Sanchez v. City of Austin

• Decision Date: 18 December 2014
• Docket Number: No. 13–50916.,13–50916.
• Citation: 774 F.3d 873
• Parties: Rodolfo SANCHEZ; Kristopher Sleeman, Plaintiffs–Appellants v. CITY OF AUSTIN, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

774 F.3d 873

Rodolfo SANCHEZ; Kristopher Sleeman, Plaintiffs–Appellants

v.CITY OF AUSTIN, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 13–50916.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Dec. 18, 2014.

Ryan Bates, Bates, P.L.L.C., Brian Rolland McGiverin, Esq., Texas Civil Rights Project, Austin, TX, Anna Rotman, Yetter Coleman, L.L.P., Houston, TX, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Christine G. Edwards, City of Austin Law Department, Austin, TX, for Defendant–Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before KING, GRAVES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge:

Beginning in October 2011, Plaintiffs–Appellants Rodolfo Sanchez and Kristopher Sleeman participated in the Occupy Wall Street protests that took place in the plaza in front of Austin City Hall. After the protests had already started, Defendant–Appellee City of Austin promulgated a policy under which it issued criminal-trespass notices—oral or written notices that individuals must depart or must not enter city property—to Appellants and other protestors. Appellants sued the City in district court, alleging facial and as-applied challenges to the City's policy under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Appellants sought declaratory and injunctive relief and damages. At the district court's request, the case proceeded to a bench trial merely one month after Appellants filed their complaint. Nine months later, the district court entered an order declaring the City's policy unconstitutional on its face and enjoining the City from issuing criminal-trespass notices under the policy. The district court, however, denied Appellants' motion for attorneys' fees and expenses under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, even though Appellants had prevailed on their constitutional challenge. Appellants timely appealed this denial. We now REVERSE the district court's denial of fees and REMAND for the district court to determine the amount of the award.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

On October 6, 2011, at the inception of the Occupy Wall Street protests in Austin, Sanchez and Sleeman joined the protests that convened at the plaza in front of Austin City Hall. On October 30, 2011, there was a large protest in the plaza. Police officers arrested Sanchez and Sleeman and issued both of them a verbal criminal-trespass notice (“CTN”), informing Sleeman that he was banned from City Hall for one year, Sanchez that he was banned for two years, and both that they would be arrested if they returned.

On November 1, 2011—two days after Appellants received their CTNs—the City formalized the CTN procedure by issuing an Administrative Bulletin entitled “Criminal Trespass Notices on City Property” (“the policy”). The policy defined a CTN as: “[An] oral or written communication to a person that: A. Entering by that person onto City Property is forbidden; or B. The person must immediately depart from City Property.” The policy defined “City Property” to include the City Hall building and surrounding property. With some exceptions, the policy stated that the City would ordinarily warn individuals before giving them CTNs. And the policy further guaranteed that anyone who received a CTN would have the opportunity for prompt administrative review. This review process, however, was only available after a person received a CTN—in other words, there was no possibility of pre-deprivation review—and if a CTN recipient failed to seek review within thirty days of receiving the notice, the CTN became final and unreviewable except upon a good-cause showing. A request for review would not stay or suspend the CTN.

On November 21, 2011, Appellants filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City and several City officials, alleging that the policy, both facially and as applied, violated the First Amendment and due-process rights of Appellants, other Occupy Austin protestors, and all citizens of Austin who used the plaza as a forum for free expression. Appellants alleged further that the policy was overbroad and vague and that the City enacted the policy to retaliate against the Occupy Austin protestors, in violation of their First Amendment rights. Appellants sought declaratory relief; injunctive relief; attorneys' fees, expenses, and costs; and damages. Appellants also applied for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) to enjoin the City from issuing CTNs, and from enforcing CTNs already issued.

Instead of resolving Appellants' TRO application, the district court asked the parties to consider whether it would be feasible for the court to expedite a trial on the merits so that it could resolve the lawsuit quickly and conclusively. The parties ultimately agreed to proceed to a trial on the merits that would start exactly one month after Appellants filed their complaint in the district court. Because they were going to trial so quickly, Appellants withdrew their application for a TRO.

Meanwhile, the City agreed to expedite Appellants' prior requests for administrative review of the CTNs that the City had issued to them. At that review, without any hearing or presentation of evidence by Appellants' counsel, the City modified both CTNs so that both Sleeman's and Sanchez's bans from the plaza expired on November 21, 2011, the day that they filed their suit in the district court. Having exhausted their administrative remedies under the City's policy, Appellants then amended their complaint to include claims that the City had denied them due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.

On December 21 and 22, 2011, the district court conducted a bench trial. In addition to Sanchez, three other witnesses testified. At the conclusion of the trial, the district court explained that it was not prepared to rule on Appellants' request for a preliminary injunction and instead would “write an opinion that disposes all of the issues” and “get [an opinion] out as quickly as” it could. While the district court had the case under consideration, however, the City began to enforce two new policies at City Hall: first, a curfew that prohibited use of the plaza between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m., and second, a requirement that groups using the plaza first make a reservation with the City.¹ As a result of these new policies, the City cleared the Occupy Austin protestors from the plaza on February 3, 2012, and the Occupy Austin protest at City Hall came to an end.

On September 27, 2012—nine months after the conclusion of the bench trial—the district court entered an order declaring the City's CTN policy unconstitutional on its face and enjoining the City from issuing CTNs under the policy. Merits Order at 1, 18. The district court found that the policy was a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction on protected speech in a traditional public forum and that the policy failed intermediate scrutiny because it did not leave open adequate alternative avenues for communication. Id. at 10–14. The district court found further that the policy's administrative-review process violated Appellants' due-process rights because the post-deprivation nature of the review created a high risk of erroneous deprivation of Appellants' First Amendment rights. Id. at 17–18. The district court entered final judgment in Appellants' favor, declaring the policy facially unconstitutional, ordering a permanent injunction against its enforcement, and awarding all costs to Appellants, but denying all other requested relief, including Appellants' requested nominal damages. The City did not appeal the district court's merits ruling.

Following the district court's order and final judgment, Appellants moved for attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, arguing that the relief they obtained was sufficient to render them prevailing parties and that their fees were reasonable and necessary given the expedited timeline of the bench trial, as well as the skill and experience level of their attorneys. The City opposed an award of fees and asserted that a fee award would be unjust because of special circumstances. In particular, the City argued that because the City had not yet formalized its CTN policy when Appellants received their CTNs, Appellants' injuries were not caused by the City's policy and the City therefore could not be liable under the Monell theory of liability.² The City likewise argued that Appellants were not prevailing parties because they had failed to show that their constitutional rights had been violated by the policy and therefore also had failed to show that the relief that the district court ordered had altered the legal relationship between the parties. Next, the City asserted that Appellants had filed suit knowing that the only potential recovery could be for their attorneys, whose requested fees bordered on “shocking the conscious [sic].” Finally, the City argued in the alternative that if the district court did award fees, the amount of the award sought should be reduced because it was unreasonable.

The district court ultimately found as a matter of law that Appellants were prevailing parties because they obtained a declaratory judgment and injunction. Sanchez v. City of Austin, No. 1:11–cv–00993–LY, slip op. at 3 (W.D.Tex. Sept. 3, 2013), ECF No. 86 [hereinafter Fee Order]. Despite this conclusion, the district court denied Appellants' request for attorneys' fees. Id. First, the district court noted that Appellants' CTNs had been modified and no longer restricted their access to City Hall. Id. The court also recognized that the Occupy Austin protest had ended before the court had entered final judgment in the lawsuit. Id. Finally, the district court also took notice of the City's new curfew and reservation rules and concluded, as a result, that the CTN policy “was no longer in effect.” Id. In sum, the district court reasoned that “the court's order enjoining the enforcement of the City's policy had little or no effect, due to the fact that Plaintiffs were no longer subject to the criminal-trespass...