Sanai v. Irvine Co.

• Decision Date: 16 March 2015
• Docket Number: B253432
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: CYRUS M. SANAI, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THE IRVINE COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.

CYRUS M. SANAI, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THE IRVINE COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.

B253432

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SEVEN

March 16, 2015

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC235671)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, K. Brazile, Judge. Reversed with directions.

Cyrus Sanai, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Call & Jensen, David R. Sugden and Melinda Evans, for Defendant and Respondent, The Irvine Company.

In Sanai v. Saltz (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 746 (Sanai 2009) we reversed the trial court's orders granting judgment on the pleadings with respect to Cyrus M. Sanai's causes of action under Civil Code section 1785.25 (part of the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act) and title 15 United States Code section 1681s-2(b) (15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2) (part of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act) against Harvey A. Saltz and First Advantage Corporation, affirmed the order granting judgment on the pleadings with respect to Mr. Sanai's six common law tort causes of action, and remanded the case to permit Mr. Sanai to amend his federal cause of action (Sanai 2009, at p. 770) and for further proceedings "not inconsistent this opinion." (Id. at p. 784.) On remand, without first seeking leave of court, Mr. Sanai filed an amended complaint that named as defendants not only Mr. Saltz and First Advantage but also The Irvine Company and included, in addition to the two statutory credit reporting causes of action addressed in Sanai 2009, claims against all defendants for extortion and unfair business practices.¹

After an unsuccessful effort to strike Mr. Sanai's new pleading under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16² (see Sanai v. Saltz (Sept. 16, 2010, B219963) [nonpub. opn.] (Sanai 2010)), and several years of delay caused by a motion to declare Mr. Sanai a vexatious litigant, which the trial grant granted and we reversed (see Sanai v. Saltz (March 20, 2013, B232770) [nonpub. opn.] (Sanai 2013)), in June 2013 The Irvine Company moved pursuant to sections 435 and 436 to strike the pleading on the ground it had added a new party and new causes of action without prior judicial permission. The trial court granted the motion without leave to amend, ruling our decision in Sanai 2009did not authorize Mr. Sanai to add new parties to the lawsuit without leave of court. We agree with the trial court's interpretation of Sanai 2009 but reverse its order (and the subsequently entered dismissal of The Irvine Company) to the extent it barred Mr. Sanai from moving for leave to add The Irvine Company as a party to the litigation or to include additional causes of action to his lawsuit.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Mr. Sanai's Initial Complaint and the Subsequent Void Trial Court Proceedings

Mr. Sanai originally sued The U.D. Registry, Inc. (UDR)³ and Mr. Saltz, its owner, in September 2000 for several torts and for violation of statutes regulating consumer credit reporting agencies based on UDR's negative credit reports following a dispute between Mr. Sanai and his landlord over the amount of rent due for a Newport Beach apartment Mr. Sanai had leased. After answering the complaint, UDR filed a special motion to strike under section 425.16, asserting Mr. Sanai's lawsuit was brought in retaliation for UDR's exercise of its constitutional right to petition or engage in speech related to a matter in litigation. The trial court denied the motion, and we affirmed in an order filed March 21, 2002. (Sanai v. Saltz et al. (Mar. 21, 2002, B147392) [nonpub. opn.].)

While the appeal from the denial of UDR's special motion to strike was pending in this court from January 16, 2001 to May 24, 2002, the litigation proceeded in the trial court, which issued a number of orders, at least at the outset without any formal objection by either party, determining pleading issues and discovery disputes and ultimately resolving against Mr. Sanai all of the substantive issues raised by his lawsuit. Among theprejudgment orders was a ruling by the trial court that Mr. Sanai's landlord was a necessary and indispensable party to the action. As a result, Mr. Sanai filed a first amended complaint and thereafter a second amended complaint adding the owners of the apartment Mr. Sanai had leased (Irvine Apartment Communities, L.P., Irvine Apartment Communities, LLC, and The Irvine Company) as defendants.

After entry of judgment against him and while various postjudgment motions for costs and fees were pending, Mr. Sanai moved in the trial court, pursuant to section 473, subdivision (d), to set aside void orders and judgment, asserting the trial court lacked jurisdiction to make any orders denying him relief or granting relief to the defendants during the pendency of the appeal from the denial of UDR's special motion to strike. The trial court denied the motion. In Sanai v. Saltz (June 28, 2005, B174924/B170618) (Sanai 2005), a nonpublished opinion on rehearing immediately following the Supreme Court's decision in Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, we reversed the order denying Mr. Sanai's motion to set aside void judgment and orders; vacated the judgment entered against Mr. Sanai; reversed all postjudgment orders awarding and denying costs and attorney fees; and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to vacate all orders entered after January 16, 2001, the date on which UDR and Mr. Saltz had filed their notices of appeal from the denial of UDR's special motion to strike Mr. Sanai's complaint, and to conduct further proceedings based on the state of the pleadings on January 16, 2001.

2. Judgment on the Pleadings and Our Partial Reversal in Sanai 2009

As of January 16, 2001, "Mr. Sanai's original complaint, the operative pleading, alleged three statutory causes of action—violations of the FCRA [Fair Credit Reporting Act] (15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2) (the eighth cause of action) and portions of the state Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (Civ. Code, §§ 1781.16, subd. (f), 1785.25) (the seventh and ninth causes of action)—and six common law tort actions based on UDR's negative reports to a credit bureau concerning Mr. Sanai's credit status relating to the dispute over his rent." (Sanai 2009, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 759.) Only UDRand Mr. Saltz were named as defendants. Mr. Sanai thereafter filed several motions to amend his complaint. "In general, Mr. Sinai sought leave to allege new and/or different facts underlying his claims, [fn. omitted] to delete four of the common law claims and replace them with a more general negligence claim, to delete the Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act claims as initially pleaded and reallege one such claim in somewhat different form and to add a new cause of action for violating Business and Professions Code section 17200." (Sanai 2009, at p. 760.) Those motions were denied by the trial court, which explained in substantially similar language as to each motion that Mr. Sanai appeared to be attempting to plead around defects in his original complaint and had failed to present evidence that factual allegations in the earlier pleading contradicted by the proposed new pleadings were the result of mistake or inadvertence, as the court had required. (Ibid.)

In April 2006 First Advantage Corporation, as successor in interest to UDR, and Mr. Saltz moved for judgment on the pleadings directed to the original complaint contending Mr. Sanai's federal claim should be dismissed because the statute upon which he relied did not provide for a private cause of action and his claim for violation of Civil Code section 1785.25 and state tort causes of action were preempted by federal law. The trial court granted the motion: The court held there was no private right of action for violating 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)—a point Mr. Sanai conceded—and Mr. Sanai had failed to state a cause of action under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b). The court gave Mr. Sanai leave to amend the subdivision 2(b) claim, but required, as a condition to allowing the amendment, that Mr. Sanai produce "admissible evidence" to support any new factual allegations in his pleading. When Mr. Sanai failed to present such evidence, the court granted the motion as to the federal claim without leave to amend. The court also ruled the state statutory and common law causes of action were preempted.

We reversed in part, ruling with respect to the federal claim that the trial court had abused its discretion in imposing unduly restrictive conditions on Mr. Sanai's right to amend his complaint and his proposed amendment to the federal cause of action pleadeda viable cause of action. (Sanai 2009, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at pp. 767-770.)⁴ We also held the court had erred in concluding Mr. Sanai's claim under Civil Code section 1785.25, subdivision (a), was preempted, relying on the analysis and holding of Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP (9th Cir. 2009) 552 F.3d 1008, superseded in October 2009 by amended opinion 584 F.3d 1147, a case decided by the Ninth Circuit well after the trial court's order. (Sanai 2009, at p. 776.) We agreed with the trial court, however, that Mr. Sanai's common law claims were preempted. (Id. at pp. 773-774.) In remanding the case for further proceedings, we noted, in light of our holdings, Mr. Sanai's challenges to the trial court's orders denying his earlier requests for leave to amend the complaint were moot. (Id. at p. 783, fn. 26.)

3. The First Amended Supplemental Verified Complaint, the Special Motion To Strike and the Vexatious Litigant Proceedings

Our remittitur in Sanai 2009 issued on May 5,...