.

III. Motion to Dismiss Standard

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. He v. Chertoff, No. 2:07-cv-14, 2007 WL 2572359, **2-3, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65236, at *5-7 (D.Vt. 2007); see Cleveland v. Caplaw Enters., 448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir.2006); Nechis v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 421 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir.2005). The appropriate inquiry is "not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 375 F.3d 168, 177 (2d Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) allows a party to move for judgment on the pleadings if the facts contained in the pleadings do not state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. In assessing a Rule 12(c) motion, a court should apply the same standard it would apply to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Burnette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52, 56, (2d Cir.1999).

IV. Discussion

Samaha argues that the exclusive remedy provision contained in the Act violates Article 7 of the Vermont Constitution. In particular, Samaha argues that if a worker dies without dependents, the Act denies his or her estate a benefit that is provided to the estates of workers' with dependents. Under the Act, dependents are entitled to receive survivor benefits, but non-dependent next of kin receive nothing. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 634. In addition, the Act states that workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for employees and their families. Id. § 622. It bars employees, their next of kin and their personal representatives from suing for injury or wrongful death. Id. Samaha asserts that this bar is unconstitutional as applied to this case.

A. Standard of Review Under Article 7

1. Article 7 and the Fourteenth Amendment

Article 7 of the Vermont Constitution states:

The government is or ought to be instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or community, and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single person, family or set of persons, who are a part only of that community; and that the community hath an indubitable, unalienable and indefeasible right, to reform or alter government, in such manner as shall be, by that community judged most conducive to the public weal.

Vt. Const, ch. I, art. 7.

The general purpose of Article 7 is to ensure that all members of the Vermont community receive equal access to the benefits and protections the law provides. Baker v. State of Vermont, 170 Vt. 194, 744 A.2d 864, 876 (1999). The Common Benefits Clause differs from the Equal Protection Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution in a number of significant ways. Id. at 870. "The concept of equality at the core of the Common Benefits Clause was not the eradication of racial or class distinctions, but rather the elimination of artificial governmental preferments and advantages." Id. at 877. Article 7 contains three separate clauses of which the second containing the prohibition against special emoluments is the most important. Baker, 744 A.2d at 892 (Dooley, J. concurring). In his concurrence, Justice Dooley noted that a classification designed to promote the general welfare and reasonably related to the public interest is not an exclusive emolument. Baker, 744 A.2d at 892 (Dooley, J., concurring) (citing Town of Emerald Isle v. State, 320 N.C. 640, 360 S.E.2d 756, 764 (1987)).

The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted by a Reconstruction-era Congress concerned with discrimination against disfavored individuals and groups. Baker, 744 A.2d at 891 (Dooley, J., concurring). The general purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is to protect against racial or other class-based discrimination. The federal courts have developed an approach to analyzing equal protection questions that involves different levels of scrutiny depending on the nature of the right and the classification. Rational basis review is the lowest level of scrutiny. Under rational basis review, the courts will uphold statutory classifications if they are "rationally related to a legitimate state interest." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). In cases where a state has drawn a classification based on race, alienage or national origin the courts will apply strict scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny, classifications will only be upheld if they are "suitably tailored to a compelling state interest." Id. at 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249. Strict scrutiny is also used in cases where a constitutionally protected right is at stake regardless of the nature of the...