Samaripas v. State

• Decision Date: 30 April 2015
• Docket Number: NUMBER 13-11-00442-CR
• Parties: DAVID SAMARIPAS JR., Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

DAVID SAMARIPAS JR., Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

NUMBER 13-11-00442-CR

COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

April 30, 2015

On appeal from the 272nd District Court of Brazos County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON REMAND¹

Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides, and Perkes

Memorandum Opinion on Remand by Justice Perkes

This case is on remand from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. On original submission, we affirmed appellant David Samaripas Jr.'s conviction for engaging inorganized criminal activity. Samaripas v. State, 446 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2013), rev'd, No. PD-135-13, 2014 WL 5247434, *5 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 15, 2014). On appeal, appellant asserted four separate issues: (1) the evidence is insufficient; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by limiting appellant's voir dire examination of a prospective juror²; (3) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the law of parties; and (4) appellant's sentence was improperly enhanced. After we affirmed the trial court's judgment, appellant sought discretionary review.

The Court of Criminal Appeals limited its consideration to appellant's voir dire and enhancement issues. The Court agreed with our disposition of appellant's enhancement issue, holding that appellant's sentence was properly enhanced. The Court, however, reversed on appellant's voir dire issue, holding that appellant preserved error for review, and remanded the issue to this Court for consideration of the merits of that issue. Samaripas, 2014 WL 5247434, at *5.

I. JURY VOIR DIRE³

By this remaining issue, appellant argues that "the trial court abused its discretion by improperly limiting [appellant's] voir dire examination of a prospective juror." Appellant contends that the trial court disallowed a proper question, and by refusing to allow counsel to ask the question, his counsel was denied the opportunity to formulate a challenge for cause and to intelligently use peremptory challenges.

During voir dire, appellant's counsel advanced the following question: "What type of evidence would you expect to hear? What type of evidence do you expect the State of Texas to bring you, Ms. O'Neal, in an effort to prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt that someone committed an offense?" The State objected on the ground that the question was an improper commitment question, and the trial court sustained the objection. Defense counsel continued with voir dire as follows:

DEFENSE: [Directed to venireperson] In that class three years ago, you probably learned there's no definition provided by the court to "beyond a reasonable doubt"; is that right?

VENIREPERSON: Right. We had a long discussion about it.

DEFENSE: And did that make sense to you?

VENIREPERSON: It can be fuzzy.

DEFENSE: It can be fuzzy. In order to convince somebody beyond a reasonable doubt—I'll come back to you, [venireperson]. What type of evidence would you expect the State of Texas to bring to you in order to convince you that somebody committed an offense beyond a reasonable doubt?

The State objected, and the trial court called the parties to the bench.

COURT: I think he is entitled to say what is your understanding of reasonable doubt, as long as he doesn't give them a definition they have to adhere to.

STATE: But if he's saying what [evidence] do you need for you to get to guilty?

The trial court sustained the State's objection. Appellant's counsel rephrased.

DEFENSE: What type of evidence would you expect to hear? What type of evidence do you expect the State of Texas to bring you, [venireperson], in an effort to proveto you beyond a reasonable doubt that someone committed an offense?

Again, the State objected, and the trial court called the parties to the bench.

STATE: Same question: "What do you expect?"

COURT: You're going to bind them to a certain level of evidence.

DEFENSE: Just asking them what do they expect the State of Texas to bring them evidence wise.

COURT: I don't have a problem with that question. Ask it that way. Sustained.

STATE: But to prove somebody guilty at that point in time, that's why.

COURT: I can't let them get committed to a certain proof in order to find somebody.

DEFENSE: I'm understanding that.

COURT: I sustain the objection.

[End of bench conference.]

DEFENSE: In a criminal case, [venireperson], what type of evidence would you expect to hear period?

VENIREPERSON: Factual.

DEFENSE: Factual evidence. What type of factual evidence, [venireperson]?

VENIREPERSON: Good. Well, maybe some eyewitnesses.

DEFENSE: Eyewitnesses. Okay, what else? Now, we're talking about engaging in organized criminal activity deadly conduct charge. What are you expecting?

VENIREPERSON: Physical evidence.

DEFENSE: Physical evidence. Number 23, what type of evidence would you expect?

VENIREPERSON: Gun.

DEFENSE: A gun. Okay.

VENIREPERSON: If that was the case.

DEFENSE: What else? What other type of evidence could we have, factual physical evidence? A gun. What else might you expect?

VENIREPERSON: Eyewitness.

VENIREPERSON: Expert testimony.

DEFENSE: Expert testimony. On what?

STATE: Judge, I'm sorry. We're going back to the same thing. Essentially saying here's what we need to prove to get to beyond a reasonable doubt.

DEFENSE: That's not my question, Judge.

COURT: Come up here again.

[Bench conference]

STATE: I keep objecting because he's trying the same exact [sic]. He's saying what kind of evidence, factual evidence—

COURT: Make clear to them in your question that your question is predicated that they're many different kinds of evidence some of it which you can hear, some of which you cannot hear. In other words, what you're doing now, again, is binding them to hear certain evidence before they can say guilty.

DEFENSE: I respectfully disagree, your Honor. I'm just asking them their expectations for trial.

COURT: Well, phrase it clearly that these may or may not be necessary to find reasonable doubt, please.

DEFENSE: Yes, sir.

COURT: Then you can ask it.

[End of bench conference.]

DEFENSE: Understanding that these items of evidence that we're talking about here may or may not create reasonable doubt, may or may not convince you beyond a reasonable doubt—okay, we talked about physical evidence; we talked about guns; we talked about—we were at expert testimony. Who said that?

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

A trial court has broad discretion over the voir dire process, including setting reasonable limits and determining the propriety of a particular question. Barajas v. State, 93 S.W.3d 36, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc). "A trial court's discretion is abused only when a proper question about a proper area of inquiry is prohibited. A question is proper if it seeks to discover a juror's views on an issue applicable to the case." Id. (citations omitted).

Commitment questions that "bind or commit a prospective juror to a verdict based on a hypothetical set of facts" exceed the proper area of inquiry, and a trial court does not abuse its discretion in disallowing the questions. See Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (quoting Allridge v. State, 850 S.W.2d 471, 480 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc)). "Commitment questions are those that commit a prospective juror to resolve, or refrain from resolving, an issue a certain way after learning a particular fact." Id. "Although commitment questions are generally phrased to elicit a 'yes' or 'no' answer, an open-ended question can be a commitment question if the question asks the prospective juror to set the hypothetical parameters for his decision-making." Id. at 180 (citing Allridge, 850 S.W.2d at 480).

But, not all commitment questions are improper. "[F]or a commitment question to be proper, one of the possible answers to that question must give rise to a valid challenge for cause."⁴ Id. at 182. For instance, "[w]hen the law requires a certain type of commitment from jurors, the attorneys may ask the prospective jurors whether they can follow the law in that regard." Id. at 181. "Even if a question meets this challenge for cause requirement, however, the question may nevertheless be improper if [the question] includes facts in addition to those necessary to establish a challenge for cause." Standefer, 59 S.W.3d at 182 (emphasis in original).

The inquiry for improper commitment questions has two steps: (1) is the question a commitment question; and (2) does the question include facts—and only those facts—that lead to a valid challenge for cause? If the answer to (1) is "yes" and the answer to (2) is "no," then the question is an improper commitment question, and the trial court should not allow the question. Id. at 182-83.

Upon holding a trial court erred in disallowing a proper question, we must evaluate for harm. "There may be instances when a judge's limitation on voir dire is so substantial as to warrant labeling the error as constitutional error subject to a Rule 44.2(a) [of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure] harm analysis." Easley v. State, 424 S.W.3d 535, 541 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). But when an attorney is not "foreclosed from explaining the concept of beyond a reasonable doubt and exploring the venire members' understanding and beliefs of reasonable doubt by other methods" or questions, the error is notconstitutional, and we review for harm under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b). Easley, 424 S.W.3d at 541. Under that standard, we disregard any "error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights . . . ." TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Easley, 424 S.W.3d at 541-42. "A substantial right is affected when the error has a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Rich v. State, 160 S.W.3d 575, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (quotation omitted). In assessing harm, we review:

everything in the record, including any testimony or physical evidence admitted for the jury's consideration, the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict, the character of the

...