Sanchez v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 19 May 1982
• Citation: 131 Cal.App.3d 884,182 Cal.Rptr. 703
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Gilbert Ernesto SANCHEZ, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent, The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 64486.

Page 703

182 Cal.Rptr. 703

131 Cal.App.3d 884

Gilbert Ernesto SANCHEZ, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent, The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.

Civ. 64486.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

May 19, 1982.

Potter, Ridenour & Cohen, and Paul E. Potter, Pasadena, for petitioner.

John K. Van de Kamp, Dist. Atty., Donald J. Kaplan and Maurice H. Oppenheim, Deputy Dist. Attys., for real party in interest.

No appearance for respondent.

WOODS, Presiding Justice.

This proceeding in mandate, initiated by a defendant in a criminal action seeking pretrial review of a denial of his motion to dismiss, presents a conflict between an in-custody defendant's right to speedy trial as specified in Penal Code section 1382, subdivision 2, and the statutory preference for trying jointly charged defendants in the same proceedings as stated in Penal Code section 1098. Petitioner's trial was continued beyond the statutory period, over his objections, on the ground that the deputy public defender representing a jointly charged codefendant was unavailable because he was engaged in and assigned to other "must-go" criminal trials.

We have concluded that, in the case here presented, the preference for joint trial did not constitute good cause to delay petitioner's trial beyond the statutory period.

On November 3, 1981, a one-count information was filed jointly charging petitioner and his two codefendants, Jose Sanchez and Santo Santiago, with burglary in violation of Penal Code section 459. Petitioner had been in custody since his arrest on October 1, 1981, on this charge, and remained in custody throughout the remaining proceedings. Both codefendants were at liberty on bail. At arraignment, the county public defender declared a conflict and private counsel were appointed for petitioner and Santiago. The public defender continued to represent defendant Jose Sanchez. All defendants pleaded not guilty and a joint jury trial was set for December 28, 1981.

At the proceedings on December 28, counsel for defendant Santiago advised the court that Santiago had been hospitalized for an indeterminate period. Deputy Public Defender Hall, who represented defendant Jose Sanchez, advised the court that he was engaged in another criminal trial and was assigned to two other "must-go" criminal trials immediately thereafter. He estimated he would not be available until after January 20, and moved for a continuance to that date. His client who remained at liberty on bail waived time. On this representation the court found good cause for continuance of the joint trial of petitioner and Jose Sanchez to January 11 or an earlier date if Deputy Hall became available sooner than anticipated. The trial of defendant Santiago was severed since his physical disability resulted in an inability to stand trial for an indefinite period.

Petitioner objected to the continuance beyond the statutory period, January 4, citing People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738, for the proposition that an in-custody defendant's trial may not be so delayed to accommodate the overcrowded case load of appointed counsel. The court ruled that Johnson, supra, was inapplicable to multiple defendants jointly charged with the same offense. It found the continuance date, seven days beyond the statutory period, was not unreasonable.

Petitioner's counsel requested that another deputy public defender be assigned to represent Jose Sanchez at trial within the statutory period. The court denied this request, stating it had no control over that office and that another deputy could not prepare for trial by January 4.

On January 6, 1982, petitioner filed a written motion to dismiss the information, asserting denial of his right to a speedy trial.

At proceedings held on January 11, 1982, counsel for defendant Santiago advised the court that his client, who was not present, had been released from the hospital and expected to be "fully ambulatory within about two weeks." Argument was then heard on petitioner's motion to dismiss. The court, after reviewing the preliminary examination transcript, denied petitioner's motion on the ground that Johnson, supra, is not controlling where multiple defendants are jointly charged with the same offense and common witnesses and evidence make joint trial appropriate. The court did not comment as to the number of expected witnesses or the relative difficulty of obtaining them for separate trials. ¹ The court then granted a further continuance for the joint trial of petitioner and Jose Sanchez to January 25, with defendant Santiago also to be tried that date if physically able. The court was careful to specify that the continuance was based solely upon the fact that Deputy Hall was engaged in other trials, rather than the illness of defendant Santiago. Defendant objected to the continuance. Defendant Jose Sanchez waived time.

On January 25, defendant Santiago appeared and was ready for trial. Deputy Hall announced readiness and the joint trial of the three defendants was ordered trailed on a day-to-day basis. Petitioner thereupon renewed his motion to dismiss. It was denied, the trial court reiterating the reasons previously stated.

The right of a defendant in a criminal case to a speedy trial is secured by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth. The right to "a speedy public trial" is independently secured by article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. As was recently observed in People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d 557, 563, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738: "Although the federal constitutional right to a speedy trial may indeed have an 'amorphous quality' (Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 522, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2187, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 ...), our own Legislature has defined certain time periods beyond which the right suffers infringement and has simplified our courts' application of the right." "The States, of course, are free to prescribe a reasonable period consistent with constitutional standards, ..." (Barker v. Wingo, (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 523, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2188, 33 L.Ed.2d 101.)

Section 1382 of the California Penal Code provides for mandatory dismissal of an action in superior court if a case is continued, without the express or implied consent of the defendant, beyond the 60-day period following the filing of the indictment or filing of the information "unless good cause to the contrary is shown." What constitutes "good cause" for delay depends on the circumstances of each case and is a determination within the discretion of the trial court. Absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion, the determination of the trial court will not be disturbed on appellate review. (People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 570, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738; People v. McFarland (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 772, 776, 26 Cal.Rptr. 596.) Where a claimed violation of the right is on appellate review prior to conviction, prejudice from the delay will be presumed upon a finding that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proof and persuasion that the delay was occasioned by "good cause." (People v. Wilson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 139, 151-152, 32 Cal.Rptr. 44, 383 P.2d 452.)

In People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d 557, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738, the trial of an indigent in-custody defendant in a criminal action was continued beyond the 60-day period, over his objection, for the sole reason that the deputy public defender appointed to represent him was engaged in and assigned to other "must-go" criminal trials. The Johnson court ² held that where an indigent defendant is in custody awaiting trial, the state has the same obligation to provide him appointed counsel who can bring the case to trial within the statutory period as its already recognized obligation to provide sufficient courtrooms, judges, and prosecutors toward that end. (Id., at pp. 570-571, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738.) Conflicting trial obligations resulting from the routine assignment of heavy case loads to chronically overburdened deputy public defenders and appointed counsel may not constitute good cause for such delay. Only extraordinary, nonrecurring circumstances creating an inordinately heavy case load may constitute such good cause. (Id., at pp. 571-572, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738.)

It is important for purposes of the present discussion to note the principal rationale for the Johnson rule. "A defendant who is incarcerated pending trial, such as defendant Johnson, suffers particular harm when he is denied his right to trial within the statutory period. The following discussion of the 'good cause' provision of section 1382 is limited to the case of an incarcerated defendant." (People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 569, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738; fn. omitted.) The Johnson court observed: "In 1901 this court in In re Begerow (1901) 133 Cal. 349, 355, 65 P. 828 ..., stated that the purpose of the state constitutional protection of the right to a speedy trial is 'to protect those accused of crime against possible delay, caused either by willful oppression, or the neglect of the state or its officers.' '[T]he state or its officers,' we must observe, includes not only the prosecution, but the judiciary and those whom judges assign to represent indigent defendants; 'oppression' or 'neglect' may include the failure to provide the facilities and personnel needed to implement the right to speedy trial." (People v. Johnson, supra, at p. 571, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738.) Accordingly, Johnson concluded: "[T]he state is in no position to deny a defendant his right to a speedy trial because the state is unable to provide counsel who can bring the case to trial within the statutory limits. If the state wants to incarcerate a citizen it cannot do so in violation of the state's own obligations and in violation of its own...