Sams Food Mart, LLC v. Town of Middletown
| Decision Date | 30 October 2018 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. NC-2017-0443 |
| Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
| Parties | SAMS FOOD MART, LLC, ABDUL KAHN, SAUDABBAD CONVENIENCE, INC., MOHAMMAD SIDDIQUI, Plaintiffs, v. TOWN OF MIDDLETOWN, Defendant, and THE STOP & SHOP SUPERMARKET COMPANY, LLC, MAXI DRUG SOUTH, L.P., COLBEA ENTERPRISES, LLC, CUMBERLAND FARMS, INC., AQUIDNECK PACKAGE STORE, INC., SHAWS SUPERMARKET, INC., BJS WHOLESALE CLUB, INC., NEWPORT NATIONAL GOLF CLUB, INC., MICHAEL SANTOS d/b/a SANDY'S LIQUORS, SKEES REALTY, LTD., BEACH LIQUORS, LLC, SPEEDWAY, LLC, 7-ELEVEN, INC., WALGREEN EASTERN CO., INC., ANDREW'S AT EASTGATE, LTD., SPLASH ECIG AND VAPOR EMPORIUM, LLC, Interested Parties. |
DECISION
Before this Court is a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief with respect to the Town of Middletown's (Middletown) Tobacco Ordinance. Plaintiffs seek a declaration from the Court that the Tobacco Ordinance is unconstitutional, exceeding the constitutional authority of the municipality. Jurisdiction is pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA), G.L. 1956 §§ 9-30-1, et seq.
On December 4, 2017, the Middletown Town Council adopted an ordinance regulating the sale of tobacco (Tobacco Ordinance). Middletown Code of Ordinances § 119; Am. Compl. ¶ 26. The Tobacco Ordinance requires anyone selling tobacco products in Middletown to obtain a "tobacco dealer's license from the Town Council," and pay an annual fee of $100. Middletown Code of Ordinances § 119.02. Additionally, the Tobacco Ordinance prohibits the use of coupons or volume discounts with the sale of tobacco as well as the sale of any flavored tobacco products. Middletown Code of Ordinances §§ 119.05(D), (E).
The Plaintiffs are owners and operators of retail stores in Middletown which sell tobacco products. Plaintiffs Mohammad Siddiqui and Saudabbad Convenience, Inc. operate a store known as Newport Mart located at 52 East Main Road in the Town of Middletown. Am. Compl. ¶ 1. Plaintiffs Abdul Khan and Sams Food Mart, LLC operate a store known as Sam's Food Mart located at 356 West Main Road in the Town of Middletown. Am. Compl. ¶ 2. The Plaintiffs have separate licenses to sell tobacco products from the State Division of Taxation under G.L. 1956 §§ 44-20-1, et seq. and/or from the Department of Health pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 23-1-56. Am. Compl. ¶ 31.
The Middletown Town Council initially enacted a similar ordinance on June 19, 2017, but the Plaintiffs asserted a violation of the Open Meetings Act, G.L. 1956 §§ 42-46-1, et seq. as part of their initial Complaint on October 26, 2017. See Middletown Code of Ordinances § 118; Compl. ¶¶ 33-39. Pursuant to a consent order entered on December 4, 2017, enforcement of Chapter 118 was stayed. The new Tobacco Ordinance Chapter 119 was enacted on December 4, 2017. See Am. Compl. ¶ 26. In their Amended Complaint filed on December 5, 2017, the Plaintiffs request declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging the Tobacco Ordinance isunconstitutional under the Rhode Island Constitution and is therefore null and void. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37-40. Pursuant to a consent order entered on February 6, 2018, Middletown agreed to be temporarily enjoined from enforcing the Tobacco Ordinance until further order of this Court.
Under the UDJA, the Superior Court possesses the '"power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed."' Sec. 9-30-1; see also P.J.C. Realty, Inc. v. Barry, 811 A.2d 1202, 1207 (R.I. 2002) (quoting § 9-30-1). The Court's power under UDJA is broadly construed, and allows the trial justice to "facilitate the termination of controversies[.]" Malachowski v. State, 877 A.2d 649, 656 (R.I. 2005). Therefore, the plaintiff must present the Court with an actual controversy when seeking declaratory relief. Millett v. Hoisting Eng'rs' Licensing Div. of Dep't of Labor, 119 R.I. 285, 291, 377 A.2d 229, 233 (1977). Further, it is well-established that a trial court's "decision to grant or to deny declaratory relief under the [UDJA] is purely discretionary." Sullivan v. Chafee, 703 A.2d 748, 751 (R.I. 1997).
"[I]n deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the hearing justice should determine whether the moving party (1) has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, (2) will suffer irreparable harm without the requested injunctive relief, (3) has the balance of the equities, including the possible hardships to each party and to the public interest, tip in its favor, and (4) has shown that the issuance of a preliminary injunction will preserve the status quo." Iggy's Doughboys, Inc. v. Giroux, 729 A.2d 701, 705 (R.I. 1999). When deciding upon the constitutional validity of a municipal enactment, it is true that "[a] plaintiff is generally entitled to injunctive relief when a municipality seeks to enforce an invalid ordinance." Women & Infants Hosp. v. City of Providence, 527 A.2d 651, 654 (R.I. 1987). Ultimately, "[t]he issuanceand measure of injunctive relief rests in the sound discretion of the trial justice." Cullen v. Tarini, 15 A.3d 968, 981 (R.I. 2011).
Middletown contends the Tobacco Ordinance is a valid exercise of a municipality's authority under the Home Rule Amendment to the Rhode Island Constitution. R.I. CONST. art. XIII, § 2. "Traditionally, cities and towns were held to be creatures of the Legislature having no inherent right to self-government but deriving all of their authority and power from the Legislature." Lynch v. King, 120 R.I. 868, 876, 391 A.2d 117, 122 (1978) (citing City of Providence v. Moulton, 52 R.I. 236, 246, 160 A. 75, 79 (1932)). Under the Home Rule Amendment, cities and towns have the . . . "power at any time to adopt a charter, amend its charter, enact and amend local laws relating to its property, affairs and government not inconsistent with this Constitution and laws enacted by the general assembly in conformity with the powers reserved to the general assembly." R.I. CONST. art. XIII, § 2. This legislative authority for cities and towns is still limited to addressing something of '"purely local concern."' Westerly Residents for Thoughtful Dev., Inc. v. Brancato, 565 A.2d 1262, 1264 (R.I. 1989) (quoting DePetrillo v. Coffey, 118 R.I. 519, 523, 376 A.2d 317, 319 (1977)). The limits of a municipality's authority under its Home Rule Charter can be easily defined as whatever constitutes a purely local concern, but discerning between state and local concerns requires first looking to what the state has exclusive domain over under its police power.
There are certain subject areas where any legislative action categorically falls under the state's police power, barring any further legislation by a municipality in that same area without some express delegation to do so. See Bruckshaw v. Paolino, 557 A.2d 1221, 1223 (R.I. 1989). ("This court has held that the state maintains sovereignty over the regulation of police affairs, the conduct of business, licensing, education, and elections."). The Tobacco Ordinance's licensing provision clearly conflicts with what is an exclusive power of the General Assembly over a statewide concern. See Newport Amusement Co. v. Maher, 92 R.I. 51, 56, 166 A.2d 216, 218 (1960) ( ) (Emphasis added.) The Rhode Island Supreme Court's language in Newport Amusement Co. leaves this Court with no option other than to find the Tobacco Ordinance's licensing provision invalid. See D'Arezzo v. D'Arezzo, 107 R.I. 422, 426-27, 267 A.2d 683, 685 (1970) ().
While the licensing provision of the Tobacco Ordinance is clearly in excess of Middletown's authority as a municipality under the Home Rule Amendment, Middletown, relying on Landrigan v. McElroy, contends that the Tobacco Ordinance would still be constitutionally valid as a whole because the licensing requirement is severable. 457 A.2d 1056, 1061 (R.I. 1983) . However, Middletown's reliance on Landrigan is misplaced. The problems with the Tobacco Ordinance do not end with thelicensing requirement because the other provisions still interfere with the General Assembly's exclusive authority to regulate business.
With respect to the state's sovereignty over regulating "the conduct of business," there is no bright line for where a municipal regulation—addressing a local concern such as health or safety—becomes an unconstitutional infringement upon the state's exclusive authority over the conduct of business. Bruckshaw, 557 A.2d at 1223. Elaborating upon the state's authority over such conduct of business, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has previously stated:
"[T]he general assembly, as representing the sovereign power of the state, has the right to impose reasonable conditions upon the right to carry on business, or to follow any given trade, profession, or calling, is beyond question; . . . If the imposition of such a condition has for its primary object the regulation of the business, trade, or calling to which it applies, its exercise is properly referable to the police power; but, if the main object is the obtaining of revenue, it is properly referable to the taxing power." State v. Foster, 22 R.I. 163, 46 A. 833, 835-36 (1900).
By prohibiting the use of coupons and volume discounts, as well as prohibiting the sale of flavored tobacco, the Tobacco Ordinance would have a clear effect on the Plaintiffs and...
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