Sandefur v. Commonwealth

Decision Date16 May 1911
Citation143 Ky. 655
PartiesSandefur v. Commonwealth.
CourtKentucky Court of Appeals
143 Ky. 655
Sandefur
v.
Commonwealth.
Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
Decided May 16, 1911.
Appeal from McLean Circuit Court.

Page 656

GLOVER H. CARY, F. A. LOCHRY, W. G. NEWTON and L. P. TANNER for appellant.

JAMES BREATHITT, Attorney General, and TOM B. McGREGOR, Assistant Attorney General for Appellee.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUDGE CARROLL — Affirming.


The appellant was indicted under section 1155 of the Kentucky Statutes reading:

"Whoever shall unlawfully, carnally, know a female under the age of sixteen years or an idiot shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than ten nor more than twenty years."

The indictment charges that he unlawfully and carnally knew and had sexual intercourse with Ruth Smith, an idiot. Upon a trial the jury found him guilty and fixed his punishment at confinement in the State prison for ten years.

The errors relied on for reversal are (1) that Ruth Smith was not shown to be an idiot; (2) that the testimony of T. D. Little relating to confessions made by the appellant was incompetent; (3) that the evidence for the Commonwealth was not sufficient to authorize a verdict of guilty; (4) that the court erred in failing to properly

Page 657

instruct the Jury; (5) that a continuance should have been granted; (6) that the Attorney for the Commonwealth was guilty of misconduct in his argument to the jury; (7) that there was no evidence that the offense charged in the indictment was committed in McLean county; and (8) error of the court in requesting the jury to make a verdict.

It was of course indispensable to a conviction that the Commonwealth should establish that the prosecutrix Ruth Smith was an idiot. The evidence upon this question is in substance this: She was an unmarried woman, about twenty-one years of age, whose mother had died some three years before the alleged criminal conduct of appellant occurred. A number of witnesses testified that from her infancy she had been feeble-minded; that she did not learn to talk until she was eight or nine years old, and always had an impediment in her speech. That she did not play with other children or as other children did, or take part in the games that children engage in and enjoy. Nor did she ever take any interest in, or seem to understand what was going on about her. That although sent to school for sometime, she scarcely learned anything and could not so much as write her name intelligibly. That she knew her parents and relatives and could go about the streets and in the neighborhood unattended. At the table she knew what she wanted to eat and took the food and other things that were handed to her; but, in this and in other matters during the lifetime of her mother, she depended as a child would upon its mother for everything. She seldom talked to any person, and if asked a question would answer it generally in monosyllables — yes or no. She did nice needle work, but could not make any garments. She could cook plain bread, meat, potatoes and other simple articles, and do such household work as sweeping and the like when some one told her what to do. A baby was born of her intercourse with appellant, but she did not seem to appreciate or understand that she was the mother of a child, and treated her offspring as a small child would a doll. In short, we may say from the evidence that the prosecutrix was virtually destitute of reason and did not have ordinary intellectual powers or sufficient mental capacity to appreciate or understand the shame and wrong of having illicit intercourse or the will power to resist in any degree the endeavors of any man who might seek to take advantage

Page 658

of her. She had a glimmering of reason, but not enough to light the way of life, and while capable of minding a simple request and doing a few little everyday things, she lived and moved unconscious of what was going on about her. This being her condition, we think it was for the jury to say whether or not she was an idiot, and that the jury did not make any mistake in finding that she was as they did when they returned a verdict of guilty.

It is not necessary to constitute an idiot in the meaning of the statute, or even generally. that the person shall have been wholly destitute of mind from infancy or totally deficient in intellectual power. The word "idiot" is variously defined by law writers and courts, and while the definitions recognize that an idiot is a person who from birth or infancy has been lacking in ordinary natural intelligence, they differ as to the degree of imbecility necessary to constitute idiocy. Some of them go to the extent of saying that an idiot is a person wholly destitute of mental powers from birth; while others describe idiocy as mental deficiency not necessarily extending to total lack of understanding. Webster defines an idiot as:

"A human being destitute of the ordinary intellectual powers, whether congenital, developmental or accidental; commonly a person without understanding from birth."

In Bouvier's Law Dictionary the definition given is:

"A person who has been without understanding from his nativity, and whom the law therefore presumes never likely to attain any."

In Russell on Crimes, vol. 1, page 6, the author says an idiot is:

"A fool, a madman, from his nativity, and one who has never had any lucid intervals; and such a one is described as a person that cannot number twenty, tell the days of the week, does not know his father or mother, or his own age; but these are mentioned as instances only; for whether idiot or not is a question of fact for a jury."

In Blackstone, the definition given is:

"A man is not an idiot if he hath any glimmering of reason, so that he can tell his parents, his age, or the like common matters."

Page 659

"In Chitty's Medical Jurisprudence, an `idiot' is Dec., 774, the court on this subject said:

"In Chitty's Medical Jurisprudence, an `idiot' is defined to be `a person who has been defective in intellectual powers from the instant of his birth, or at least before the mind had received the impression of any idea.' Again, Chitty says that idiocy consists in `a defect or sterility of the intellectual power, while lunacy or madness consists in a perversion of intellect.' All these definitions imply either a weakness or perversion of the mind or its powers — not their destruction. Hence, an idiot cannot be said to have no will, but a will weakened or impaired, a will acting but not in conformity to those rules and motives and views which control the actions of persons of sound mind."

The trial court in the case before us defined an idiot as:

"A natural fool; a fool from birth; a human being in form but destitute of reason from birth and of the ordinary intellectual power of man."

As the word "fool" is defined by Webster to be:

"One destitute of reason or of the common powers of understanding; an idiot; a natural; a person deficient in intellect; one who acts absolutely or pursues a course contrary to the dictates of wisdom; one without judgment; a simpleton; a dolt."

We think the words "a natural fool," "a fool from birth," might well have been omitted from the instruction, although their addition to it was not at all prejudicial to appellant. Taken as a whole, the instruction fairly expressed the definition of an idiot, although we think an idiot might more aptly be defined as a person who has been from birth or infancy deficient in mental...

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