Sanchez v. State
| Decision Date | 03 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | A14-1679 |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Francisco Herrera Sanchez, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent. |
Affirmed
*
Rice County District Court
Jason A. Nielson, Igbanugo Partners Int'l Law Firm, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
John Fossum, Rice County Attorney, Terence Swihart, Assistant County Attorney, Faribault, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Willis, Judge.
The deportation consequences of a plea of guilty to third-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b) (2012), are not "truly clear" as that term is used in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010), and therefore counsel isrequired to advise a noncitizen client pleading to that charge only that a conviction "could" or "may" result in deportation.
Francisco Herrera Sanchez pleaded guilty to one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b). Because Herrera Sanchez is not a United States citizen, the government began removal proceedings against him following his conviction. Herrera Sanchez then sought to withdraw his plea, arguing that counsel did not effectively assist him during the plea process because counsel failed to inform him that he would be deported based on his guilty plea. Herrera Sanchez further argued that counsel's use of leading questions to provide a factual basis for his plea rendered the plea inaccurate. Following an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court found that Herrera Sanchez received effective assistance of counsel and that his plea was therefore accurate, and denied Herrera Sanchez's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Because the deportation consequences of Herrera Sanchez's plea were not "truly clear" as that term is used in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), and because the record demonstrates that Herrera Sanchez's plea was accurate, we affirm.
Francisco Herrera Sanchez was born in Mexico in 1995, and he entered the United States 12 years later. In 2012, he requested immigration status under a program called "Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals," and the government granted his request.
One year later, the state charged Herrera Sanchez with two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct and one count of furnishing alcohol to a minor. Herrera Sanchez pleaded guilty. At the plea hearing, his counsel questioned him about the plea agreement that the two had reviewed, in which the state agreed to dismiss one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct in exchange for a guilty plea on the remaining third-degree criminal-sexual-conduct count and the single count of furnishing alcohol to a minor:
The plea agreement referred to the possible immigration consequences of the plea in a single paragraph:
My attorney has told me and I understand that if I am not a citizen of the United States this plea of guilty may result in deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States of America or denial of citizenship.
Herrera Sanchez signed the agreement.
Herrera Sanchez's counsel asked him the following questions in an effort to provide a factual basis for the plea:
The district court found that this testimony established a factual basis for Herrera Sanchez's plea and sentenced him on the remaining counts.
Shortly after sentencing, representatives of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) seized Herrera Sanchez and delivered him to the ICE office in Bloomington for the institution of removal proceedings.
Two months later, Herrera Sanchez obtained new counsel and sought to withdraw his guilty plea by filing a petition for postconviction relief. Herrera Sanchez argued that he received "clearly erroneous" advice about the immigration consequences of his pleabecause counsel stated that by pleading guilty only that he "could" be deported. Herrera Sanchez alleged that because his sex-offense conviction was an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), his removal was "an absolute certainty." He argued that caselaw required counsel to inform him that by pleading guilty he would be deported and that without this warning his plea was neither intelligent nor voluntary. He also asserted that because counsel used leading questions to establish the factual basis of the plea, his plea was not accurate.
The postconviction court granted Herrera Sanchez's request for an evidentiary hearing. After receiving testimony from Herrera Sanchez and his plea counsel, the postconviction court denied Herrera Sanchez's request to withdraw his plea. The postconviction court found that counsel had told Herrera Sanchez that he "was looking at deportation" following his plea. The postconviction court determined that, with this advice, counsel provided effective assistance rendering Herrera Sanchez's plea voluntary and intelligent. The postconviction court also rejected Herrera Sanchez's argument that counsel's use of leading questions to provide a factual basis rendered his plea inaccurate.
Herrera Sanchez's appeal follows.
I. Did the district court err by determining that Herrera Sanchez's counsel provided constitutionally sufficient advice concerning the immigration consequences of his plea?
II. Did the district court err by determining that counsel's use of leading questions did not, by itself, render Herrera Sanchez's plea inaccurate?
Appellate courts review a postconviction court's denial of a petition for relief for an abuse of discretion. Gulbertson v. State, 843 N.W.2d 240, 244 (Minn. 2014). A postconviction court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision "on an erroneous view of the law" or its decision "is against logic and the facts in the record." Id. (quotation omitted). Appellate courts review a postconviction court's legal determinations de novo, and the postconviction court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Id.
Before a defendant is sentenced, the district court "may" allow the defendant to withdraw his plea "if it is fair and just to do so." Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. But after sentencing, a defendant can withdraw a guilty plea only if "withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice." Id., subd. 1. "A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid." State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). A valid plea is one that is "accurate, voluntary, and intelligent." Id. Ineffective assistance of counsel renders a guilty plea involuntary and unintelligent. See Butala v. State, 664 N.W.2d 333, 341 (Minn. 2003); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S. Ct. 366, 369 (1985). A motion to withdraw a plea after sentencing must be raised in a postconviction petition. See James v. State, 699 N.W.2d 723, 726 (Minn. 2005).
Herrera Sanchez contends that his counsel did not effectively assist him during the plea process because counsel did not inform him that he would certainly be deported following his plea. He argues that counsel's ineffective assistance during the plea process means that his plea was neither voluntary nor intelligent.
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed under the two-pronged analysis explained in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). First, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. State v. Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248, 266 (Minn. 2014) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S. Ct. at 2064). Second, the defendant must prove that there is "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Scruggs v. State, 484 N.W.2d 21, 25 (Minn. 1992) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068).
Herrera Sanchez contends that counsel's assistance fell below the standard of objective reasonableness explained in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). In Padilla, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires that a noncitizen defendant be informed of the deportation risks associated with pleading guilty. Id. at 1482, 1486. The nature of the advice required varies...
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