San Joaquin County Employees' Assn., Inc. v. County of San Joaquin

• Decision Date: 10 May 1974
• Citation: 113 Cal.Rptr. 912,39 Cal.App.3d 83
• Parties: , 86 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2942 SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 13978.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 912

113 Cal.Rptr. 912

39 Cal.App.3d 83, 86 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2942

SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, Defendant and Appellant.

Civ. 13978.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

May 10, 1974.

Carroll, Burdick & McDonough by Christopher D. Burdick, San Francisco, for plaintiff-respondent.

Gerald A. Sherwin, County Counsel by Robley E. George, Asst. County Counsel and Michael N. Garrigan, Deputy County Counsel, Stockton, for defendant-appellant.

THOMPSON ^*, Associate Justice.

Defendant County of San Joaquin (hereinafter referred to as 'County') appeals following the granting of judgment on the pleadings in favor of plaintiff San Joaquin County Employees' Association, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as 'Association').

This action had its genesis in the filing of a complaint for declaratory relief by the Association seeking a determination by the court that under presently applicable statutes a public entity could lawfully agree to pay salary increases retroactive to the date of the expiration of a presently existing salary ordinance or resolution, that such retroactive payment would not constitute a gift of public funds, and that the court further decree that defendant County must meet and confer with plaintiff Association as to such retroactive salary increases in accordance with the provisions of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (Gov.Code, § 3500 et seq.).

County's legal position is that there is no statutory authority for the payment of retroactive salary increases; that such payments are constitutionally prohibited as gifts of public money for services already rendered and paid for; that in view of the illegality of such payments no purpose would be served by meeting and confering with the Association as to retroactive salary increases.

Preliminary to our discussion of the applicable law, no questions of fact being present, we note that plaintiff Association is a duly recognized bargaining representative of County's employees with respect to their employee-employer relations. As had been the previous custom, the Association entered into negotiations with County on about March 1, 1972. In this instance it interjected the demand that County 'meet and confer in good faith' on the question of retroactive pay raises. The County for the reasons we have previously set forth refused to do so.

Both parties sought judgment upon the pleadings. The Association prevailed and County was ordered to 'meet and confer' with the Association on the subject of retroactive pay raises, the court finding that County could lawfully do so, the trial court in the judgment stating: 'IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

'1. That an agreement between the County of San Joaquin, and a duly recognized employee organization representing any of the employees of said County to pay retroactive pay increases to said employees for services to be performed at a time when wage and salary rates are not fixed and are indefinite, said payment to be retroactive to the date on which said pay become unfixed or indefinite through expiration of the previously existing contract, memorandum of understanding, or salary plan or ordinance, is permitted by law and is within the authority of the Board of Supervisors under the provisions of Article XI Section 5 of the California Constitution. Such an agreement is not prohibited as being the payment of extra compensation under Article IV Section 17 of the California Constitution or as being a gift of public funds under Article XIII Section 25 of the California Constitution; . . ..'

While the trial court's opinion quoted above stresses the constitutional and statutory aspects of this case, we believe that the case should first be viewed in the larger context of its relationship to the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (Gov.Code, § 3500 et seq.), with which act this litigation is inextricably involved. That act, first adopted in 1961 and amended many times since, by its terms endeavored to create a method whereby disputes regarding 'wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment' (Gov.Code, § 3500) could be resolved, a method which was at the same time both viable and voluntary. Therefore we are constrained to interpret the act in such a manner as to create no hypertechnical impediment to either its viability or its voluntariness within the state constitutional framework.

We think it obvious that the act has drawn liberally from the experiences of private management-labor relations. Certainly the effective date of negotiated wage settlements is almost an invariable item in negotiations, and we further believe it is an accurate statement that pay raises are frequently backdated to the date of the expiration of the last contract. The Legislature, in recognition of the fact that public agencies unlike private concerns are faced with statutory budget deadlines (Aug. 30 in the case of counties, Gov.Code, § 29088), amended section 3505 of the Government Code in 1971 by adding the underlined language. Section 3505: 'The governing body of a public agency, or such boards, commissions, administrative officers or other representatives as may be properly designated by law or by such governing body, shall meet and confer in good faith regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment with representatives of such recognized employee organizations, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 3501, and shall consider fully such presentations as are made by the employee organization on behalf of its members prior to arriving at a determination of policy or course of action.

"Meet and confer in good faith' means that a public agency, or such representatives as it may designate, and representatives of recognized employee organizations, shall have the mutual obligation personally to meet and confer * * * Promptly upon request by either party and continue for a reasonable period of time in order to exchange freely information, opinions, and proposals, and to endeavor to reach agreement on matters within the scope of representation Prior to the adoption by the public agency of its final budget for the ensuing year. The process should include adequate time for the resolution of impasses where specific procedures for such resolution are contained in local rule, regulation or ordinance, or when such procedures are utilized by mutual consent.'

We add that as a practical matter salary ordinances cannot be adopted until the budget is fixed.

We think it is an almost universal custom for governmental agencies to do as was done in this case to adopt their salary ordinances at the start of the fiscal year, July 1. Here the Legislature has selected the budgetary date rather than the fiscal year date as the target date for reaching an agreement negotiated between governmental agencies and employee organizations. It is wholly illogical to believe that it was intended that governmental agencies should adopt interim salary ordinances, greatly increasing accounting and other problems, for the period July 1 to August 31. We think the more logical interpretation is that the Legislature contemplated that any pay adjustments negotiated would be made retroactive to July 1, the pay of employees continuing in the interim on the previous year's schedule, just as would be the case with private labor-management agreements.

It is an incontestable fact of governmental employment practices that governmental agencies must compete in the labor market with non-governmental employers. Such competition includes not only salaries but sick leave time, vacations and numerous other conditions of employment. It has been, for instance, a judicially noticeable practice...