Sanders v. Alger

• Decision Date: 01 June 2017
• Docket Number: No. CV-16-0181-PR,CV-16-0181-PR
• Citation: 394 P.3d 1083
• Parties: Jeanette M. SANDERS, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Francis ALGER, Defendant/Appellee.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

394 P.3d 1083

Jeanette M. SANDERS, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.Francis ALGER, Defendant/Appellee.

No. CV-16-0181-PR

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Filed June 1, 2017

J. Patrick Butler (argued), Tretschok, McNamara & Miller, P.C., Tucson, Attorneys for Jeanette M. Sanders

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General, Dominic Draye, Solicitor General, Daniel P. Schaack (argued), Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Robert R. McCright, Assistant Attorney General, Attorneys for Francis Alger

CHIEF JUSTICE BALES authored the opinion of the Court, in which VICE CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER, JUSTICES BRUTINEL, TIMMER, BOLICK, and GOULD, and JUDGE VEDERMAN joined.^*

CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, opinion of the Court:

¶ 1 We hold that a patient owes a duty of reasonable care to a caregiver allegedly injured by the patient's actions, thereby making the patient potentially liable for negligence. We further hold that the negligence claim, which involves an in-home caregiver hired by the Arizona Department of Economic Security ("DES"), is not barred by the firefighter's rule, a common law doctrine barring recovery by a rescuer for injuries incurred while performing duties as a professional firefighter.

I.

¶ 2 We review a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Andrews v. Blake , 205 Ariz. 236, 240 ¶ 12, 69 P.3d 7 (2003). Because the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant Francis Alger, we view the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff Jeanette M. Sanders as the non-moving party. See id.

¶ 3 In 2004, Sanders contracted with DES to provide in-home care to Alger, who is developmentally disabled and, as a "vulnerable adult," is eligible for services from the DES Division of Developmental Disabilities. See A.R.S. § 36–559(A). Alger suffers from cerebral palsy

and other conditions that limit his mobility and place him at risk of falling. Sanders worked for DES as an independent contractor rather than an employee. In 2011, Sanders, then sixty years old, was assisting seventy-four-year-old Alger in moving from his wheelchair to a car. Alger attempted to stand up and, distracted, did not respond to Sanders' warnings and began to fall. When Sanders tried to prevent the fall, Alger grabbed her, and she said "let go, you're hurting me." Alger nonetheless fell on Sanders, seriously injuring her. Sanders subsequently sued Alger for negligence. Among other things, she alleged that he had negligently placed himself in jeopardy of falling, thereby requiring her to rescue him.

¶ 4 Alger moved for summary judgment, arguing that he did not owe a duty of care to Sanders, that the firefighter's rule barred her claim, and that no reasonable jury could find that he had acted negligently. The trial court granted summary judgment based on the firefighter's rule and did not address the other arguments.

¶ 5 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the firefighter's rule does not apply. Sanders v. Alger , 240 Ariz. 90, 93 ¶ 12, 375 P.3d 1199 (App. 2016). The court also held that "Alger owed Sanders the basic duty that all persons owe each other: the duty to use reasonable care to avoid causing injury to others." Id. at 94 ¶ 19, 375 P.3d 1199 (footnote omitted) (citing Ontiveros v. Borak , 136 Ariz. 500, 509, 667 P.2d 200 (1983) ). The court concluded that Alger was not relieved of his duty by the fact that Sanders had contractually undertaken to care for him, including by helping to prevent the risks of his falling. Id. at 93–94 ¶¶ 15–16, 375 P.3d 1199.

¶ 6 We granted review to consider whether a patient owes a caregiver a duty of reasonable care and, if so, whether the firefighter's rule bars a caregiver's negligence claim, both recurring issues of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12–120.24.

II.

A.

¶ 7 Under Arizona law, a plaintiff must prove four elements to sustain a claim for negligence: "(1) a duty requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of care; (2) a breach by the defendant of that standard; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual damages." Gipson v. Kasey , 214 Ariz. 141, 143 ¶ 9, 150 P.3d 228 (2007). "Whether the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty of care is a threshold issue; absent some duty, an action for negligence cannot be maintained." Id. ¶ 11 (citation omitted).

¶ 8 We first address whether Alger, the patient, owed any duty to Sanders, who provided caregiver services to him pursuant to her contract with DES. The court of appeals held that such a duty exists because all people have a duty to use reasonable care to avoid causing injury to others. Sanders , 240 Ariz. at 94 ¶ 19 ; cf. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical & Emotional Harm § 7(a) (Am. Law Inst. 2010) (providing that "[a]n actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the actor's conduct creates a risk of physical harm"). Although we agree with the court of appeals that Alger owed a duty of reasonable care to Sanders, we decline to adopt that court's rationale, as we need not here decide whether people generally owe a duty of reasonable care to others. Cf. Gipson , 214 Ariz. at 146 ¶ 24 & n.4, 150 P.3d 228 (noting tension in Court's statements regarding scope of duty and declining, as unnecessary, to base decision on broad statements of duty generally owed by all persons).

¶ 9 Under Arizona common law, duties of care may arise from, among other things, a direct relationship between the parties. Id. at 144–45 ¶ 18, 150 P.3d 228 ; see also Stanley v. McCarver , 208 Ariz. 219, 221 ¶ 7, 223 ¶ 13, 92 P.3d 849 (2004) (recognizing duty by examining physician even absent formal physician-patient relationship); Ontiveros , 136 Ariz. at 508, 667 P.2d 200 ("The relation between individuals which imposes a legal obligation is usually a direct relationship between the plaintiff and defendant."); cf. Alhambra Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court , 165 Ariz. 38, 41, 796 P.2d 470 (1990) ("Duty refers to the relationship between individuals; it imposes a legal obligation on one party for the benefit of the other party.") (citation omitted).

¶ 10 No one questions that caregivers who contractually agree to provide services (such as helping a person with mobility issues) have a direct relationship with their patients and owe them a duty of reasonable care in connection with such services. Nor would anyone dispute that, given the relationship, the caregiver owes a duty of reasonable care with respect to actions beyond the contractually assumed responsibilities. For example, a caregiver hired to help with mobility issues would undoubtedly owe a duty of care that would be implicated if the caregiver negligently spilled scalding water on the patient.

¶ 11 The question here is whether patients owe any duty to their caregivers. Recognizing such a duty comports with our recognition of duties in other contexts. If a patient sues a caregiver for alleged negligence, the defendant caregiver generally will be able to argue that the patient's own failure to act with reasonable care constitutes contributory negligence. See, e.g ., George Washington Univ. v. Waas , 648 A.2d 178, 184–85 (D.C. 1994) (citing case law and jury instructions from numerous states and other legal authority recognizing a patient's contributory negligence and duty to his or her physician in medical contexts); Richard A. Epstein, Torts § 8.2.1, at 189 (1999) (noting that duty is an element of contributory negligence).

¶ 12 Recognizing a duty of care on the part of patients is also consistent with the rescue doctrine recognized in Espinoza v. Schulenburg , 212 Ariz. 215, 129 P.3d 937 (2006). Under the rescue doctrine, an actor who negligently imperils himself or herself may be liable to a person who is physically harmed in attempting to aid or protect the actor. See Espinoza , 212 Ariz. at 217 ¶¶ 7–9, 129 P.3d 937 (adopting Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. For Physical & Emotional Harms § 32); see also Cowen v. Thornton , 621 So.2d 684, 687–88 & n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (finding patient owed duty of care to caregiver despite patient's assertion that the firefighter's rule barred the caregiver rescuer's claim). "The law should encourage people to respond to those in distress. The rescue doctrine does so by allowing the possibility of compensation to those who injure themselves while taking risks to help others." Espinoza , 212 Ariz. at 217 ¶ 9, 129 P.3d 937. Thus, the rescue doctrine presumes a "duty" on the part of the actor whose conduct creates the need for rescue—if the actor fails to exercise reasonable care and imperils the actor or another, the actor's breach of that duty may result in liability to a person harmed while trying to aid or protect the actor. See Sears v. Morrison , 76 Cal.App.4th 577, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 528, 532–34 (1999) (compiling cases from various jurisdictions and other authorities recognizing that rescuer may seek recovery from person negligently placing himself or herself in danger).

¶ 13 Recognizing a duty by patients to their caregivers is not, of course, the same as saying that patients will be liable for injuries incurred by a caregiver in doing his or her job or that the patient's standard of care is the same as that of a caregiver. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299(A) (Am. Law Inst. 1965) (noting "one who undertakes to render services in the practice of a profession or trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession or trade in good standing in similar communities"). That a duty exists does not mean that it has been breached in any particular case or that a negligent act has proximately caused an injury. Similarly, recognizing the existence of a duty of care does not preclude the jury's application of doctrines such as comparative fault, assumption of risk, or superseding cause to limit recovery of damages. See Gipson , 214 Ariz. at 147 ¶ 30...