Sandeen v. Kansas City, St. Joseph & Council Bluffs R.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 31 October 1883
• Parties: SANDEEN v. THE KANSAS CITY, ST. JOSEPH & COUNCIL BLUFFS RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

79 Mo. 278

SANDEEN

v.THE KANSAS CITY, ST. JOSEPH & COUNCIL BLUFFS RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1883.

To 102 ties at 50c

$51 00

To 440 feet of lumber at $20 per M

8 80

$59 80

Appeal from Clay Circuit Court.--HON. GEO. W. DUNN, Judge.

REVERSED.

Strong & Mosman for appellant.

Henry Smith, Hamner & Burris for respondent.

MARTIN, C.

On the 2nd day of May, 1877, the plaintiff commenced suit before a justice of the peace by filing the following account:

The Kansas City, St. Joseph & Council Bluffs R. R. Co. To Peter Sandeen, Dr.

To 102 ties at 50 cents

$51 00

To 440 feet of lumber (being 6 pieces, each 8 inches by 11 feet) at $20 per 1,000 feet

8 80

$59 80

The trial resulted in a judgment by default, from which the defendant, after proper motion, appealed to the circuit court.

At the trial in that court the evidence of plaintiff tended to prove that the ties and timber mentioned in his account, were unlawfully taken by the servants of defendant, and that his action was brought to recover the value thereof. The plaintiff himself testified that he had never sold to defendant the lumber and ties mentioned in his account; that the defendant's men came and took them without asking him for them; and that he never consented to the taking, and did not know the exact time when they were taken. The defendant objected to the introduction of any evidence, on the ground that plaintiff had filed no statement of facts constituting his cause of action. This objection was overruled. The evidence of defendant tended to prove that the defendant's men had not taken the ties and lumber sued for. At the conclusion of the evidence the court refused an instruction asked by defendant to the effect that on the pleadings and evidence there could be no recovery, and of its own motion gave the following instruction: “If the jury find from the evidence that the defendant, by its agents and servants, took the ties and lumber of the plaintiff sued for and used the same in repairing its railroad, they will find for the plaintiff the value of the ties and lumber at the time the same were so taken and used, unless they find that defendant paid plaintiff for the same.” The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the full amount claimed, and the defendant brings this appeal, assigning as principal error a want of jurisdiction of the cause of action by the justice's court in which it was brought.

Under the statute the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace in actions for injuries to personal property is limited to $50. Wag. Stat., 808, § 3. The case as set forth in the statement filed before the magistrate is for money due on an account. The case as made in the evidence of plaintiff was for the unlawful taking of ties and lumber, and contains all the elements of the common law action of trover. That action in its nature consists of an injury to personal property, inflicted upon the owner by a conversion of the same to another's use, and as such it falls within the class of actions in which a justice's jurisdiction is limited to $50. Smith v. Grote, 12 Mo. 51; Glasby v. Prewitt, 26 Mo. 121. While the evidence discloses an action of tort in the nature of trover for the conversion of personal property, which, on account of the amount claimed, exceeds the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace, it is nevertheless contended by plaintiff that inasmuch as the defendant, according to plaintiff's evidence, has received the full value of the ties and lumber in its road, the law, at the option of plaintiff, raises an implied assumpsit to pay the value of the property, upon his waiving the tort; and that the case, in this manner changed to an action of assumpsit, is within the jurisdiction of a justice; his jurisdiction in actions on contract being in excess of the amount sued for.

It is perhaps unnecessary to examine this question upon principle, for the reason that it has been repeatedly settled in this State against the plaintiff. In the case of Ahern v. Carroll, 30 Mo. 200, the plaintiff sued on a statement of indebtedness for the value of a horse in the sum of $90, which it was alleged the defendant had unlawfully taken and detained. It is evident from the form of the account that he was suing as on an assumpsit for a conversion. But the court held that the action exceeded the jurisdiction of the justice. In the case of Webb v. Tweedie, 30 Mo. 488, the plaintiff sued as on an account for the killing of a bull. While the form of the statement might well imply, as in the former case, that the tort was waived and the defendant called to account in assumpsit for the value of the bull, the plaintiff did not leave this conclusion to inference, but expressly stated in his account that he waived the wrong and sued in assumpsit. He was not permitted to give jurisdiction by such a...