Sanders v. City of Columbia

• Decision Date: 26 May 2020
• Docket Number: WD 82527
• Parties: Rob SANDERS, Appellant, v. CITY OF COLUMBIA, Missouri, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

602 S.W.3d 288

Rob SANDERS, Appellant,

v.CITY OF COLUMBIA, Missouri, Respondent.

WD 82527

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

OPINION FILED: May 26, 2020

Scott T. Jansen, St. Louis, MO, for appellant.

Ian P. Cooper and Mollie G. Mohan, St. Louis, MO, for respondent.

Before Division One: Lisa White Hardwick, Presiding Judge, Cynthia L. Martin, Judge and Thomas N. Chapman, Judge

Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

Rob Sanders ("Sanders") appeals from a judgment ("Judgment") entered by the trial court in favor of the City of Columbia ("City") after a trial de novo conducted pursuant to section 536.150¹ of the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act ("MAPA"). The trial court's Judgment rejected all claims included in Sanders's Second Amended Petition, which challenged the City Manager's administrative determination to terminate Sanders's employment. Sanders argues that the trial court erred in entering its Judgment because: (1) the trial court misapplied section 536.150 by failing to conduct de novo review to determine whether the City Manager lawfully terminated Sanders's employment; (2) the trial court misapplied section 536.150 by not substituting its own discretion to determine whether Sanders violated City policy or ordinances; (3) substantial evidence did not support the City Manager's finding that Sanders violated the City's Use of Force Policy and City Ordinance section 19-225(a)(3); and (4) City Ordinance section 19-225(a)(3) is unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous. Finding no error, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background²

Sanders was employed by the City with the Police Department from 1993 until September 2011. Prior to August 15, 2011, Sanders had thirteen instances of documented discipline, including four suspensions.

On August 15, 2011, Sanders responded to a call to assist other officers with the arrest of Kenneth Baker ("Baker"), who was intoxicated and resisting arrest. After a prolonged fight during which pepper spray was used to subdue Baker, Baker was eventually arrested and transported to the Police Department. Sanders assisted Baker to irrigate the pepper spray from Baker's face and eyes. Once inside the station, Baker was no longer handcuffed, was not violent, did not resist arrest, and did not attempt to flee. Baker was placed in a holding cell to await the arrival of the arresting officers who were required to complete the booking process. In the meantime, Baker continued to complain of the effects of the pepper spray and asked if the water to a sink located in the holding cell could be turned on. Sanders provided Baker with a paper towel to fan his face. Sanders explained that the sink was broken and that the only water available to Baker was from the toilet. Baker began slapping the cell door. Sanders, who was outside the cell along with two other officers, advised Baker that he needed to stop slapping the door or Sanders would handcuff Baker to a ring in the holding cell. No one else was near or inside the cell besides the three officers. Baker struck the door again. Sanders opened the door and entered. Sanders instructed Baker to sit at the rear of the cell. Baker refused and cursed at Sanders. Sanders again directed Baker to sit at the rear of the cell. Baker again cursed at Sanders. Sanders then used a two-handed shove on Baker with such force that Baker flew airborne, striking his head on the concrete holding cell wall. The sound of Baker striking the concrete holding cell wall was so loud that it was captured by a microphone located in the booking room, which was located down and around two hallways.

Baker was handcuffed to the holding cell ring. Outside the cell, Sanders realized he had blood on his arm. Sanders and the other two officers returned to the cell and found that Baker had a laceration on his head. Baker was conscious, threatening to kill Sanders, and bleeding on the ground. The officers left Baker lying on the floor of the cell with his hands handcuffed behind him for twelve minutes, while they contacted emergency medical services. Upon returning to the booking room, Sanders stated to his fellow officers "Well, let's just say he lost round two."

After reviewing the incident, the Police Chief determined that Sanders had violated numerous department policies and issued a notice of termination. Sanders challenged the termination through the City's internal review process. Eventually, a hearing was held before the City's Personnel Advisory Board ("PAB"), which issued a decision upholding Sanders's termination of employment. Sanders appealed the PAB decision to the City Manager, who determined that Sanders's conduct violated City policy and ordinances and terminated Sanders's employment with the Police Department.

Sanders sought review of the City Manager's determination as a contested case under 536.140. A trial court conducted review accordingly, and reversed the City Manager's determination to terminate Sanders's employment. The City appealed. In Sanders v. City of Columbia , 481 S.W.3d 136 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016) ( "Sanders I "), this Court reversed and remanded because the City Manager's determination should have been reviewed as a noncontested case pursuant to section 536.150.

Upon remand, the trial court conducted a trial de novo pursuant to section 536.150. The trial court entered its Judgment, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, concluding that the City Manager acted lawfully in determining that Sanders's use of force was objectively unreasonable and retaliatory in violation of the City's Use of Force Policy, permitting termination pursuant to City Ordinance section 19-225(a)(4). The trial court's Judgment also found that the City Manager acted lawfully in determining that Sanders's treatment of Baker was abusive and improper in violation of City Ordinance section 19-225(a)(3). The trial court thus concluded that the City Manager lawfully exercised the discretion delegated him over personnel matters to terminate Sanders's employment.

Sanders filed this timely appeal.

Analysis

Sanders raises four points on appeal. Sanders's first point argues that the trial court misapplied the law by reviewing the City Manager's determination for substantial evidence instead of conducting a trial de novo. Sanders's second point argues that the trial court misapplied the law by deferring to the City Manager's discretion instead of exercising its own discretion to decide if Sanders violated City policy or ordinances. Sanders's third point argues that the City Manager's determination that Sanders violated City policy and ordinances was not supported by substantial evidence. Sanders's fourth point argues that City Ordinance section 19-225(a)(3) as applied to Sanders is unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous.³

Standard of Review

This appeal involves judicial review of a noncontested administrative decision. Sanders I, 481 S.W.3d at 144. Judicial review of a noncontested administrative decision is governed by section 536.150.1, which provides that:

When any administrative officer or body existing under the constitution or by statute or by municipal charter or ordinance shall have rendered a decision which is not subject to administrative review, determining the legal rights, duties or privileges of any person ... and there is no other provision for judicial inquiry into or review of such decision, such decision may be reviewed by suit for injunction, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition or other appropriate action, and in any such review proceeding the court may determine the facts relevant to the question whether such person at the time of such decision was subject to such legal duty, or had such right, or was entitled to such privilege, and may hear such evidence on such question as may be properly adduced, and the court may determine whether such decision, in view of the facts as they appear to the court, is unconstitutional, unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious or involves an abuse of discretion; and the court shall render judgment accordingly, and may order the administrative officer or body to take such further action as it may be proper to require; but the court shall not substitute its discretion for discretion legally vested in such administrative officer or body, and in cases where the granting or withholding of a privilege is committed by law to the sole discretion of such administrative officer or body, such discretion lawfully exercised shall not be disturbed.

Section 536.150 recognizes that "[i]n a noncontested case ... the administrative body acts on discretion or on evidence not formally adduced and preserved." Phipps v. School Dist. of Kansas City , 645 S.W.2d 91, 94-5 (Mo. App. W.D. 1982) (citation omitted). As such, "[t]he [trial] court on such a ‘review’ has no record to review, and thus owes no deference to conform doubtful evidence to the administrative decision." Id. at 95 (citations omitted). The trial court does not apply the "competent and substantial evidence" test as applied in judicial review of contested administrative decisions, but instead conducts a de novo review during which "it hears evidence on the merits of the case, makes a record, determines the facts, and decides whether, in view of those facts, the agency's decision is unconstitutional, unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise involves an abuse of discretion." Missouri Nat. Educ. Ass'n v. Missouri State Bd. of Educ. , 34 S.W.3d 266, 274 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000) (citing section 536.150.1). Though the trial court determines the facts, section 536.150 "withhold[s] from the [trial] court the prerogative to ‘substitute its discretion for discretion legally vested in [an] administrative officer or body.’ " Phipps , 645 S.W.2d at 95 (quoting section 536.150.1). This withholding of authority "does not abridge the role of the court as factfinder but rather confines the judgment to exclusively legal considerations. That scheme of [the] statute ... acknowledges that an...