Sanchick v. Michigan State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry
| Decision Date | 06 June 1955 |
| Docket Number | No. 48,48 |
| Parties | Edwin L. SANCHICK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHIGAN STATE BOARD OF EXAMINERS IN OPTOMETRY et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Paul B. Barak, Detroit, Ernest Goodman, Detroit, of counsel, for plaintiff and appellant.
Thomas M. Kavanagh, Atty. Gen., Edmund E. Shepherd, Sol. Gen., Lansing, Maurice M. Moule, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants and appellees.
Before the Entire Bench.
Plaintiff, a licensed optometrist, filed a bill of complaint in the Ingham county circuit court seeking to enjoin the defendant State board of examiners in optometry from conducting a hearing on a complaint charging plaintiff with unprofessional, unethical and dishonest conduct.
Plaintiff's bill of complaint challenged the sufficiency of the notice of hearing served upon him by the board and the constitutionality of the optometry act, P.A.1909, No. 71, as amended, Comp.Laws 1948, § 338.251 et seq. A temporary restraining order and an order to show cause issued upon the filing of the bill. The defendant board moved to dismiss on the ground that the bill of complaint did not state a cause of action, that plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law, and that the court was without jurisdiction to enjoin and interfere with the administrative function of the board.
After hearing, the circuit court sustained defendant's motion to dismiss and entered an order dismissing plaintiff's bill of complaint. Plaintiff has appealed from the order of dismissal.
Section 4, Act No. 71, P.A.1909, as amended, C.L.1948, § 338.254, Stat.Ann. § 14.644, provides in part:
'The board of examiners in optometry shall refuse to issue the certificate of registration provided for in this act to any person who shall have been guilty of grossly unprofessional, unethical and dishonest conduct of a character likely to deceive the public, and may suspend or revoke such certificate for like reasons.
"Unprofessional and dishonest conduct' as used in this act is hereby declared to mean:
'(a) The loaning of his license by any licensed optometrist to any person; the employment of 'capper' or 'steerers' to obtain business; 'Splitting' or dividing a fee with any person or persons; the advertising by any means whatsoever of optometric practice or treatment or advice in which untruthful, improbable, misleading or impossible statements are made'.
Appellant urges upon us that the clause 'grossly unprofessional, unethical and dishonest conduct of a character likely to deceive the public,' as found in the act, is not sufficiently definite to inform appellant of the path he must follow at his peril, and, more particularly, that the word 'unethical,' as so employed, is vague and undefined and thus offensive to the constitutional due process clauses. Moreover, asserts appellant, the complaint itself, which charges that appellant employed a 'capper' or 'steerer' subparagraph (a), supra, merely compounds his confusion, since it lacks specific allegations as to how capping and steering deceives the public, and, in addition, like the statute, employs the allegedly vague language describing his conduct as grossly unprofessional, unethical and of a character likely to deceive the public. Finally, he asserts that the complaint does not link capping and steering with swindling, that it thus does not constitute a violation of section 4(a) of the act, and hence that the board of examiners is without jurisdiction to proceed with the hearing.
The act must be read in its entirety and construed in the light of its objectives. Words will be given their usual and customary meanings, save as otherwise defined, and, in seeking meaning, words and clauses will not be divorced from those which precede and those which follow. Our interpretation will thus carry out the intention of the legislature. Wayne County Board of Road Commissioners v. Wayne County Clerk, 293 Mich. 229, 291 N.W. 879. The axis upon which this appeal turns is the expression 'grossly unprofessional, unethical and dishonest conduct of a character likely to deceive the public'. We will examine it in detail for its adherence to the standard above set forth. Its beginning and its ending will not long detain us. The word 'grossly' introduces no new or different charge but relates solely to the matter of degree; and, as to the words 'of a character likely to deceive the public,' we agree with the New Jersey court, Abelson's, Inc., v. New Jersey State Board of Optometrists, 5 N.J. 412, 75 A.2d 867, 22 A.L.R.2d 929, that they are words of definite and certain meaning and, as employed in our act, sufficiently explicit to inform our people as to the conduct which will render them liable to its penalties.
Although it is not an inevitable conclusion that the words "Unprofessional and dishonest conduct", standing alone, would have lacked the necessary particularity, e. g., Matter of Bell v. Board of Regents, 295 N.Y. 101, 65 N.E.2d 184, 163 A.L.R. 900, our legislature has not seen fit to let the matter rest in the courses of conduct known to be improper and unprofessional as a matter of common knowledge. It has defined unprofessional and dishonest conduct. What, however, of the word 'unethical'? Does its added employment render vague and ill-defined what was theretofore precise? Does it import a new and different concept and standard? To answer this inquiry we must inquire into the standards themselves, particularly with respect to the need therefor and the content thereof. It is well recognized that in those professions dealing with human ills and their treatment it is the policy of our people, expressed in many legislative acts, of which the act before us is one, to require of those who would essay such practice conformity with the highest standards of personal and professional competence. With reference to the practice of optometry, it has been well said:
(The work of the optometrist) ...
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