Sanchez v. Roden

• Decision Date: 14 February 2013
• Docket Number: Civil No. 12-10931-FDS
• Parties: DAGOBERTO SANCHEZ, Petitioner, v. GARY RODEN, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

DAGOBERTO SANCHEZ, Petitioner,

v.GARY RODEN, Respondent.

Civil No. 12-10931-FDS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

Dated: February 14, 2013

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

SAYLOR, J.

This is an action by a state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner Dagoberto Sanchez was convicted in Suffolk County of second-degree murder and unlawful possession of a firearm. He was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment (with the possibility of parole after 15 years) on the murder conviction and a concurrent two-year term on the firearm conviction. Sanchez now seeks habeas relief, contending that the prosecution deliberately exercised peremptory challenges to strike young men "of color" in violation of his constitutional rights.

For the reasons set forth below, the petition will be denied.

I. Background

A. The Trial

The facts surrounding the crime that led to Sanchez's conviction are extensively set out in the decision of the Massachusetts Appeals Court on the his direct appeal, and only the facts thatare relevant to this opinion bear repetition. See Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 189 (2011). The petition now before the Court concerns not the events of the crime, but events that transpired at trial and on direct appeal.

On August 25, 2005, Sanchez was indicted on one count of second-degree murder and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm. His trial began on September 25, 2006. The jury selection process took two days. By the second day, the prosecution had used eleven peremptory challenges to remove eight white jurors, one 41-year-old Hispanic man, and two African-American men, ages 24 and 25. At that point, ten jurors had been seated, five of whom were African-American. The five African-Americans already seated on the jury included two men, ages 51 and 34. Sanchez's counsel objected to the prosecution's use of its twelfth peremptory challenge against Juror No. 261, an 18-year-old African-American man. Defense counsel argued that the challenge of a third young African-American juror established a discriminatory pattern of excluding young black males, or, when taken with the exclusion of the 41-year-old Hispanic juror, established a pattern of excluding young dark-skinned jurors.

After counsel raised that objection, the trial court initially observed that there was a pattern of challenging young black men. After some discussion at sidebar about the racial identity of the excluded Hispanic juror, the following exchange occurred between the court and defense counsel:

THE COURT: Counsel, the clerk indicates that we have, already, five black people sitting on this jury, okay; so I can't see, as a class; regarding to the color would be a problem. I think the only - what you're basically saying is it's because they're young black men, is that correct? In other words, the emphasis on their age?

MR. SHAPIRO: I think that's certainly part of it; I mean I think that that's what distinguishes these challenges from the other black persons whoweren't challenged. But I think that even if you just look at the two black persons who were challenged, that would be two out of a total of seven which is a significant percentage, in and of itself. But the additional feature to the black persons who have been challenged, I believe, are the relatively youthful - I guess one is 24 and one is 25.

THE COURT: . . . Counsel, in looking at the case law . . . there's nothing with a reference to age here that is one of the classes under Commonwealth versus Soares.

MR. SHAPIRO: I agree and . . . even if you take out Mr. Chinchilla, the Guatemalan [the excluded Hispanic juror] . . . would be the third black man challenged out of a total of eight questioned, so far. So we have three out of a total of eight; which, I say is a significant percentage -

THE COURT: I make a determination that there has not been shown a pattern of discrimination in this case, under the Soares case, at this time.

The trial court allowed the exclusion of Juror No. 261 over defense counsel's objection. Because a prima facie showing of impropriety had not been made, the prosecutor was not required to justify his use of a peremptory challenge.¹

The record does not reflect the final racial composition of the jury, although it appeared to have at least five African-American members. On October 6, 2006, the jury found Sanchez guilty of both counts.

B. The Direct Appeal

Sanchez appealed his conviction to the Massachusetts Appeals Court. He raised two arguments as to the trial judge's jury instructions that are not at issue here. He also argued that the government's use of peremptory challenges was unconstitutional. Specifically, he contended that the exclusion of four apparently young men "of color" violated the Equal Protection Clauseof the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

The Appeals Court affirmed the conviction. The court found that Sanchez had not made a prima facie showing of impropriety, because he could not show a pattern of "excluding members of a discrete group" where it was "likely that individuals [were excluded] solely on the basis of their membership in that group." Sanchez, 79 Mass. App. Ct. at 192 (citing Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460, 463 (2003)). The court found that there was no pattern of discrimination in light of the fact that five African-Americans had already been seated on the jury; that age was not a protected class under either the United States Constitution or the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; and that persons "of color" was not a cognizable group under either state or federal law. Id. at 192-93. Because Sanchez could not establish a prima facie showing of impropriety, the government was not required to justify the peremptory challenge. Id. at 191.

C. The Application to Leave for Further Appellate Review

Sanchez then filed an Application for Leave to Obtain Further Appellate Review (ALOFAR) with the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC). In his ALOFAR, Sanchez set forth the same three arguments, including the argument that the prosecutor improperly used peremptory challenges to discriminate against young men "of color." Sanchez, however, did not explicitly argue that the government's use of peremptory challenges discriminated against young African-American men. On June 29, 2011, the SJC summarily denied the ALOFAR. Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 460 Mass. 1106 (2011). Sanchez then petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court of the United States, which was denied on October 11, 2011.

D. Federal Proceedings

On May 23, 2012, Sanchez filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court. Sanchez concedes that the jury that decided his case was a fair cross-section of the community within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. However, he contends that the government violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when the prosecutor used four peremptory challenges on "the first four apparently young dark-skinned men in the jury pool."² He contends that the government's use of peremptory challenges against the four dark-skinned prospective jurors established a prima facie case of combined color/gender discrimination. Alternatively, he contends that the exclusion of three African-American men, without consideration of the excluded Hispanic man, establishes a prima facie showing of racial discrimination.³

II. Standard of Review

A federal court may not grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus for a person in state custody unless the state court decision is "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, " or the decision was an "unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

"'[A]n unreasonable application' of Supreme Court case law occurs if 'the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle for th[e] [ Supreme] Court's decisions butunreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Jackson v. Coalter, 337 F.3d 74, 81 (1st Cir. 2003). The "unreasonable application" determination must be decided primarily on the basis of Supreme Court holdings that were clearly established at the time of the court proceedings. Id. Nevertheless, factually similar cases from the lower federal courts "may inform such a determination, providing a valuable reference point when the relevant Supreme Court rule is broad and applies to a kaleidoscope array of fact patterns." Rashad v. Walsh, 300 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2002).

If a claim was not "adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings," then the claim should be reviewed de novo by the district court. Clements v. Clarke, 592 F.3d 45, 52 (1st Cir. 2010). In determining whether a claim was adjudicated on the merits in state court, the Court looks to whether the state court decision resolved the parties' claims, with res judicata effect, based on the substance of the claim advanced, rather than on a procedural, or other, ground. Id. Furthermore, to garner the protection of deferential review, the claim must not only be adjudicated on the merits, but, specifically, the merits of the federal claim at issue, which is complicated by the fact that determining precisely which "substance" a state court relied on may be difficult to ascertain. Id. at 53.

Petitioner contends that his claim was not adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings, and, therefore, he is entitled to de novo review.

A. State Adjudication

The Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed the trial court's finding that petitioner could not rebut the presumption of propriety in the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges. See Sanchez, 79 Mass. App. Ct. at 191. In doing so, the Appeals Court reiterated the Massachusettsstandard: "Peremptory challenges are presumed to...