Sanders State Bank v. Hawkins

• Decision Date: 07 December 1911
• Citation: 142 S.W. 84
• Parties: SANDERS STATE BANK v. HAWKINS et al.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 84

142 S.W. 84

SANDERS STATE BANK v. HAWKINS et al.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Texarkana.

December 7, 1911.

Appeal from District Court, Bowie County; P. A. Turner, Judge.

Action by the Sanders State Bank against W. E. Hawkins and another. From a judgment of dismissal, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Hart, Mahaffey & Thomas, for appellant. Jewel P. Lightfoot, Atty. Gen., Jno. W. Brady, Asst. Atty. Gen., A. S. Hawkins, and Wm. E. Hawkins, for appellees.

HODGES, J.

The appellant brought this suit against the appellees to recover damages which it claims to have sustained by reason of the closing of its banking house and the suspending of its banking operations by the appellees, while they were claiming to act under the law regulating state banks and trust companies. The petition alleges that the appellant was duly incorporated under the laws of Texas, during the year 1909, as a state bank; that it thereafter received a permit from the proper authority to engage in the banking business with its domicile and place of business in De Kalb, Bowie county, Tex.; that it had a paid-up capital stock of $10,000. The petition then proceeds as follows:

"That continuously from the date when the plaintiff first began business up to the 23d day of March, 1910, it did a banking business in compliance with and by authority of its charter and such certificate so issued to it, and that, on the 23d day of March, 1910, the plaintiff was a solvent and going bank, and that its business and affairs were so managed and conducted, so that in no degree were the safety or security of its depositors, creditors, or stockholders jeopardized. That on said date the resources of the plaintiff consisted of divers and sundry sums of money due it from other solvent banks and bankers in the total sum of $3,000, cash on hand, $225, and loans due it from solvent persons, $7,000, making the total amount of its resources, outsides of fixtures, stationery, etc., $10,250. That on the date aforesaid the liabilities of the plaintiff consisted alone of $10,000, its capital stock, and $225 due the state banking board.

"The plaintiff further alleges that it was then and there located in a prosperous town and county, was well located, had just fairly entered upon its business career. That its standing and credit were good in the financial world, and that its name and standing were good in the community where it was located, and it had reasonable prospects of becoming a prosperous and paying institution, and of making money for its stockholders and conserving the interests of its depositors. That heretofore, on the said 23d day of March, 1910, the defendant W. E. Hawkins was, and for some time had been, the Commissioner of Insurance and Banking of the state of Texas, and on said date the defendant M. E. Hulsey was a bank examiner of the state of Texas. That on the said 23d day of March, 1910, or shortly prior thereto, the defendant W. E. Hawkins, pretending to act as Commissioner of Insurance and Banking, as aforesaid, and pretending to act by virtue of authority in him vested as such officer, but in truth and in fact acting without legal cause or authority, and with malice, and being prompted by motives of pique, spite, and ill will entertained by him against this plaintiff and some or all of its officers, and with the purpose and intent of injuring and harassing this plaintiff and some or all of its stockholders, ordered the defendant M. E. Hulsey, as bank examiner aforesaid, to proceed to De Kalb and close the plaintiff, and take possession of its assets. That the said M. E. Hulsey then and there, and all times thereafter, well knew the motives, purposes, and intentions of the said defendant Hawkins above charged; well knew that said defendant Hawkins was without legal authority to give such order; well knew there existed no legal or just cause for closing plaintiff and taking charge of its assets; well knew that the said Hawkins, in giving him such an order, was prompted by malice, spite, pique, and ill will which he then and there had and held against plaintiff, and against some or all of its officers; notwithstanding such knowledge on his part, however, the said defendant Hulsey, not repudiating, but sharing and entering into, the malice, spite, and illegal and wrongful purposes and intentions of the defendant Hawkins, as above charged, proceeded to De Kalb, Tex., and then and there, to wit, on the 23d day of March, 1910, unlawfully and wrongfully, and for the purpose of carrying out the aforesaid unlawful and malicious purposes and intentions of the defendant Hawkins, by force and arms, unlawfully (entered) into and took possession of that part of a certain brick building in said town of De Kalb, Tex., in which the business of the plaintiff was being conducted, and then and there took possession of the furniture and fixtures of said plaintiff therein situated, consisting of one set of mahogany bank fixtures, three office desks, one typewriter, one-half dozen chairs, carpets, and one cuspidor; and then also took into his possession all of the books and accounts of the plaintiff, its notes, amounting to $7,000, its evidences of money deposited with other banks, amounting to $3,000, and $225 cash on hand, also all of its stationery of every kind and character; and then and there excluded the plaintiff's officers from the part of such building where plaintiff conducted its business, and then and there closed and declared he had closed plaintiff, and thereupon posted on the door of plaintiff bank a notice in substance and to the effect as follows, to wit: `This bank [the Sanders State Bank] is in charge of the Commissioner of Insurance & Banking of the state of Texas. W. E. Hawkins, Commissioner of Insurance & Banking, by M. E. Hulsey, Examiner.'

"The plaintiff further alleges that the defendants, after taking possession of its property, as aforesaid, and closing it, as aforesaid, continued thereafter to hold possession of its property, and to prevent it from carrying on its business; and in order to regain possession of its property, and to be enabled to resume its business, the cashier of the plaintiff was obliged to go to Austin, Tex., and there institute in one of the district courts of Travis county a suit for injunction against the defendant W. E. Hawkins, and in such suit procured a temporary injunction against said defendant Hawkins, by means of which alone it was enabled to secure possession of its property.

"By reason of the wrongful injuries and trespasses of the defendant, as aforesaid, the plaintiff was deprived of the use of its property and the privilege of carrying on its business for three days, to its actual damage the sum of $100. That on account of the trespass aforesaid it sustained actual damages in the further sum of $500. That, in order to procure possession of its property, the plaintiff was obliged to send its cashier to Austin, and his reasonable expenses, which plaintiff paid, were $40, whereby the plaintiff sustained actual damages in the further sum of $40. That to procure possession of its property it became and was necessary for the plaintiff to employ and pay attorneys to institute and prosecute said suit for injunction, and that on this account it paid out the sum of $350, which was a reasonable sum, to its actual damage in the further sum of $350. That on account of the closing of its bank, as aforesaid, and the wide and general publicity given of such closing, which publicity was given to such fact by the defendants, or at least by the defendant Hawkins, the credit, standing, and business prospects of plaintiff were greatly injured, and its prospects of carrying on a successful or profitable business, or securing deposits, were shattered and practically ruined, to the plaintiff's actual damage in the further sum of $9,010, aggregating actual damages in the sum of $10,000, which sum the plaintiff alleges it is entitled to recover of the defendants jointly and severally. And the plaintiff further alleges that because of the facts hereinbefore alleged it is justly entitled to recover of defendants exemplary damages, and if not entitled to recover of the defendants the several items hereinbefore alleged, to wit, $40, for expenses of its cashier to Austin, $350, paid out as attorney's fees, and $9,010 for injury to its credit, business prospects, and financial standing, as actual damages, then, in such case, the plaintiff pleads and prays to recover such amounts as exemplary damages of the defendants, and prays that it recover of defendants exemplary damages in the aggregate sum of $10,000."

The appellees, defendants below, urged a general demurrer to this petition, which was by the court sustained. The plaintiff declined to amend, and the cause was dismissed, and from that judgment this appeal is prosecuted.

It appears to be conceded by counsel for appellant that the appellees were quasi judicial officers, and that their conduct in closing the bank must be regarded as having been performed while purporting to act in that capacity. In order to render a judicial or quasi judicial officer personally liable in a private action for damages resulting from his official conduct, it must appear that he transcended the limits of his power. As long as he remains within the scope of his legal authority, his motive is immaterial. Rains v. Simpson, 50 Tex. 495, 32 Am. Rep. 609; McVea v. Walker, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 46, 31 S. W. 839; Taylor v. Goodrich, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 109, 40 S. W. 515; Anderson v. Roberts, 35 S. W. 416; Throop on Public Off. § 713, and numerous cases cited in note. The case of Rains v. Simpson, supra, was one in which a sheriff sued the members of the county court for maliciously refusing to approve his bond as tax collector. After discussing the facts alleged in the petition and holding that they were insufficient to constitute a cause of action, the court said: "From the very necessity of the case,...