Sanders v. Blain's Adm'rs

• Decision Date: 05 October 1831
• Parties: Sanders, et al v. Blain's Adm'rs.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

29 Ky. 446

Sanders, et al v. Blain's Adm'rs.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

October 5, 1831

Assignment. Assignee. Administrators. Co-obligees. Obligation.

ERROR TO THE FRANKLIN CIRCUIT; DANIEL MAYES, JUDGE.

Sanders for plaintiffs.

Monroe for defendant.

OPINION

ROBERTSON CHIEF JUSTICE:

On a note executed to Ezra Richmond administrator, and to Mary Blain, administratrix of James Blain, deceased; and on which was the following endorsement: " For value received, I assign the within note to Richard Boulware, Nov. 7th, 1829;

E. RICHMOND."

The obligees brought suit in their own names, and recovered judgment. The obligors pleaded that E. Richmond was the acting administrator, and had, by his assignment, vested the legal right of action on the note, in R. Boulware. But the circuit court sustained a demurrer to that plea. And now, the only question to be decided, is, whether or not, the court erred in its judgment on the demurrer. As the plea is in proper form, the only point to be considered, is, whether, admitting all its allegations to be true, the suit can be maintained in the names of the obligees.

The averment, that the legal title is in Boulware, can be considered, only as a deduction from the endorsement on the note. If, therefore, that endorsement does not show that the right of action is in Boulware, the plea was insufficient.

If the note had been given to the intestate, any one of his personal representatives could have tranferred the whole legal right to it, by assignment, because any one of them might alone have fully represented him, and disposed of all personal interests which accrued to him in his lifetime.

Where a note has been executed to the intestate, any one of his administrators can transfer, by assignment, the whole legal right to it.

When a note is executed to A, " administrator" of B, it will be considered, for most purposes, as a note to A individually; and he may sue on it in his own name, and will (in whatever character he may sue) he individually liable for costs.

But the note in this case, having been given to the administrator and administratrix, as the obligees, must be considered, for most purposes, as their individual note. They might sue on it in their individual names; and would (in whatever character they might choose to sue,) be individually liable for costs. Each being an obligee, and therefore, having a legal interest in the note, that legal interest of each, can not be assigned by one, unless the legal interests of joint obligees in their own right may be assigned by any one of them. The reason and analogus of the law, seem to authorize this conclusion. But, however this may be, as Richmond has treated the note as one in his own right, and assigned it as such, it will be proper to consider it as an ordinary joint obligation to several in their own right.

It seems to us, that principal and authority are equally opposed to the idea urged in this case by the counsel for the plaintiffs in error, that one joint obligee can, by his sole act, transfer the whole legal interest of the...