Sanchez-Rengifo v. Caraway

• Decision Date: 14 August 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–2876.,14–2876.
• Citation: 798 F.3d 532
• Parties: Humberto SANCHEZ–RENGIFO, Petitioner–Appellant, v. J.F. CARAWAY, Respondent–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

798 F.3d 532

Humberto SANCHEZ–RENGIFO, Petitioner–Appellant

v.J.F. CARAWAY, Respondent–Appellee.

No. 14–2876.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 19, 2014.

Decided Aug. 14, 2015.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 14, 2015.

Humberto Sanchez–Rengifo, Terre Haute, IN, pro se.

Gerald A. Coraz, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Indianapolis, IN, for Respondent–Appellee.

Before RIPPLE, MANION, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.

Humberto Sanchez–Rengifo, imprisoned after a conviction in the District of Columbia, brought a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, the district in which he is serving his sentence. The district court denied the petition and did not address the matter of a certificate of appealability. Mr. Sanchez–Rengifo then filed an appeal here. We conclude that, for purposes of habeas corpus relief, Mr. Sanchez–Rengifo's petition must be deemed as seeking relief from a detention “aris[ing] out of process issued by a State court,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate of appealability is therefore required before he can pursue an appeal in this court. On review of Mr. Sanchez–Rengifo's submissions, we conclude that a certificate of appealability cannot be granted. Accordingly, we dismiss Mr. Sanchez–Rengifo's petition for lack of jurisdiction.

IBACKGROUND

A.

Mr. Sanchez–Rengifo was convicted by a jury in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia of, among other crimes, three counts of first-degree child sexual abuse while armed and one count of second-degree child sexual abuse while armed. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals described the factual basis for those convictions accordingly:

The offenses occurred on June 16, 1997, the fifteenth birthday of N.V., the complaining witness. N.V. testified that on that afternoon, she was in her family's apartment with one of her friends when she went to the door in response to a knock. She observed a man, whom she identified later as Sanchez–Rengifo, wearing a paint-splattered blue and white striped shirt and blue pants, an orange and white “Home Depot” hat, and brown paint-splattered boots. She testified that the man told her that he was there to make repairs in the apartment and assured her that her mother knew about the work. N.V. admitted Sanchez–Rengifo into the apartment where he looked around the apartment, including her mother's bedroom. N.V. pointed out a problem with the bars on her bedroom window. Sanchez–Rengifo told N.V. that he would return, and left the apartment. Soon afterwards, N.V.'s friend left the apartment.

Within minutes, Sanchez–Rengifo returned, and N.V. let him in. N.V. was talking on the telephone at the time, and Sanchez–Rengifo asked her to end the conversation so that they could talk about the repairs. N.V. complied, walked into her mother's bedroom, and as she turned around, she saw that Sanchez–Rengifo was holding a knife. He warned her that he would kill her if she made any noise. He then ordered her to sit on her mother's bed and to remove her clothes, which she did. For the next two hours approximately, Sanchez–Rengifo forced N.V. to engage in various sexual acts.

Sanchez–Rengifo v. United States, 815 A.2d 351, 353 (D.C.2002). Following his conviction, Mr. Sanchez–Rengifo was sentenced to life without parole on the first-degree child sexual abuse counts and to shorter sentences on the remaining counts of conviction, with all of the sentences to be served concurrently.

While his direct appeal was pending, he challenged his convictions under District of Columbia Code § 23–110, arguing that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for, among other reasons, failing to call an independent DNA expert. The trial court denied his motion for post-conviction relief.

Mr. Sanchez–Rengifo appealed his convictions and sentences, as well as the denial of his post-conviction motion. On appeal, he argued “that his convictions for first and second-degree child sexual abuse while armed merge because the criminal conduct involved constitutes one continuous sexual assault,” and, therefore, his convictions for these offenses violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution. Sanchez–Rengifo, 815 A.2d at 353. He maintained that the trial court erred in denying his post-trial motion. In this respect, he maintained that “his trial counsel[ ] was ineffective because he (1) failed to call or consult an independent DNA expert, and (2) failed to consult an independent fingerprint expert.” Id. at 359. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. Sanchez–Rengifo's conviction and sentence and also upheld the denial of his motion to vacate under § 23–110. See id. at 362.

B.

Mr. Sanchez–Rengifo was assigned to serve his sentence in the United States Penitentiary in Terre Haute, and, in 2014, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Southern District of Indiana. In his petition, he argued that he was entitled to relief because the prosecution had adduced insufficient evidence of his guilt at trial; specifically, there was no DNA evidence to corroborate the victim's identification of him as the perpetrator. Mr. Sanchez–Rengifo maintained that he therefore was actually innocent of the crimes charged.

The district court denied the petition. The district court explained that “[a] 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion is the presumptive means by which a federal prisoner can challenge his conviction or sentence, although § 2241 also supplies a basis for collateral relief under limited circumstances,”¹ such as when a federal prisoner establishes that § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention,”28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). Mr. Sanchez–Rengifo, however, “ha[d] not met that burden even after he was invited to do so.”² Consequently, because it determined that Mr. Sanchez–Rengifo's petition was legally insufficient on its face, the district court denied the petition.

Following its denial of relief, the district court did not indicate whether a certificate of appealability should issue, and Mr. Sanchez–Rengifo never applied for a certificate of appealability in this court.

IIDISCUSSION

A.

The Supreme Court recently has reaffirmed “that the failure to obtain a [certificate of appealability]” when one is statutorily required “is jurisdictional.” Gonzalez v. Thaler, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 641, 649, 181 L.Ed.2d 619 (2012). Section 2253 of Title 28 makes clear that a certificate of appealability is required when the petitioner challenges a detention that “arises out of process issued by a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). Despite Mr. Sanchez–Rengifo's incarceration in a federal penitentiary, he is not a federal prisoner. He was convicted of his crimes in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and is considered a “state” prisoner for purposes of federal habeas review. See Madley v. United States Parole Comm'n, 278 F.3d 1306, 1309 (D.C.Cir.2002) ; Eldridge v. Berkebile, 791 F.3d 1239, 1243 (10th Cir.2015). Before he may appeal the denial of relief by the district court, therefore, he must obtain a certificate of appealability. See Evans v. Circuit Court of Cook Cty., 569 F.3d 665, 666 (7th Cir.2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) ).³

If a certificate of appealability has not been issued by the district court, and the petitioner has not sought one in this court, we may treat a notice of appeal as a request for a certificate of appealability. See Fed. R.App. P. 22(b)(2) (“If no express request for a certificate is filed, the notice of appeal constitutes a request addressed to the judges of the court of appeals.”). Moreover, when we have the benefit of briefing by a pro se petitioner, we may look to his submissions to inform our decision on whether a certificate of appealability should issue. Cf. Lavin v. Rednour, 641 F.3d 830, 832 (7th Cir.2011) (“When a prisoner on collateral review files a pro se brief containing non-certified claims, we will construe the brief as an implicit request for certification.”). Consequently, we turn to Mr. Sanchez–Rengifo's brief to determine whether the statutory standard for issuing a certificate of appealability has been met.

B.

As we have noted earlier, “[a] court may grant a certificate if the applicant makes a ‘substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.’ ” Arredondo v. Huibregtse, 542 F.3d 1155, 1165 (7th Cir.2008) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) ). We have explained that “[a]n applicant has made a ‘substantial showing’ where ‘reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were “adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” ’ ” Id. (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000)). With this standard in mind, we turn to Mr. Sanchez–Rengifo's claims of error.

Mr. Sanchez–Rengifo first argues that D.C.Code § 23–110 was not an adequate or effective avenue for challenging his conviction. If a District of Columbia petitioner has been denied relief under § 23–110, he may proceed on a federal habeas claim only if he establishes that the § 23–110 remedy “is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” D.C.Code § 23–110(g). The district court did not assess whether Mr. Sanchez–Rengifo had met this requirement, but instead evaluated Mr. Sanchez–Rengifo's petition according to the statutory standard for petitions filed by federal prisoners seeking to invoke § 2241 —whether 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).⁴ There is no question, therefore, that the district court misapprehended the statutory standard that provides the procedural mechanism for asserting a constitutional violation.

However, such an error, standing alone, does not constitute “a substantial...