Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo

Decision Date19 March 2008
Docket NumberCivil No. 07-1618 (JAG).
Citation573 F.Supp.2d 474
PartiesAngel Luis SANCHEZ, Plaintiff v. Miguel A. PEREIRA-CASTILLO, et al., Defendant(s).
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

Guillermo J. Ramos-Luina, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Jose J. Gueits-Ortiz, Department of Justice of Puerto Rico, Julio Nigaglioni-Arrache, Lopez Mulero, Colon Rodriguez & Nigaglioni Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

GARCIA-GREGORY, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Defendants' Miguel A. Pereira-Castillo ("Pereira"), Hector Fontanez-Rivera ("Fontanez"), Ramon Diaz-Correa ("Diaz"), Gilberto Negron-Falcon ("Negron"), Walter Soto-Hernandez ("Soto"), Miguel Caban-Rosados ("Caban") (collectively "Defendants") and Sandra I. Deniz Rocafort's ("Deniz") Motions to Dismiss. (Docket Nos. 20, 24). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants' and Deniz's Motions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 10, 2007, Plaintiff Angel Luis Sanchez ("Plaintiff"), an inmate under the custody of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Administration of Corrections ("AOC"), filed the present complaint. Plaintiff states that on July 13, 2006, several correction officers conducted a search of the living quarters at the correctional facility where he is serving his sentence. On that date, the officers also searched the bodies of the inmates including Plaintiff.

Plaintiff states that while wearing only his underwear, several correction officers, scanned his body with a handheld metal detector. The handheld metal detectors made a positive finding and, as a result, Plaintiff was taken to an area where he was sniffed by a K-9 dog and subsequently strip searched. Plaintiff was then subject to a second search by the correction officers using a hand held metal detector. None of the aforementioned searches resulted in a positive finding.

Nonetheless, Plaintiff was taken to a correctional facility where, in order to rule out the possibility of contraband, x-rays of his abdominal area were taken. Plaintiff objected to the taking of the x-rays, but a corrections officer told him that there was a judicial order for such a procedure. Plaintiff requested to see the alleged order but the corrections officer declined to show it.

After the x-rays were taken, a corrections officer ordered Plaintiff to force himself to have a bowel movement on the floor. This did not produce any foreign object. The Medical Director for the correctional facility where Plaintiff was housed examined the x-rays and informed Plaintiff that they reflected the existence of a foreign object within his rectum that was consistent with a cellular telephone. Plaintiff denied that he had any foreign objects inside himself and requested that another x-ray be performed. No other x-ray tests were performed.

Afterwards, Plaintiff was referred to the Emergency Room of the Rio Piedras Medical Center ("Medical Center"). Doctors at the Medical Center performed two rectal exams, which did not produce any foreign objects. Nonetheless, personnel from the correctional facility insisted that Plaintiff had a foreign object.

Deniz, a doctor at the Medical Center, scheduled Plaintiff for an emergency surgery. No x-rays were taken by Deniz prior to the surgery. On July 14, 2006, Deniz performed an exploratory surgical procedure on Plaintiffs abdomen. Prior to the surgery, Deniz obtained Plaintiffs written consent. As part of the procedure, a post-surgical x-ray film was taken. Both the surgical procedure and the film revealed that Plaintiff did not have a cellular phone or other foreign object within his body. On July 16, 2006, Plaintiff was discharged from the hospital and returned to his cell.

On July 18, 2006, Plaintiff filed an administrative complaint with the AOC. The AOC never addressed Plaintiffs administrative complaint. Consequently, on July 10, 2007, Plaintiff filed the present complaint.

Plaintiff requests money damages under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and under Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31 § 5141. Additionally, Plaintiff has a medical battery and medical malpractice claim. Plaintiff avers that the surgery, the rectal exams and the x-ray exams that were performed on him were invasive, mutilated his body, desecrated his body integrity, jeopardized his life and health, and subjected him to severe physical and emotional pain that continues to this day. Plaintiff contends that several named defendants among them the abovementioned co-defendants are jointly and severally liable for these violations.

On and before July 13, 2006, Pereira was the Secretary of Corrections and Rehabilitation of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and Fontanez was the Auxiliary Administrator of Security and/or the Director of Security at the Central Office of the Administration of Corrections. Diaz was the Director of the Eastern Region for the AOC and Negron was the Security Director for that region. Soto was the warden of the institute where Plaintiff was housed. Plaintiff contends that Pereira, Fontanez, Diaz, Negron, and Soto failed to adequately train the staff at the correction facility, whose actions deprived Plaintiff of his constitutional rights and caused him damages. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that Pereira, Fontanez, Diaz, Negron, and Soto failed to ensure that the correctional officers under their command followed practices and procedures, which would protect his constitutional rights and preserve his bodily integrity. According to Plaintiff, Pereira, Fontanez, Diaz, Negron, and Soto's omissions caused him harm.

Caban was in charge of conducting the search of the living quarters at the correctional facility where Plaintiff was housed. Caban was also one of the correctional officers that ordered Plaintiff to be transported to the facility where the x-rays were taken. Furthermore, Caban was the corrections officer that asserted that there was a judicial order that allowed the taking of the x-rays. Additionally, Caban refused to show the alleged judicial order to Plaintiff before the x-rays were taken. Caban also ordered Plaintiff to force himself to have a bowl movement. According to Plaintiff, Caban may have also been responsible together with other police officers of coordinating the transportation of Plaintiff to the Medical Center; and of ordering other correctional officers to push the doctors at the Medical Center to perform the abdominal surgery on Plaintiff. (Docket No. 1).

On October 22, 2007, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. Defendants contend that Plaintiff's Section 1983 and state law damage claim against them should be dismissed because they are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Furthermore, Defendants allege that the present complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Section 1983 upon which relief can be granted. Moreover, Defendants aver that the case at bar should be dismissed because they are each entitled to qualified immunity. Additionally, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs Fifth Amendment claim must be dismissed because there are no federal government employees involved in the case at bar. Defendants also allege that the claims against Pereira, Fontanez, Diaz, Negron, and Soto should be dismissed because the doctrine of respondeat superior liability is inapplicable to them. Finally, Defendants request that all supplemental claims be dismissed. (Docket No. 20). On November 30, 2007, Plaintiff opposed all of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (Docket No. 23).

On January 22, 2008, Deniz also filed a Motion to Dismiss. Deniz contends that she is entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity in her official capacity and to qualified immunity in her personal capacity. (Docket No. 24). Plaintiff did not oppose Deniz's motion.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Motion to Dismiss Standard

In Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), the Supreme Court recently held that to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege "a plausible entitlement to relief." Rodriguez-Ortiz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92, 95-96 (1st Cir.2007)(quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1967). While Twombly does not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, it does require enough facts to "nudge [plaintiffs'] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1974. Accordingly, in order to avoid dismissal, the plaintiff must provide the grounds upon which his claim rests through factual allegations sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 1965.

The Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor. See Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir.1990). The Court need not credit, however, "bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocutions, and the like" when evaluating the Complaint's allegations. Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996). When opposing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "a plaintiff cannot expect a trial court to do his homework for him." McCoy v. Massachusetts Institute of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 22 (1st Cir.1991). Plaintiffs are responsible for putting their best foot forward in an effort to present a legal theory that will support their claim. Id. at 23 (quoting Correa-Martinez, 903 F.2d at 52). Plaintiffs must set forth "factual allegations, either direct or inferential, regarding each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable theory." Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir.1988).

Discussion

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8 cases
  • Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
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    ...capacity. C. The Dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint The district court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss. Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 573 F.Supp.2d 474 (D.P.R. 2008). The court first determined that because the suit was brought against the defendants in their personal capacity, so......
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    ...is restricted to federal actions and cannot be applied to state actions or private individuals actions. Sanchez v. Pereira–Castillo, 573 F.Supp.2d 474, 484 (D.P.R.2008) (“The Fifth Amendment applies only to actions of the federal government not those of private individuals, nor of state gov......
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    ...27, 2012) (the Eight Amendment applies when the strip search is conducted in a physically abusive manner); Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 573 F. Supp. 2d 474, 485-86 (D.P.R. 2008), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 590 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2009), quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S......
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