Sanchez v. State
| Decision Date | 20 September 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-145.,04-145. |
| Citation | 2006 WY 116,142 P.3d 1134 |
| Parties | Steven Chris SANCHEZ, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Representing Appellee: Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; James Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney General.
Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.
[¶ 1] A jury found Steven C. Sanchez guilty of first degree felony murder and second degree murder for causing the death of a seventeen-month-old child. He appeals from his judgment and sentence alleging several errors. He claims the district court erred by: (1) denying his motion for a change of venue; (2) admitting evidence under the Wyoming Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 609; (3) permitting expert testimony; and (4) imposing time constraints on closing arguments. Mr. Sanchez also contends the verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence. We affirm.
[¶ 2] The following issues are presented on appeal:
I. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Sanchez's motions for change of venue?
II. Did the district court abuse its discretion in admitting evidence under W.R.E. 404(b)?
III. Did the district court abuse its discretion in admitting evidence under W.R.E. 609?
IV. Did the district court abuse its discretion in placing a time restriction on closing arguments?
V. Did the district court abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony of Dr. Sirotnak?
VI. Was there sufficient evidence to support Mr. Sanchez's convictions of first degree felony murder and second degree murder?
[¶ 3] On July 7, 2003, Mr. Sanchez was babysitting his girlfriend's seventeen-month-old son, JZ. At approximately 3:10 p.m., the Evansville Police Department received a call indicating that JZ had been hit in the chest at Mr. Sanchez's trailer home. Upon arrival, Officer Joseph Vigneri approached Mr. Sanchez who was holding JZ in his arms. The child was covered in vomit and was not breathing. Believing that JZ was choking, Officer Vigneri attempted to resuscitate him. A few moments later, medical personnel arrived and resuscitation efforts were continued. Their efforts were unsuccessful and the child was taken to the Wyoming Medical Center in Casper.
[¶ 4] At the hospital, Dr. Mel Meyer was advised that JZ had been hit in the chest and was not breathing. Upon examination, Dr. Meyer determined JZ had two collapsed lungs, but no external injuries existed except for an injury to the left side of his head and a soft mass on the right side of his head. Dr Meyer called in a trauma surgeon who inserted tubes into JZ's chest to remove the air that had accumulated in his chest cavity. A neurosurgeon was also consulted due to the severity of JZ's head injury. A CAT scan was ordered.
[¶ 5] Upon review of the CAT scan, the neurosurgeon concluded that JZ suffered a massive blow to his head. Surgery was performed to alleviate the pressure mounting in JZ's head and damaging his brain. The surgery alleviated some pressure, but JZ's chance of survival remained quite poor due to the extensive brain damage that had already occurred.
[¶ 6] After the surgery, JZ was stabilized and flown to the Children's Hospital in Denver, Colorado. Despite being seen by several physicians, his condition worsened. JZ died the following day.
[¶ 7] An investigation ensued to determine the cause of JZ's injuries. Officer Vigneri learned from the physicians at the Casper hospital that JZ's condition was the result of massive trauma to his head. When asked about the incident during subsequent interviews with the police, Mr. Sanchez gave varying versions, but ultimately told officers that he ran through a door in the trailer home and somehow hit JZ with his knee and/or the door, "taking him out." Mr. Sanchez repeated this statement to the investigator for the Department of Family Services.
[¶ 8] Mr. Sanchez was taken to the police department for another interview. Mr. Sanchez eventually admitted to hitting JZ in the back of the head. He also admitted that he was angry for various reasons when he went through the door. Mr. Sanchez was arrested and charged with first degree felony murder, committed in the perpetration of the abuse of a child under the age of 16 years, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101, and second degree murder in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-104. A jury convicted Mr. Sanchez of both offenses. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. This appeal followed.
[¶ 9] Prior to jury selection, Mr. Sanchez moved for a change of venue claiming he would be unable to receive a fair and impartial trial in Natrona County as a result of pretrial publicity. The motion was denied. Five days before jury selection, Mr. Sanchez filed a motion to reconsider his change of venue request. The motion was based upon the same allegations as the first, but emphasized that the continuing media coverage was increasing the likelihood of prejudice. This motion was also denied.
[¶ 10] Mr. Sanchez challenges the district court's decision to deny both of his motions. We review decisions on motions for a change of venue under our abuse of discretion standard. Sides v. State, 963 P.2d 227, 231 (Wyo.1998). "We will not interfere with a trial court's decision concerning venue unless it acted in a manner exceeding the bounds of reason under the circumstances." Nixon v. State, 994 P.2d 324, 327 (Wyo.1999). Mr. Sanchez bears the burden of showing prejudice so great that a fair trial cannot be obtained. Id. Mr. Sanchez must also show actual prejudice in the minds of the jurors. Id.
[¶ 11] Article 1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution grants the right to trial "by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed." "The legislative provision mirroring the constitution requires `every criminal case shall be tried in the county in which the indictment or offense charged is found, except as otherwise provided by law.'" Nixon, 994 P.2d at 327 (quoting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-7-102(a) (LEXIS 1999)). "Trial proceedings are transferred to another county `only if the court is satisfied that there exists within the county where the prosecution is pending so great a prejudice against the defendant that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial in that county.'" Id. (quoting W.R.Cr.P. 21(a)).
[¶ 12] Mr. Sanchez contends the district court abused its discretion by applying the wrong standard when it analyzed his request for a change of venue. Mr. Sanchez argues that although the court required him to show actual prejudice, the pretrial publicity in this case was so inflammatory that prejudice may be presumed and a change of venue required as a matter of law pursuant to Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965). He claims that the overwhelming publicity coupled with the connection of Mr. Sanchez's case to other homicides involving the use of methamphetamine supports a presumption of prejudice.1 We disagree.
[¶ 13] Presumed prejudice is rarely invoked and only in extreme circumstances. United States v. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168, 1177 (10th Cir.1991). Because pretrial publicity in topical criminal cases is inevitable, a defendant's rights are impacted only when the publicity dictates the community's opinion as to guilt or innocence. Estes, 381 U.S. at 536, 85 S.Ct. at 1629. In rare cases, the community is so predisposed that prejudice can be presumed and venue must be transferred as a matter of law. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 10 L.Ed.2d 663 (1963).
[¶ 14] For example, in Estes, prejudice was presumed because the pretrial publicity amounted to eleven volumes of press clippings. Estes, 381 U.S. at 535, 85 S.Ct. at 1629. In Rideau, prejudice was presumed when the defendant's confession to the sheriff was filmed and televised on the local news, compromising due process. Rideau, 373 U.S. at 727, 83 S.Ct. at 1419. In Sheppard, five volumes of news clippings accumulated in a six month period. Newspapers published the names and addresses of potential jurors who were peppered with letters and telephone calls regarding the upcoming trial. Again, prejudice was presumed. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 342-343, 86 S.Ct. at 1512.
[¶ 15] In contrast, the evidence of the pretrial publicity in this case consisted of one newspaper clipping and one segment from a local news broadcast. That evidence reflects mostly statements of fact gathered from public records. Although the media did report Mr. Sanchez's case, the adverse publicity did not permeate the community to such a degree that empanelling a fair jury would have been impossible.2 United States v. Affleck, 776 F.2d 1451, 1454 (10th Cir. 1985). This is not a case where prejudice may be presumed.
[¶ 16] Alternatively, Mr. Sanchez contends that even if prejudice is not presumed, actual prejudice tainted his trial and the district court erred by denying his motions. To determine whether pretrial publicity requires a change of venue, we utilize a two-part test. Duke v. State, 2004 WY 120, ¶ 25, 99 P.3d 928, 940 (Wyo.2004). First, the nature and extent of the publicity must be considered. Id. Second, the difficulty or ease in selecting a jury must be considered along with the amount of prejudice which actually appears during voir dire examination. Id.
[¶ 17] In his motions, Mr. Sanchez contended that selecting an impartial jury in Natrona County would be impossible considering the small population and the amount of news coverage. However, the nature and extent of the pretrial publicity in this case was not unusual and jury selection did not prove to be...
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