Sanchez v. State
Decision Date | 08 December 1965 |
Docket Number | No. 38795,38795 |
Citation | 398 S.W.2d 117 |
Parties | Regino Juarez SANCHEZ, Appellant. v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Murray J. Howze, Monahans, for appellant.
Leon B. Douglas, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
DICE, Commissioner.
The offense is murder without malice (Art. 802c, Vernon's Ann.P.C.); the punishment, five years.
The facts as shown by the state's evidence reflect that on the night in question, the appellant, while driving his automobile upon state highway #17, between Pecos and Balmorhea in Reeves County, around 8:30 p. m., collided with the rear of an automobile being driven by Ynes Luna. Riding in the automobile with Mr. Luna were his wife and several children, including the deceased, Ruben Luna, six years of age, who was killed in the collision. At the time of the collision the Luna automobile was being driven on its right-hand side of the highway, and it was struck at the left rear by the right front of appellant's automobile.
Sheriff A. B. Nail and state highway patrolman Jack Dean, who observed appellant at the scene after the collision, testified that he was unsteady on his feet, that his speech was incoherent, and that he had the odor of alcoholic beverage on his breath. Each officer expressed the opinion that at such time appellant was intoxicated. Patrolman Dean further testified that when he arrived at the scene appellant approached him and stated that he was the driver of the automobile and was 'speeding, running between ninety and ninety-five.'
After being placed under arrest, appellant executed a written consent to the giving of a blood specimen. The blood specimen obtained from him, upon being examined at the Department of Public Safety by chemist and toxicologist Wayne Merritt, was shown to contain 0.17% alcohol by weight. The chemist expressed the opinion that the person from whom the blood specimen was taken was intoxicated at the time.
A written statement was also made and signed by appellant on the night of his arrest after having been duly warned by Henry T. Barnett, the person to whom it was made. The statement was introduced in evidence by the state after the court, in a hearing held in the jury's absence, found that the same was voluntarily made.
In the statement, appellant admitted that he was the driver of one of the automobiles involved in the collision and related, in part, as follows:
Testifying as a witness in his own behalf, appellant denied that he was intoxicated and swore that the cause of the collision was dim tail lights on the Luna car and also the fact that he was blinded by the headlights of an approaching automobile. Appellant stated that, because of the dim tail lights, he was within forty-five to sixty feet of the Luna car before seeing it; that it was traveling partially on the right shoulder; and that he tried to avoid the collision by driving between the two vehicles. Another reason given by appellant for the collision was that the left front tire on his automobile blew out. He also denied telling highway partrolman Dean that he was driving between ninety and ninety-five miles per hour and stated that he was driving between sixty-five and seventy-five miles per hour at the time.
Appellant, in support of his application for a suspended sentence, swore that he had never been convicted of a felony in this or any other state.
In rebuttal, the state called deputy sheriff Gary Ingram, of Reeves County, who testified on direct examination that he knew the reputation of appellant as a law-abiding citizen in the neighborhood in which he resided and that it was bad.
While the witness was testifying on direct examination, counsel for appellant stated:
'Your Honor please, Mr. Ingram resides in this county and the Defendant resides in Ector County.'
Then on cross-examination by appellant's counsel, the witness was asked and testified as follows:
'By Mr. Howze:
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...In cases of this nature, the existence or nonexistence of such causal connection is normally a question for the jury. See Sanchez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 398 S.W.2d 117; Stewart v. State, 172 Tex.Cr.R. 253, 355 S.W.2d 706; Dorsche v. State, Tex.Cr.App.,514 S.W.2d 755. In the present case, th......
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