Samuels v. United Seamen's Service

• Citation: 165 F.2d 409
• Decision Date: 10 February 1948
• Docket Number: No. 11630.,11630.
• Parties: SAMUELS v. UNITED SEAMEN'S SERVICE, Inc.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

165 F.2d 409 (1948)

SAMUELS v. UNITED SEAMEN'S SERVICE, Inc.

No. 11630.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

January 9, 1948.

Rehearing Denied February 10, 1948.

Theodore M. Monell, of San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.

J. J. Doyle, of San Francisco, Cal., for appellee.

Before MATHEWS, BONE, and ORR, Circuit Judges.

BONE, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court in an action for declaratory relief arising out of the construction of a provision in a lease between appellant and appellee.

On September 15, 1943 appellant Samuels, a resident of California, leased certain premises in the City of San Francisco to appellee United Seamen's Service, Inc., a New York corporation. Appellee is a non-profit organization which was formed at the request of the U. S. Maritime Commission and the War Shipping Administration for the purpose of providing lodging and recreation places for merchant seamen. The written lease provided that its term should "extend for a period of six (6) months from and after the cessation of hostilities in the present war with Japan." There was no discussion by the parties when entering into this lease contract concerning the meaning of this quoted language, or its effect upon the termination date of the lease. The parties stipulated that August 14, 1945 was "V-J Day," at which time the orders were given to cease fire, and that on September 1, 1945 on board the U.S.S. Missouri the formal document of surrender was executed between the then empire of Japan and the United States of America.

About the end of February, 1946 appellant's agent and appellee's local representative discussed an extension or renewal of the lease at an increased rental, but appellee's New York office later rejected this proposal being of the opinion that the original lease was still in effect. Appellant thereupon brought this action for declaratory relief in a California state court. The cause was subsequently removed to the United States District Court on the ground of diversity of citizenship.¹ Jurisdictional requirements are present.

Appellant alleged that the parties intended that the lease terminate six months after the cessation of open and hostile warfare as accomplished by the surrender of Japan on August 14, 1945. The trial court held in effect, and appellee here contends, that termination of the lease required a formal governmental determination of the cessation of hostilities (which determination was made by Presidential Proclamation on December 12, 1946, effective December 31, 1946).

The sole question then before this court is whether the lower court ascribed the correct meaning to the language in the lease, that is that it should terminate "six months from and after the cessation of hostilities in the present war with Japan."

As indicated above, nothing was said by the parties regarding the termination date until renewal or extension negotiations were begun some time prior to March, 1946. Papers, which apparently extended or renewed the lease, were executed and sent to the home office of appellee, in New York. That office returned the papers, being apparently of the view here contended for by appellee that the language of the lease required it to be construed as being in force until six months after the official proclamation of the cessation of hostilities.

Construction (in this case) is necessarily the ascertainment of meaning, as nearly as it can be measured by the purpose and understanding of the parties when they entered into the lease contract. They provide no aid in the way of proof of an agreement or understanding as to the meaning or significance they then attached to the phrase "from and after the cessation of hostilities in the present war with Japan." The lease was apparently prepared by a representative of appellant, and (with certain changes) approved by the "home office" of appellee — this at a time when the war was in a critical stage. Speed was vital, and it may be assumed, without doing violence to logic or reason, that the appellee was moved by a desire to speedily provide the proposed facilities for merchant seamen — a motive wholly in keeping with the spirit of the enterprise. Since there was no discussion whatever concerning the termination date, it is an equally tenable conclusion that the parties did not then seriously concern themselves with, or attempt to decide, the technical question here presented.

In this situation, words must be construed in their ordinary sense without regard to possible refinements of technical legal linguistics. It may fairly be postulated that the parties were not thinking in terms of political or diplomatic parlance when they employed this particular language. The lease contract did not state merely "the end of the war." It simply, but very specifically specified "the cessation of hostilities in the present war." (Emphasis supplied.) Webster defines "hostilities" as follows: "State of being...