Sanders v. Black

• Decision Date: 02 December 1957
• Docket Number: No. 18207,18207
• Citation: 318 P.2d 1100,136 Colo. 417
• Parties: Louis D. SANDERS, Louise D. Sanders, and Lillian C. Black, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Myrtie BLACK, Defendant in Error.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 1100

318 P.2d 1100

136 Colo. 417

Louis D. SANDERS, Louise D. Sanders, and Lillian C. Black Plaintiffs in Error, v. Myrtie BLACK, Defendant in Error.

No. 18207.

Supreme Court of Colorado, In Department.

Dec. 2, 1957.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 23, 1957.

Charles S. Vigil, Denver, for plaintiffs in error.

Carmel A. Garlutzo, Trinidad, for defendant in error.

DAY, Justice.

This case is among those we sometimes encounter which would justify the court in resorting to the speedy avenue of disposition afforded in Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 118(f). Nevertheless the contentions of plaintiffs in error may be answered fully but concisely so we proceed to the task.

The action by the plaintiff below, defendant in error, was addressed to the equity powers of the court. We note in the findings and conclusions of the trial court that complete equity has been accomplished among the parties by an able court. The judgment is amply supported by the evidence. The respective parties find themselves in the position they should be equity occupy, so none has just cause for complaint. We will not disturb the judgment of the trial court.

A rather complicated factual situation, boiled down to its bare essentials, reveals that Myrtle Black was entitled to a reconveyance to her of certain property which she gave to her son Arthur R. Black and her daughter-in-law Lillian. They did reconvey to her, but during the time Myrtle Black's property was held in their names they used it, along with certain hotel property of their own, as security for a loan obtained from a Trinidad bank. At the time of the reconveyance they were unable to obtain release of Myrtle Black's property from the encumbrance thereon, but an agreement was entered into between Arthur and Lillian whereby Lillian would pay off the bank obligation and thus, without any cost to Myrtle, would eventually obtain for her complete clearance of her property. Lillian's obligation was transferred to and assumed by Louis D. Sanders in a purchase and sale agreement involving the hotel property. Sanders understood that part of the purchase price for the hotel was his obligation to pay off the encumbrance of the bank, and thus he, in turn, agreed that without cost to Myrtle her property would eventually be released through the payment of Sanders of his obligation. For an almost identical case we refer to the holding in Cooley v. Murray, 11 Colo.App. 241, 52 P. 1108.

The law of the case may be found succinctly in 12 Am.Jur., 825-826, § 277, wherein it is stated:

'* * * the rule in a great majority of American jurisdictions is that a third person may enforce a promise made for his benefit even though he is a stranger both to the contract and to the consideration. In other words, it is not necessary that any consideration move from the third party; it is enough if there is a sufficient...