Sanchez v. Swanson

• Decision Date: 16 January 1986
• Docket Number: No. 66491,66491
• Parties: 11 Fla. L. Weekly 31 George I. SANCHEZ, Petitioner, v. Maynard F. SWANSON, Jr., as Circuit Judge, Sixth Judicial Circuit, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 481

481 So.2d 481

11 Fla. L. Weekly 31

George I. SANCHEZ, Petitioner, v. Maynard F. SWANSON, Jr., as Circuit Judge, Sixth Judicial Circuit, Respondent.

No. 66491.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Jan. 16, 1986.

George I. Sanchez, in pro. per.

Thomas H. McGowan, St. Petersburg, for respondent.

SHAW, Justice.

Due to a conflict between the decision below, Sanchez v. Swanson, 461 So.2d 155 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), and Perego v. Robinson, 377 So.2d 834 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979), we have accepted jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

On March 16, 1984, petitioner was awarded a money judgment against Daniel Merlinos in the County Court for Pinellas County. Merlinos filed a notice of appeal in the St. Petersburg branch office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Pinellas County ¹ on Monday, April 16, 1984. The following day, one day after the time expired for filing notice of appeal, the notice was docketed at the clerk's office in Clearwater, the county seat. Respondent, the Honorable Maynard F. Swanson, found the notice to have been timely filed. The Second District Court of Appeal agreed and denied petitioner's writ to prohibit the Circuit Court from exercising jurisdiction over the appeal.

The issue presented is whether a notice of appeal, filed in a branch office prior to the expiration of the thirty-day period for vesting appellate jurisdiction, is timely if the notice is not docketed at the county seat until after expiration of the thirty-day period.

Article VIII, section 1(k) of the Florida Constitution states:

COUNTY SEAT. In every county there shall be a county seat at which shall be located the principal offices and permanent records of all county officers. The county seat may not be moved except as provided by general law. Branch offices for the conduct of county business may be established elsewhere in the county by resolution of the governing body of the county in the manner prescribed by law. No instrument shall be deemed recorded in the county until filed at the county seat according to law.

Petitioner argues that the notice herein was not timely filed because "instrument" as used in the final sentence of section 1(k) is intended to encompass appellate pleadings and motions, and cites in support the requirement in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.040(g) that the clerk record all notices to review final orders of county and circuit courts in civil cases. Petitioner misapprehends the applicability of the rules and the responsibility of an appellant. Rule 9.040(g) sets forth the responsibilities of the clerk, not the appellant. Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(b) requires only that the appellant file the notice of appeal within thirty days, it does not require the appellant to record the notice. This is understandable because recording a notice of appeal is the responsibility of the clerk. Further, "recorded" is not a term generally associated with pleadings and motions which by rule require only filing. The constitutional requirement that instruments evidencing liens, covenants, and proprietary interests in real property be recorded at the county seat serves the manifest purpose of making such information available to the general public at a centralized depository. Similar reason would dictate that security interests in personal property be recorded at a centralized depository. Pleadings and notices in a law suit are distinguishable in that while they might serve some public purpose, they primarily concern the immediate litigants, counsel, and courts. We feel that a logical distinction can be drawn between these two types of instruments and that such a distinction is contemplated by both the constitution and the rules of appellate procedure. In Hoffman v. Hoffman...