San Antonio v. Lewis

• Citation: 9 Tex. 69
• Parties: SAN ANTONIO v. LEWIS.
• Decision Date: 01 January 1852
• Court: Supreme Court of Texas

9 Tex. 69

SAN ANTONIO

v.LEWIS.

Supreme Court of Texas.

1852.

All parol contracts made by the authorized agents of a corporation within the scope of the legitimate purposes of its institution are express promises of the corporation; and all duties imposed on them by law and all benefits conferred at their request raise implied promises, for the enforcement of which an action will lie.

The legal effect of written evidence is matter of law to be determined by the court. It follows as a necessary consequence that the court must instruct the jury as to the legal effect of such evidence; and it is no infraction of the law which forbids the court to charge the jury upon the weight of evidence. (Note 16.)

By permitting testimony to go to the jury without objection as to the meaning of a written contract, the parties did not deprive the court of the right nor exonerate it from the duty of expounding to the jury what was the legal interpretation of the contract.

Where work is done for a corporation under a special contract, it is not competent to introduce evidence as to the value of the work, unless for the purpose of showing that the contract was so grossly unequal as to raise the presumption of fraud or want of authority in the officer to make it.

Appeal from Bexar. This suit was brought by the appellee to recover of the appellant $511.57, the amount of an account for printing done by the former for the latter, pursuant to a contract between the parties.

The defendant denied that the work was done under the contract, and averred that it was worth no more than thirty-two dollars. The contract was evidenced by the following proposition, accepted by the city by its Mayor acting under the authority of the Board of Aldermen:

“SAN ANTONIO, July 5th, 1850.

The undersigned propose to do the city printing at one cent for each ten words and for each insertion in the paper, and for each hundred bills at thirty-five cents for each ten words.”

Witnesses were called who testified without objection to their understanding of the meaning of the contract and to the value of the work done. On both points the testimony was conflicting. It was proved that the work was done as charged and that it was contracted for by the Mayor, by the authority of the Board of Aldermen of the city, but whether given in writing or verbally did not certainly appear. The minutes of the city council showed no written authority.

The court instructed the jury that if the Mayor was authorized by the Board of Aldermen of the city, either verbally or otherwise, to contract, and did contract, accordingly the contract was legal and binding upon the city, and that the meaning of the contract admitted in evidence was that the undertakers should receive thirty-five cents for every ten words of the first hundred hand bills, and in the same proportion for any greater or less number.

The court was asked by the defendants but refused to give the instruction, “That no resolution of the Board of Aldermen of the city is binding upon the inhabitants unless reduced to writing and spread upon the records.”

There was a verdict for the plaintiff for the full amount of his account, a motion by the defendant for a new trial overruled, and the defendant appealed. The assignment of errors questioned the correctness of the instructions of the court and the propriety of the verdict under the evidence and the law of the case.

I. A. & G. W. Paschal, for appellant.

Harris & Pease, for appellee.

WHEELER, J.

It seems to be the well-settled doctrine that all parol contracts made by the authorized agents of a corporation...