CARTER
J.
This
action by the plaintiff, Jabez J. Sanders, Jr., against the
defendant Charleston Consolidated Railway & Lighting Company,
was commenced in the court of common pleas for Charleston
county, July 30, 1927, for damages, in the sum of $100,000,
for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by the
plaintiff, on or about the 20th day of November, 1926, on
account of the negligence, carelessness, recklessness, and
wantonness of the defendant, its agents and servants, in the
particulars to which we shall hereinafter call attention.
Answer to the complaint was filed by the South Carolina Power
Company, as the successor to the Charleston Consolidated
Railway & Lighting Company. This is the second appeal in the
case. The result of the first appeal is reported in 154 S.C.
220 and 158 S.E. 438. All that was decided in the first
appeal was that the judgment below would have to be reversed
because the verdict of the jury should not have been received
and recorded, and for that reason the case was remanded for a
new trial. The second trial of the case was had at the April,
1930, term of said court of common pleas of Charleston
county, before his honor, Judge M. M. Mann, and a jury. At
the close of the testimony introduced on behalf of the
plaintiff, on motion of counsel for the defendant, his honor,
Judge Mann, granted a nonsuit, and from the judgment entered
on the order of nonsuit the plaintiff has appealed to this
court, alleging error in the following particulars:
"Exception
I. The Presiding Judge erred in granting a non-suit upon
the ground that there was ample testimony to carry the case
to the jury.
"Exception
II. Because the plaintiff having proved a violation of the
ordinances of the City of Charleston by the defendant,
requiring its wires to be insulated, and this being
negligence per se, his honor should have left it to the
jury to say whether this negligence was the proximate cause
of the injury and on this ground erred in granting the
motion for a non-suit.
"Exception
III. His honor erred in granting a non-suit on the
following grounds: 'But with the exhibit before me, I
can only conclude that the defect in the wire is only a
rare instance, it does not seem to be habitual. I cannot
see how that uninsulated spot, however it may have come
there, unless it is larger than the camera shows it, could
be held to be a negligent act in law, knowing that
insulation may from time to time become defective in
spots;' the error being:
"(a)
That it was for the jury to determine, with all the
exhibits before it and the other testimony, whether or
not the defendant was guilty of negligence.
"(b)
That his honor could not take judicial cognizance of the
fact (if it be a fact) 'that insulation may from time
to time become defective in spots.'
"(c)
That his honor could not substitute his knowledge that
insulation or wiring becomes defective and therefore
there was no actionable negligence on the part of the
defendant in allowing its wires to become so, when the
city ordinances required defendant's wires to be
insulated.
"Exception
IV. That his honor erred in granting the non-suit on the
ground that he was estopped from considering the
testimony in the present case by the decisions in the
Foster and Williams cases for the reason
that neither of said cases are applicable to the present
case."
The
following quotation from plaintiff's complaint is
necessary to get a clear understanding of the facts relied
upon by the plaintiff to sustain his alleged cause of action:
"Second:
That on or about the 20th day of November, 1926, plaintiff
and his nephew, Carroll Huggins, a lad of about sixteen years
of age, were in the yard in the rear of premises, corner
Harris and Meeting Streets, in the City of Charleston, where
the said plaintiff lived; that the said Carroll Huggins, in
play and sport tied a long wire to a piece of iron and
telling his grandmother that he was going to throw it into
the marsh, threw the iron with the wire attached in the
direction of the marsh; that the piece of iron fell and in
doing so the wire attached to said iron came across an
electric wire owned by said defendant corporation and strung
along said Harris Street and carrying a high and deadly
current of electricity, the insulation on said wire having
been allowed by said defendant to become worn and defective;
that when the said lad, Carroll Huggins, saw that the wire
attached to the piece of iron which he had thrown had caught
over said electric wire, he ran out in the street and in a
few minutes plaintiff heard him scream and rushed out to see
what the trouble was; that as he did so and got in the street
he saw his nephew, Carroll Huggins, lying on the ground
dying, the said nephew having come in contact with the wire
which had been thrown over the electric wire of defendant
corporation, which said electric wire was carrying a high and
dangerous current of electricity and on which the insulation
had been allowed by said defendant to become worn and
defective; that in the alarm, confusion, excitement and
emergency of the situation, in going to the aid of said
nephew, plaintiff became entangled in the wire attached to
the missile which the said Carroll Huggins had thrown, and
said wire, having become highly charged with electricity by
reason of the insulation on said wire belonging to said
defendant having been allowed to wear off, and become
defective, he received a frightful and terrible shock from
said highly charged wire, he was rendered unconscious, his
right hand was burned at the wrist and side and crippled, he
was badly burned on the side and back, burned in the mouth
and nose and his left hand so horribly and frightfully burned
that it was obliged to be amputated above the wrist. He was
taken to a hospital where he remained for weeks and weeks,
suffering the most excruciating and agonizing pain, was
afterwards taken to his home, still suffering, and is
permanently disfigured, maimed and crippled."
Following
these allegations, the plaintiff, in naming specific acts of
negligence, further set forth the following additional
allegations:
"Third:
That the injuries to plaintiff, as aforesaid, were caused
by the negligence, carelessness, recklessness and
wantonness of said defendant corporation, its agents and
servants, in the following particulars, to wit:
"(a)
In causing and allowing the insulation to be worn off and
become defective on its wires on Harris Street, which said
wires carried a high and dangerous electric current.
"(b)
In failing and omitting to keep said wires, carrying said
high and dangerous current of electricity over a publc
street in the City of Charleston, properly insulated.
"(c)
In failing and omitting to have made any proper inspection
of said wires, carrying said deadly current of electricity,
so as to have ascertained their defective condition.
"(d)
In failing and omitting to have said wire insulated, as
required by
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