Samuels v. Richmond & D.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 16 March 1892
• Citation: 14 S.E. 943,35 S.C. 493
• Parties: SAMUELS v. RICHMOND & D. R. CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

14 S.E. 943

35 S.C. 493

SAMUELS v. RICHMOND & D. R. CO.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

March 16, 1892

Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Aiken county; IZLAR Judge.

Action by Elizabeth Samuels against the Richmond & Danville Railroad Company for damages for carrying plaintiff beyond the station at which she was to get off, and for ejecting her. From a judgment entered on a verdict for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

J. S Cothran and B. L. Abney, for appellant.

Henderson Bros. and J. R. Cloy, for respondent.

POPE J.

In the court of common pleas for Aiken county, on the 20th day of February, 1891, before his honor, Judge IZLAR, and a jury the action for $1,000 damages between the plaintiff and defendant came on for trial. The complaint, among other things, alleged: "(3) That on the 24th of December 1890, the plaintiff Elizabeth Samuels, a widow, with her three little children, boarded the south-bound passenger train of the defendant lessee company at Vaucluse, a station on said road, for the purpose of taking passage to Aiken Junction, another station on said road; that she purchased from the agent at Vaucluse a ticket for said Aiken Junction, having paid him the fare usually demanded and paid therefor, which said ticket was taken up by the conductor in charge of the train, and yet said train, run negligently and carelessly, carried her beyond said Aiken Junction for a considerable distance, and plaintiff and her children were carelessly, negligently, and in a rude, angry, and insulting way, ejected from the said train at a place unusual and remote, wet and damp, and she and they were compelled to walk back to said Aiken Junction, and from there to the place they were going, incumbered with bundles and baggage, without the escort who were to meet her at the station. By all of which acts and grievances said plaintiff was injured in her person and feelings to her great damage, one thousand dollars." The answer of the defendant denied the allegations in said paragraph 3 of the complaint.

The testimony established the following as the facts of the case: On the 24th December, 1890, a ticket was purchased of the defendant's agent at Vaucluse, and received by the plaintiff, by which she was entitled to passage on defendant's train to Aiken Junction, on defendant's leased road. The conductor, after plaintiff delivered to him her ticket, was requested by her to be let off the train at Aiken Junction. The plaintiff was accompanied by her three little children, and carried a large basket. Her brother-in-law was expected to meet her at Aiken Junction, and was there to meet her, and accompany her to his house. The train was about half an hour behind the schedule time, and was not stopped at Aiken Junction, although it was the duty of the defendant to stop there, to let off and take on passengers at that point. The conductor, being apprised of his failure to let plaintiff and her children get off at Aiken Junction, did stop the train from 275 to 400 yards beyond that station. The point at which plaintiff and her children were landed was damp and in a ditch. Plaintiff requested conductor to take her back to the station, which he declined to do. No reason was given for such refusal. Plaintiff suffered for more than a week from prostration because of these facts. Both plaintiff and defendant made written requests of the trial judge for charge. No complaint is made of the charge upon some of such requests, and, as any alleged errors therein are embodied in defendant's grounds of appeal, we will consider them there. The jury rendered a verdict for plaintiff of $100. After judgment thereon the defendant appealed therefrom.

We will now consider the grounds of appeal. The first and second grounds will be considered together, and are as follows: (1) Because the presiding judge erred in charging the jury "that if the conductor, upon demand that he should return the passenger to the station to which she had purchased her ticket, willfully and without just excuse refused to do so, and ejected her from the train, she would be entitled to recover exemplary damages;" the error consisting of not charging the jury that such action must amount to malicious, insulting, or oppressive conduct on the part of the conductor. (2) Because the presiding judge erred in charging the jury "that if a party is carried beyond the station to which he has purchased his ticket, and demands that he be returned to the station, and the conductor willfully refuses, in a sense that I have endeavored to show you,--that a mere refusal would not do, but it must be willful and without excuse,--should refuse to return her, why, she would be entitled to such damages, not only for what was the contract and may be the result of the act, but such additional damages as you in your judgment may think proper to give her by way of exemplary damages." The propriety of this court considering these grounds of exception together will be manifest by reading both at the same time. If taken singly, each one would fall within that class which makes a quotation here and a quotation there of a judge's charge, by which a great injustice is done the trial judge. He is entitled to have his whole deliverance upon any branch of the law considered. Counsel have shown their careful preparation in this case by having made written requests to charge. The great advantage from such a course is that they are thereby enabled to have the trial judge meet their issues squarely, and, if in error, point this court to the same. They did not go far enough in this case. The consequence is that they assail the charge of the trial judge by snatches. This court has frequently expressed its disapproval of such a course. Apart from the authority of such ruling here, its wisdom is apparent, and should commend it to the ready acceptance and observance by the bar. Inasmuch, however, as these grounds of appeal, when considered together, reasonably well represent the charge of the trial judge on the point made, we will consider it.

It must be borne in mind, whenever a tort sounds in exemplary damages, that it belongs to a particular class of actions. It is one species of that class. A tort that sounds in exemplary damages is where some right of person or property is invaded maliciously, violently, wantonly, or with reckless disregard of social or civil obligations. The terms "maliciously" and "wantonly" are used in this definition in the sense that they are applied by writers in connection with the subject here considered. To entitle a plaintiff to exemplary damages, he must not only prove the elements that enter in to make up this cause of action, but he must in the first place, in his complaint, set up distinctively the elements that make up his cause of action and if he fails to do so his complaint should be dismissed. Any other course is subversive of the rules of pleading. It may be to complain of one wrong, and then prove another. Every defendant is entitled to know by the pleadings what he is expected to answer. Having answered, he is entitled to have the testimony restricted to the cause of action set up in the complaint. Fortunately for the plaintiff here, the complaint sets up a tort sounding in exemplary damages. Let us now consider these exceptions. What is the duty of a common carrier to a passenger, so far as carriage to the point of destination is concerned? Suppose, by way of illustration, a stage-coach had as its passenger one who had paid his fare and obtained passage to a particular point on the route traversed by such stage-coach. What would be the right of the passenger there? Unquestionably, it would be to be carried to the exact point contracted for. But suppose the carrier recklessly or willfully or wantonly or maliciously or negligently carried the passenger past the place of his destination. Would there not arise a palpable invasion of such passenger's right? It is true such a wrong would, so to speak, arise out of the contract of carriage, yet it was not an actual stipulation in the contract by express words; for it is seldom if ever that the parties to such a contract enter into such stipulations. The contract, therefore, would not be complained upon, nor would it be the cause of action. No; rather it would be the willful or malicious or wanton or neglectful or utter disregard shown by the carrier to the rights of the passenger. The duty owed by the carrier was not paid, and would not be answered, except by the delivery of the passenger at the point of destination, if in his reasonable power. But suppose the horses took fright and became unmanageable and ran while near the point of destination, and the...