Malachowski v. State

• Decision Date: 08 July 2005
• Docket Number: No. 2003-268-M.P., No. 2003-339-APPEAL.
• Citation: 877 A.2d 649
• Parties: James J. MALACHOWSKI v. STATE of Rhode Island et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

877 A.2d 649

James J. MALACHOWSKI v. STATE of Rhode Island et al.

Nos. 2003-268-M.P., 2003-339-APPEAL.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 8, 2005.

Martin K. DeMagistris, Esq., Warwick, for Plaintiff.

Douglas J. Emanuel, Esq., Providence, for Defendant.

Before: WILLIAMS, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION

GOLDBERG, Justice.

This case came before the Supreme Court on March 8, 2005. The plaintiff, James J. Malachowski (Malachowski or plaintiff), pursuant to an appeal and a petition for certiorari, seeks our review of a Superior Court judgment that dismissed his complaint and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants: the State of Rhode Island; the Personnel Appeal Board; the Unclassified Pay Plan Board; the Department of Administration; Lincoln C. Almond, in his capacity as the governor of the State of Rhode Island (Governor Almond); Anthony Bucci, in his capacity as personnel administrator; and Robert Carl, in his capacity as the chairman of the Unclassified Pay Plan Board (collectively defendants).¹ For the reasons set forth herein, we deny the petition for certiorari and sustain the appeal from the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment against the plaintiff in his declaratory judgment action.

Facts and Travel

When the Legislature enacted the Utility Restructuring Act of 1996(act), G.L.1956 chapter 1 of title 39, as enacted by P.L. 1996, ch. 316, § 1, plaintiff was serving a six-year term as the chairperson of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC). The act created the position of public utilities administrator (administrator) and granted the administrator authority to direct the Division of Public Utilities and Carriers. Section 39-1-3. The act did not abolish plaintiff's position as chairperson of the PUC (chairperson or PUC chairperson), a position in the unclassified service. The plaintiff remained the chairperson; however, the act reassigned a portion of plaintiff's duties to the administrator.

Governor Almond, as plaintiff's appointing authority, submitted a request to the Unclassified Pay Plan Board (Pay Plan Board),² proposing that the pay grade for the chairperson be reduced based upon the allocation of some of the chairperson's responsibilities to the administrator. The plaintiff appeared before the Pay Plan Board and filed a memorandum, in which he argued, unsuccessfully, against any reduction in his salary. On February 24, 1997, the Pay Plan Board approved Governor Almond's request and slashed the chairperson's salary by at least two pay grades.³ On March 19, 1997, plaintiff received a letter (letter) signed by Governor Almond and the chairperson of the Pay Plan Board notifying him of the Pay Plan Board's action. The plaintiff sought relief from the administrator of adjudication for the Department of Administration,⁴ the Personnel Appeal Board, and ultimately, the Superior Court.

On March 27, 1997, plaintiff filed an appeal with the Personnel Appeal Board, seeking review of the Pay Plan Board's decision to reduce his pay grade. Although in answer to a jurisdictional questionnaire for the Personnel Appeal Board, plaintiff specified that his grounds for appeal included political discrimination,⁵ the Personnel Appeal Board dismissed plaintiff's appeal for lack of jurisdiction on October 7, 1998.

On October 30, 1998, plaintiff turned to the Superior Court; in a two-count complaint Malachowski sought review of the Personnel Appeal Board's final decision pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), G.L.1956 § 42-35-15, and also included a claim for declaratory relief. In the declaratory judgment count, plaintiff sought a declaration of his rights under G.L.1956 §§ 36-4-16.3⁶ and 36-4-16.4, as amended by P.L.1990, ch.332, art. 1, § 13.⁷ The parties cross-motioned for summary judgment. The trial justice concluded that plaintiff was challenging a final decision of the Pay Plan Board, an administrative agency governed by the APA, and therefore, the Superior Court could only review the claims if plaintiff complied with the provisions of the APA. The trial justice granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that, by failing to file his complaint within thirty days after receiving notice of the salary reduction, plaintiff's appeal to the Superior Court was untimely pursuant to § 42-35-15. The trial justice also dismissed plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief, concluding that the APA "is the single and exclusive method of obtaining judicial review of agency decisions."

In addition to appealing the grant of summary judgment in the declaratory judgment action, plaintiff sought review in this Court by petition for certiorari challenging the trial justice's dismissal of his administrative appeal from the decision of the Personnel Appeal Board. On April 30, 2003, the Superior Court entered final judgment in favor of defendants. We granted certiorari and consolidated all proceedings before this Court.⁸

Standard of Review

"On certiorari, our review of the record `is limited to examining the record to determine if an error of law has been committed.'" McCarthy v. Environmental Transportation Services, Inc., 865 A.2d 1056, 1059 (R.I.2005) (quoting Matter of Falstaff Brewing Corp. Re: Narragansett Brewery Fire, 637 A.2d 1047, 1049 (R.I. 1994)). "We do not weigh the evidence on certiorari, but only conduct our review to examine questions of law raised in the petition." Jeff Anthony Properties v. Zoning Board of Review of North Providence, 853 A.2d 1226, 1229 (R.I.2004).

With respect to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we undertake a de novo review. United Lending Corp. v. City of Providence, 827 A.2d 626, 631 (R.I.2003). In conducting that review, we are bound by the same criteria as those employed by the trial justice. M & B Realty, Inc. v. Duval, 767 A.2d 60, 63 (R.I.2001). "Only when a review of the admissible evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party reveals no genuine issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, will this Court uphold the trial justice's grant of summary judgment." United Lending Corp., 827 A.2d at 631 (quoting Carlson v. Town of Smithfield, 723 A.2d 1129, 1131 (R.I.1999)). "[A] party who opposes a motion for summary judgment carries the burden of proving by competent evidence the existence of a disputed material issue of fact and cannot rest on allegations or denials in the pleadings or on conclusions or legal opinions." Id. (quoting Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1225 (R.I.1996)).

Applicability of the Administrative Procedures Act

The trial justice concluded that plaintiff was aggrieved by a decision of the Pay Plan Board that reduced his salary. She also determined that the Pay Plan Board was an administrative agency pursuant to the APA, and therefore, plaintiff's challenge to the Pay Plan Board's decision was governed by the APA's provisions. Because plaintiff failed to appeal the decision of the Pay Plan Board to the Superior Court within thirty days after the letter notifying plaintiff of the Pay Plan Board's action was mailed, as required by § 42-35-15, the trial justice granted summary judgment.⁹ Pursuant to § 42-35-18(a), the APA applies "to all agencies and agency proceedings not expressly exempted." We have consistently held that the APA was "intended to provide an exclusive method of judicial review of agency decisions unless the agency is one of those specifically exempted by the provisions of § 42-35-18." Great American Nursing Centers, Inc. v. Norberg, 439 A.2d 249, 251 (R.I.1981).

We note at the outset that the Pay Plan Board and its proceedings are not explicitly exempted from the APA. Section 42-35-18. Thus, if the Pay Plan Board meets the statutory definition of an agency — "each state board, commission, department, or officer, other than the legislature or the courts, authorized by law to make rules or to determine contested cases" — the APA governs the issues in this case. Sections 42-35-1(a); see 42-35-18. In order for its proceedings to be governed by the APA, an administrative agency must have independent rulemaking authority or the responsibility of determining contested cases.

The Pay Plan Board does not meet the statutory definition of an agency because it has no rulemaking authority and is not empowered to determine contested cases. We recognize that § 36-4-16.2 grants the Pay Plan Board the authority "to establish a pay plan for unclassified employees of the state, including such rules and regulations as are necessary to implement and complement the plan." However, the governor is vested with final approval authority, and the governor may adopt any changes to the plan that he or she deems necessary. Section 36-4-16.3. This demarcation of authority is conclusive on the issue of the Pay Plan Board's independent rulemaking power.¹⁰ We are satisfied that the Pay Plan Board is not authorized by law to make rules within the meaning of the APA.¹¹

The Pay Plan Board not only lacks rulemaking authority, it is not authorized to determine contested cases. A "contested case" is "a proceeding, including but not restricted to ratemaking, price fixing, and licensing, in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a specific party are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing." Section 42-35-1(c). For an administrative proceeding to qualify as a contested case, "a hearing must be required by law." Property Advisory Group, Inc. v. Rylant, 636 A.2d 317, 318 (R.I.1994). However, this mandate need not be explicitly provided for by statute. Colonial Hilton Inns of New England, Inc. v. Rego, 109 R.I. 259, 263, 284 A.2d 69, 71 (1971) (Although a hearing was not explicitly required by statute, the proceeding was, nevertheless, a contested case because the applicant for a permit to construct a wharf or bulkhead on the shore of Narragansett Bay...