Samara v. Matar

• Decision Date: 25 June 2018
• Docket Number: S240918
• Citation: 419 P.3d 924,5 Cal.5th 322,234 Cal.Rptr.3d 446
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: Rana SAMARA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Haitham MATAR, Defendant and Respondent.

5 Cal.5th 322

419 P.3d 924

234 Cal.Rptr.3d 446

Rana SAMARA, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.Haitham MATAR, Defendant and Respondent.

S240918

Supreme Court of California.

Filed June 25, 2018

Curd, Galindo & Smith, Alexis Galindo, Long Beach, and Tracy Labrusciano for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Ford, Walker, Haggerty & Behar, Katherine M. Harwood, Long Beach; Tardiff Law Offices and Neil S. Tardiff for Defendant and Respondent.

McGarrigle Kenney & Zampiello, Patrick C. McGarrigle, Los Angeles, and Michael J. Kenney for Kenneth Barton as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Law Offices of Mary A. Lehman and Mary A. Lehman, Coronado, for Stephen H. Bennett, Richard T. Letwak and Letwak & Bennett as Amici Curiae.

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

When a trial court judgment rests on more than one ground, it may be impossible for a losing party to obtain appellate review of all of the court’s determinations. In a breach of contract action, for example, a trial court might grant a defense motion for summary judgment because no contract was formed, and because in any event there was no breach. On direct review, an appellate court could affirm if either of those conclusions was correct, without resolving or even considering the other one. Thus, a plaintiff who argues on appeal that there was a contract (and that the contract was breached) might lose based on a lack of breach without appellate review of whether a contract existed in the first place.

This case concerns the claim- and issue-preclusive significance, in future litigation, of a conclusion relied on by the trial court and challenged on appeal, but not addressed by the appellate court. We hold that the preclusive effect of the judgment should be evaluated as though the trial court had not relied on the unreviewed ground. Our contrary decision in People v. Skidmore (1865) 27 Cal. 287 ( Skidmore ) is overruled.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Claim and Issue Preclusion

The law of preclusion helps to ensure that a dispute resolved in one case is not relitigated in a later case. Although the doctrine has ancient roots (see Note, Developments in the Law: Res Judicata (1952) 65 Harv. L.Rev. 818, 820-822 ), its contours and associated terminology have evolved over time. We now refer to "claim preclusion" rather than "res judicata" ( Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896-897, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 51 P.3d 297 ( Mycogen ) ), and use "issue preclusion" in place of "direct or collateral estoppel" ( Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. (1984) 465 U.S. 75, 77, fn. 1, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 ; see Vandenberg v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815, 824, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 366, 982 P.2d 229 ( Vandenberg ) ).¹

Claim and issue preclusion have different requirements and effects. Claim preclusion prevents relitigation of entire causes of action. ( Mycogen , supra ‚ 28 Cal.4th at p. 896, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 51 P.3d 297 ; see also id. , at p. 904, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 51 P.3d 297 [discussing "primary right theory," which defines the scope of a cause of action].) Claim preclusion applies only when "a second suit involves (1) the same cause of action (2) between the same parties [or their privies] (3) after a final judgment on the merits in the first suit." ( DKN Holdings , supra , 61 Cal.4th at p. 824, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 809, 352 P.3d 378.) Issue preclusion, by contrast, prevents "relitigation of previously decided issues," rather than causes of action as a whole. ( Ibid. ) It applies only "(1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party." ( Id. , at p. 825, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 809, 352 P.3d 378.) Courts have understood the " ‘necessarily decided’ " prong to "require[ ] only that the issue not have been ‘entirely unnecessary’ to the judgment in the initial proceeding" ( Lucido , supra , 51 Cal.3d at p. 342, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767, 795 P.2d 1223 )—leaving room for a decision based on two grounds to be preclusive as to both.

B. Facts and Procedural History

Plaintiff Rana Samara was missing a tooth. Dr. Haitham Matar recommended that she receive a dental implant

, and Dr. Stephen Nahigian performed the implantation surgery. Samara later sued them both for professional negligence. Our focus is Samara’s contention that defendant Matar is vicariously liable for former defendant Nahigian’s alleged tort.

1. First judgment, in favor of Nahigian

Nahigian moved for summary judgment. He argued, in pertinent part, that the suit against him was untimely and that he did not cause Samara’s alleged injuries. The trial court agreed that the suit was untimely with respect to Nahigian (unlike Matar) and further agreed that no material factual dispute prevented judgment in Nahigian’s favor on the issue of causation. The court entered judgment on both grounds.

Samara appealed. She conceded that the judgment against her could be affirmed based on the statute of limitations. Concerned about the potential preclusive effect of the trial court’s determination regarding a lack of causation, however, she urged the Court of Appeal to reverse that portion of the trial court’s decision. The Court of Appeal declined to do so in an unpublished opinion, stating, "We need not, and do not, reach the court’s alternative ground for granting summary judgment." It added, "Because the question is not before us, we also do not address whether collateral estoppel may be used with regard to an alternative ground for judgment not reviewed by the appellate court."

2. Second judgment, in favor of Matar

Around the time Samara noticed an appeal from the first judgment, Matar moved for summary judgment in the trial court. As relevant here, Matar argued that the court’s earlier no-causation determination precluded holding him liable for Nahigian’s conduct. After the remittitur issued in the first appeal, the trial court agreed, granting Matar’s motion for summary judgment. Although the particulars of the trial court’s reasoning are not entirely clear, the core of its rationale was that because Nahigian was not liable to Samara for his conduct, Matar could not be liable for that conduct vicariously.

The Court of Appeal, in an opinion issued by the same panel that decided the first appeal, reversed and remanded the matter. It concluded that preclusion provided no basis for the trial court’s decision. The court’s analysis of claim preclusion focused on whether there had been "a final judgment on the merits in the first suit." ( DKN Holdings , supra , 61 Cal.4th at p. 824, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 809, 352 P.3d 378.) The court observed that the prior judgment was affirmed solely because of the statute of limitations, which the court believed to be a "purely procedural ground" rather than a decision on the merits. Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that under our decision in Skidmore , supra , 27 Cal. 287, a judgment on the merits affirmed on purely procedural grounds might qualify as a judgment on the merits in the relevant sense. Noting that "the Supreme Court [of California] might want to address" the continuing vitality of the "Civil War-era" Skidmore decision, the Court of Appeal instead ruled that claim preclusion was unavailable because Samara sued Nahigian and Matar in a single lawsuit, rather than two successive suits. The court further held that Skidmore was inapplicable to issue preclusion, concluding that "an affirmance on an alternative ground operates as collateral estoppel/issue preclusion only on the ground reached by the appellate court."

We granted Matar’s petition for review. He contends that the Court of Appeal’s claim- and issue-preclusion analysis is inconsistent with Skidmore and asks us to "address the viability of" that 1865 decision. Because we conclude that Skidmore must be overruled, we agree with the Court of Appeal that Matar is not entitled to summary judgment on preclusion grounds.

II. Skidmore ’S VIABILITY

A. The Skidmore Decision

To contextualize Skidmore ’s analysis of the preclusive effect of a particular judgment, we begin by describing the litigation resulting in that judgment.

Walter Skidmore was charged with murder. ( Skidmore , supra , 27 Cal. at p. 289.) To secure his appearance to answer the charge, Skidmore and his sureties entered into a recognizance, something roughly akin to a bail bond. (See ibid. ) Skidmore also created a trust for his sureties’ financial protection, pledging property toward the payment and extinguishment of the recognizance should he fail to appear. ( People v. Skidmore (1861) 17 Cal. 260, 261 ; unless otherwise noted, all short-form Skidmore citations concern the 1865 appellate decision.) After he failed to appear, the People sued. ( Ibid. ) The suit sought equitable relief against the trustee, urging that the property held in trust "be applied to the debt due by the recognizance." ( Ibid. ; see also Skidmore , supra , 27 Cal. at p. 289.) The trial court entered judgment against the People, and the People appealed.

We affirmed. ( People v. Skidmore , supra , 17 Cal. at p. 262 [initial appeal].) Our opinion addressed a demurrer based on "a misjoinder of causes of action, among other [objections]." ( Id. , at p. 261.) Declining to reach those other objections, we agreed that there had been a misjoinder: "It may be that the sureties will not be held liable at all; or it may be, if they are, that they are ready and willing to pay whenever their liability is declared; and in that case, there would be no necessity of coming upon this fund. If, after judgment, the defendants are insolvent, another question might arise, or the question might arise of a right to sell or subject this property as the property of Skidmore. But it is not necessary to pass upon this matter in advance of the proper stage of the inquiry." ( Id. , at p. 262.) "The effect of the judgment and of this affirmance," we added, "will not be to preclude the plaintiff...