Arce v. La. State
| Decision Date | 01 March 2018 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION No. 16–14003 |
| Citation | 299 F.Supp.3d 810 |
| Parties | Nelson ARCE et al. v. LOUISIANA STATE et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Andrew David Bizer, Bizer Law Firm, LLC, New Orleans, LA, Brittany Shrader, Pro Hac Vice, Andrew Rozynski, Pro Hac Vice, Eric Baum, Pro Hac Vice, Eisenberg & Baum, LLP, New York, NY, Garret S. DeReus, Marc P. Florman, Bizer Law Firm, LLC, New Orleans, LA, for Nelson Arce et al.
Dennis J. Phayer, Elizabeth A. Doubleday, Burglass & Tankersley, L.L.C., Daniel Rault Martiny, James Bryan Mullaly, Jeffrey David Martiny, Martiny & Associates, Metairie, LA, for Louisiana State et al.
ORDER AND REASONS
The concept of reasonableness plays a leading role in American law, from the "reasonable person" of tort law fame to the "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures" enshrined in the Fourth Amendment. It is also central to the inquiry currently before the Court: after plaintiff Ana Christine Shelton sought as much as millions in compensatory damages, yet won only nominal damages and no other judicially sanctioned relief, what amount of attorney's fees and costs—if any—would it be reasonable for the Court to award her?
This case arose from Nelson Arce's interactions with the Louisiana criminal justice system. After pleading guilty to a drug possession offense in Louisiana state court, Nelson—who was deaf—was placed on probation in Jefferson Parish.1 Plaintiff alleged that Jefferson Parish probation office staff knew that Nelson required a qualified American Sign Language ("ASL") interpreter to effectively communicate, but did not provide such an interpreter to facilitate communication at meetings between themselves and Nelson.2 Plaintiff contended that, as a result, Nelson inadvertently violated the terms and conditions of his probation, leading to his incarceration in the Jefferson Parish Correctional Center ("JPCC") for 90 days.3
Plaintiff further alleged that JPCC officials likewise understood Nelson's communication needs, but ignored them.4 For example, plaintiff argued that JPCC officials never interpreted JPCC rules and regulations into ASL for Nelson.5 Plaintiff alleged that Nelson thus did not understand the rules governing inmates in JPCC, but that, notwithstanding, JPCC twice penalized Nelson for violating these rules.6
On August 22, 2016, Nelson and his father, Lazaro Arce, filed a lawsuit in this Court against the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Public Safety and Corrections ("Louisiana"); Sheriff Newell Normand, in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Jefferson Parish ("Sheriff of Jefferson Parish");7 and Jefferson Parish.8 Their initial complaint asserted claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehab Act"), and prayed for compensatory damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief, against all defendants.9
Nearly two months after initiating their case, Nelson and Lazaro filed a motion for a preliminary injunction against Louisiana, asking the Court to order Louisiana to provide a qualified ASL interpreter for Nelson's probation meetings while the case was pending.10 Before the Court had an opportunity to hold an evidentiary hearing or otherwise act on the motion, the parties reached an agreement that addressed Nelson and Lazaro's concerns.11 After the parties informed the Court of this development, and with the parties' consent, the Court in a minute entry dismissed the motion for a preliminary injunction as moot.12
Several months later and in the midst of discovery, Nelson unfortunately passed away.13 All parties have consistently recognized that Nelson's death was unrelated to the litigation.
After learning of Nelson's untimely passing, the Court dismissed without prejudice all claims for injunctive relief without opposition.14 Shortly thereafter, plaintiff was substituted in Nelson's place and reurged the claims for injunctive relief.15 With plaintiff's consent, the Court granted Louisiana's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief, as plaintiff did not have standing to assert such claims.16
Prior to trial, the Court also dismissed all claims against Jefferson Parish,17 as well as all claims brought by Lazaro.18 Further, the parties held settlement discussions19 before the U.S. Magistrate Judge about two months before trial. Plaintiff's initial settlement demand was $2 million per defendant .20 According to plaintiff, she made this demand "understanding that any settlement would mean no admission of liability, a significant concession particularly in light of Nelson's death"21 —a position seemingly at odds with her recognition that any alleged transgression by defendants did not cause Nelson's death.
Plaintiff then reduced her demand to $1 million per defendant.22 Plaintiff contends that she "indicated a willingness to negotiate," but "[d]efendants did not give any offer whatsoever."23
On the eve of trial, however, defendants offered plaintiff a combined $95,000, inclusive of attorney's fees and costs, to settle the case.24 Plaintiff alleges that she countered their offer with "an admission of liability, $95,000 in damages, plus an application of attorney's fees and costs."25 Defendants argue that "this never occurred."26 In any event, no settlement was reached, and the case proceeded to trial.
After nearly a week of hearing the evidence, the jury found that Louisiana and the Sheriff of Jefferson Parish had both discriminated against Nelson in violation of Title II of the ADA and of § 504 of the Rehab Act, and that the discrimination had been intentional.27 However, the jury found that the discrimination had not caused any injury to Nelson—a point hotly contested by the parties—and it therefore did not award plaintiff any compensatory damages.28 Per the parties' stipulation,29 the Court then awarded plaintiff nominal damages of $1 as to each defendant.30
Plaintiff now requests attorney's fees in the amount of $495,853.50 and costs in the amount of $32,373.08.31 Louisiana and the Sheriff Jefferson Parish both oppose plaintiff's request.32
The Court will address each of plaintiff's requests in turn.
"In the United States, parties are ordinarily required to bear their own attorney's fees—the prevailing party is not entitled to collect from the loser." Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep't of Health & Human Res. , 532 U.S. 598, 602, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001). However, numerous federal statutes depart from this "American Rule," authorizing courts to award an attorney's fee to a "prevailing party." The ADA and the Rehab Act are among them.
In an action under Title II of the ADA, "the court..., in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee, including litigation expenses, and costs." 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Similarly, in an action under § 504 of the Rehab Act, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b).
The Fifth Circuit generally interprets the ADA and the Rehab Act in pari mate ria. See Frame v. City of Arlington , 657 F.3d 215, 223 (5th Cir. 2011). As the parties have not identified any reason why the Court should interpret the ADA and the Rehab Act differently with respect to the question of attorney's fees, the Court will analyze the fee-shifting provisions of both statutes together. See id. at 224.
Further, "[j]urisprudence interpreting either [Title II of the ADA or § 504 of the Rehab Act] is applicable to both." Hainze v. Richards , 207 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2000). For example, the Fifth Circuit has followed its sister circuits and applied case law addressing fee-shifting under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to fee-shifting under Title II of the ADA. See No Barriers, Inc. v. Brinker Chili's Texas, Inc. , 262 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2001). The same case law would likewise apply to § 504 of the Rehab Act.
The threshold question is whether plaintiff qualifies as a "prevailing party" against defendants under the ADA and the Rehab Act. "The 'touchstone' of the prevailing party analysis is whether there has been 'a material alteration of the legal relationship' between the parties." Grisham v. City of Fort Worth, Tex. , 837 F.3d 564, 569 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist. , 489 U.S. 782, 792, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989) ).
To modify the parties' legal relationship, the modification must bear the "necessary judicial imprimatur ." Buckhannon , 532 U.S. at 605, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (emphasis in original). Worded differently, "prevailing party" status requires the receipt of some type of judicially sanctioned relief; an opposing party's voluntary change in conduct will not do. See id. at 603–06, 121 S.Ct. 1835.33 Thus, "[t]o qualify as a prevailing party, the plaintiff must (1) obtain actual relief, such as an enforceable judgment or a consent decree; (2) that materially alters the legal relationship between the parties; and (3) modifies the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff at the time of the judgment or settlement." Walker v. City of Mesquite, Tex. , 313 F.3d 246, 249 (5th Cir. 2002).
"[T]he Supreme Court has emphasized that 'the prevailing party inquiry does not turn on the magnitude of the relief obtained.' " Sanchez v. City of Austin , 774 F.3d 873, 879 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Farrar v. Hobby , 506 U.S. 103, 114, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) ). "A judgment for damages in any amount , whether compensatory or nominal , modifies the defendant's behavior for the plaintiff's benefit by forcing the defendant to pay an amount of money he otherwise would not pay." Farrar , 506 U.S....
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