Samuel Enters., Inc. v. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.

• Decision Date: 15 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. CC–12–2706.,CC–12–2706.
• Citation: 971 N.Y.S.2d 74,2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 50394,38 Misc.3d 1235
• Court: New York City Court
• Parties: SAMUEL ENTERPRISES, INC., Plaintiff, v. CENTRAL HUDSON GAS & ELECTRIC CORP., Defendant.

38 Misc.3d 1235

971 N.Y.S.2d 74

2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 50394

SAMUEL ENTERPRISES, INC., Plaintiff,

v.CENTRAL HUDSON GAS & ELECTRIC CORP., Defendant.

No. CC–12–2706.

City Court, City of Poughkeepsie.

March 15, 2013.

Michelle Kagan, Esq., Rhinebeck, attorney for the plaintiff.

Christina Bookless, Esq., Rizzo & Kelley, Poughkeepsie, attorneys for the defendant.

KATHERINE A. MOLONEY, J.

Defendant has moved, by Notice of Motion dated December 14, 2012, to dismiss the complaint filed in this action pursuant to C.P.L.R. § 3211(a)(1)(2) and (7). Defendant's motion is supported by the affirmation of Christina Bookless, Esq. dated December 14, 2012, the affidavit of Eileen Lomoriello, defendant's Operating Supervisor with Credit and Collections, dated December 13, 2012 (Exhibit A), together with Exhibits B and C. Plaintiff has opposed the motion by filing the affirmation of Michelle Kagan, Esq., dated January 9, 2012. In reply to plaintiff's opposition and further support of its motion, the defendant filed the reply affirmation of Christina Bookless, Esq., dated January 16, 2013. The Court having duly deliberated on the motion, finds and determines the motion as follows:

FACTS AND ARGUMENTS:

Plaintiff brought the instant commercial claims lawsuit seeking to recover $2,975.62 from the defendant, said sum representing property damage allegedly resulting from the defendant's improper termination of electrical services. The defendant moves to dismiss the action, claiming, in part, that 1) plaintiff has failed to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial intervention. In particular, defendant claims the Public Service Commission (hereinafter “PSC”) is the regulatory agency vested with reviewing and resolving claims like the instant one, and since plaintiff failed to file its claims with the PSC prior to bringing the instant lawsuit the matter should be dismissed; 2) plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action in that the plaintiff has failed to make itself available to defendant and this caused plaintiff to suffer the purported property damages it complains about now; and 3) since defendant followed the statutory regulations prior to terminating plaintiff's electrical services, and the bills sent to plaintiff left unpaid constitute documentary evidence of defendant's compliance with the regulations prior to terminating services, the matter should be dismissed.

The plaintiff has filed opposition to the motion to dismiss arguing that contrary to Ms. Lomoriello's affidavit, the plaintiff was never referred to the PSC for administrative resolution of the matter. Plaintiff further argues that this Court is the proper venue to recover damages suffered as a result of the defendant's improper termination of services, and that the issues in this matter generate questions of law outside the purview of the PSC.

In response, the defendant maintains that service was properly disconnected in accordance with the PSC regulations and that the proper procedure is for plaintiff to exhaust its administrative remedies with the PSC before seeking judicial intervention.

LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION:

The Uniform City Court Act (UCCA) § 1801–A provides that a commercial claim may be brought for any cause of action for money not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000.00). Should a matter be brought in this forum, the Court is empowered by statute to adjudicate commercial claims in such a manner as to do “substantial justice between the parties according to the rules of substantive law and is not bound by statutory provisions or rules of practice, procedure, pleading or evidence.” Uniform City Court Act § 1804–A.

The goal of the Commercial Claims courts is to provide a simplified and expeditious manner for claims to be heard “without the burden of being bound by statutory rules of practice, procedure, pleading and evidence.” Celona v. Celona, N.Y.L.J., p. 36, col. 2 (March 25, 1994); citing MacCollam v. Arlington, 94 Misc.2d 692 (Albany City Ct., 1978); Weiner v. Tel Aviv Car and Limousine Service, Ltd., 141 Misc.2d 339 (Civ.Ct., N.Y. County, 1988); Harding v. N.Y. State Teamsters Council, 60.A.D.2d 975 (4th Dept.1978) appeal dismissed44 N.Y.2d 641 (1978). Indeed, motion practice is discouraged in these venues. Id. citing Weiner v. Tel Aviv Car and Limousine Service, Ltd., 141 Misc.2d 339 (Civ.Ct., N.Y. County, 1988)(motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim is inappropriate); Clegg v. Bon Temps, 114 Misc.2d 805, 809 (Civ.Ct., N.Y. County, 1982).

Here, while the defendant moves to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under C.P.L.R. § 3211(a)(7) and upon a defense founded in documentary evidence pursuant to C.P.L.R. § 3211(a)(1), such motions are rarely, if ever, applicable in commercial or small claims cases and should be dismissed as having been improperly brought, without reaching the merits. Weiner, supra at 342–43; Figueroa v. Rivera, 21 Misc.3d 835 (Poughkeepsie City Ct., 2008). As such, this Court dismisses that portion of defendant's motion seeking dismissal under C.P.L.R. § 3211(a)(1) and (7).Turning now to defendant's claim that this court lacks jurisdiction based upon the plaintiff's failure to exhaust its administrative remedies, this Court finds that this portion of the motion requires further analysis. While the exhaustion of remedies concept advanced by defendant is a procedural concept, not a substantive concept [ see, ...