San Diego Trolley, Inc. v. Superior Court
| Decision Date | 16 March 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. D036000.,D036000. |
| Citation | 87 Cal.App.4th 1083,105 Cal.Rptr.2d 476 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | SAN DIEGO TROLLEY, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of San Diego County, Respondent; Dannielle M. Kinder, Real Party in Interest. |
Daley & Heft, Robert R. Heft and Lee H. Roistacher, Solana Beach, for Petitioners.
No appearance for Respondent.
Greene, Broillet, Raylor, Wheeler & Panish and Mark T. Quigley, for Real Party in Interest.
In this writ proceeding we find the trial court's discovery order infringes upon a witness's psychotherapist-patient privilege as well her right to privacy. Accordingly, we grant the witness's writ and direct the trial court to enter a new order consistent with the views we express.
Real party in interest Dannielle M. Kinder was severely injured on August 27, 1998, when she attempted to climb over the coupling device of two trolleys operated by petitioners San Diego Trolley, Inc., and Metropolitan Transit Development Board (collectively Trolley). Kinder made her attempt from the platform of an eastbound trolley which was stopped at one of Trolley's station. While waiting on the eastbound platform, Kinder discovered she wanted to get on a westbound trolley, which had also stopped at the station. Kinder was able to get over the coupling device on the eastbound trolley; as she was doing so Kinder was seen by the operator of the eastbound trolley who attempted to alert his counterpart on the westbound trolley. Unfortunately, the operator of the westbound trolley, petitioner Sherryl Ann Cooper, had just started to move her trolley and Kinder became trapped beneath it.
Kinder was severely injured and sued Trolley. She alleged Cooper had been negligent in failing to activate a buzzer and public announcement warning of the impending departure of her trolley. Kinder took Cooper's deposition and Cooper stated she had begun suffering anxiety attacks in 1995 following the murder of a passenger on a trolley she was operating. Cooper disclosed at the deposition she was being treated for the anxiety by a psychiatrist, that at the time of Kinder's injury she was taking three prescription medications , and that she had informed her supervisors about her treatment and medication. Cooper testified the stress engendered by the Kinder incident had prevented her from returning to work for Trolley, and further that she was still being treated by a psychiatrist and had filed a stress-related workers' compensation claim against Trolley.
In response to the information she obtained at Cooper's deposition, Kinder served the Trolley with a request to produce Cooper's personnel file and noticed depositions of two Trolley employees with knowledge of the contents of the file. Kinder also served document subpoenas on Cooper's pharmacy, her health maintenance organization, the Trolley's workers' compensation carrier and lawyers who had participated in her prior workers' compensation claims.
In light of privacy objections asserted by Cooper, neither Trolley, Cooper's psychiatrist nor the third parties on whom Cooper had served document subpoenas complied with Kinder's discovery requests. Kinder then moved to compel responses to her discovery requests, arguing Cooper had waived her physician-patient and psychotherapist-patient privileges by revealing her condition both at her deposition in this case and in the course of making her workers' compensation claims. Kinder argued that any general privacy interest Cooper had in preventing disclosure of either her psychiatric records, personnel files or workers' compensation claims was outweighed by Kinder's need to prosecute her personal injury claim.
The trial court ordered Trolley to produce to it under seal the requested personnel records. Following argument, and its in camera review of the documents Trolley had produced, the trial court granted Kinder's motion to compel. The trial court ordered Trolley to produce its records of Cooper's workers' compensation claims and her personnel file; one of Cooper's supervisors at Trolley was directed to testify as to whether he knew she was taking prescription drugs at the time Kinder was injured; Cooper's psychiatrist was directed to appear for his deposition; Cooper's health maintenance organization was directed to respond to Kinder's document subpoena, as were the attorneys who had participated in disposition of Cooper's earlier workers' compensation claim. However, the trial court also found no documents or responses which required disclosure of attorney-client or doctor-patient communications was required unless "such information is contained in workers' compensation files or the Trolley personnel file."
Trolley and Cooper filed a petition for a writ of mandate in which they asked us to direct the trial court to vacate its order. We stayed enforcement of the order and issued an order to show cause.
In arguing the trial court erred in requiring disclosure of information about Cooper's psychological condition and employment history, in the main Trolley and Cooper rely upon the psychotherapist-patient privilege set forth in the Evidence Code and on Cooper's right of privacy, as guaranteed by article I, section 1 of the California Constitution. As she did in the trial court, Kinder argues Cooper waived the privileges and that Cooper's more general right of privacy must yield to Kinder's need to fully prosecute her claim.
Our Supreme Court has consistently recognized (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 555, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290, quoting Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 440, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334.) At the time the psychotherapist-patient privilege was adopted, it was noted: (Sen. Judiciary Com. com., 29B West's Ann.Evid.Code (1995 ed.) § 1014, p. 333.)
By its terms the psychotherapist-patient privilege protects "confidential communication between patient and psychotherapist." (Evid.Code, §§ 1012, 1014.) Nonetheless, "[t]he privilege can cover a communication that was never, in fact, `confidential'—so long as it was made in confidence. The communication need only comprise `information ... transmitted between a patient and his psychotherapist in the course of that relationship and in confidence by a means which, so far as the patient is aware, discloses the information' to no 'outside' third person. [Citation.]
The "privilege to prevent" disclosure to others not only prevents disclosures by a patient's psychotherapist, it also governs any other third person privy to a confidential communication. (Menendez v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 448, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 92, 834 P.2d 786.) (Ibid.)
In categorically rejecting the notion that the privilege is lost as soon as any communication loses its confidential status, the court in Menendez v. Superior Court focused on the purpose of the privilege, which is to protect the patient's "right to privacy and promote the psychotherapeutic relationship." (Menendez v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 448, 11 Cal. Rptr.2d 92, 834 P.2d 786.) The court concluded the privilege may survive even broad disclosure of a communication because the psychotherapeutic relationship, much like other relationships, may survive such a disclosure. (Ibid.)
The relatively high importance of protecting psychotherapeutic confidentiality can be seen in the fact that, unlike the physician-patient privilege, the psychotherapist-patient privilege is not subject to a good cause exception in personal injury actions. (City of Alhambra v. Superior Court (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 513, 519, 168 Cal.Rptr. 49.) However, as important as psychotherapeutic confidentiality is, even its value may be outweighed by other societal interests. Thus, where a patient is dangerous and disclosure of confidential communication is necessary to prevent harm, the psychotherapist-patient privilege has no application. (Evid.Code, § 1024; see Menendez v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 449, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 92, 834 P.2d 786; People v. Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 548-563, 280 Cal. Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290; Bellah v. Greenson (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 614, 622, 146 Cal.Rptr. 535; Tarasoffv. Regents of University of California, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 441, fn. 13, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334.)1 The exception is an expression of the Legislature's determination that the value of safeguarding confidential psychotherapeutic communications, as great as it is, is outweighed by the public interest in protecting foreseeable victims from physical harm. (See Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, supra, 17 Cal.3d at...
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San Diego Trolley v. Superior Court of San Diego
... 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 476 (Cal.App. 4 Dist. 2001) ... SAN DIEGO TROLLEY, INC., et al., Petitioners, ... THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, Respondent; DANNIELLE M. KINDER, Real Party in Interest ... COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA ... Filed 3/16/01 ... (San Diego County Super. Ct. No. 731692) ... ...