Sanders v. Folsom

Decision Date06 March 1969
Docket NumberC,No. 9463,No. 23,23,9463
Citation451 P.2d 612,104 Ariz. 283
PartiesCharles E. SANDERS, Jr., Gloria Willson and Canuto Sena, President, Clerk and Member respectively of the Board of Trustees of Naco Common School District,ochise County, Arizona, ex rel. Naco School Districtochise County, Arizona, a body politic, Petitioners, v. Sarah FOLSOM, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Respondent.
CourtArizona Supreme Court

Richard J. Riley, Cochise County Atty., Alan L. Slaughter, Deputy County Atty., Bisbee, for petitioners.

Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., Alvin E. Larson, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for respondent.

McFARLAND, Justice.

The Board of Trustees of Naco Common School District No. 23, Cochise County, Arizona, hereinafter referred to as Naco, filed an application for writ of mandamus, seeking to compel the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, hereinafter referred to as Superintendent, to provide Naco with $90,957.01 which was tentatively allocated by the Superintendent to Naco as 'state financial assistance' under A.R.S. § 15--1223.

The Superintendent refused to disburse the above stated amount of 'financial assistance' because the board of supervisors had levied a tax rate of only three cents per one hundred dollars of assessed valuation on the taxable property in the Naco School District.

The Superintendent justified withholding disbursal of the funds because she interpreted the pertinent statute as requiring an actual levy of twenty cents per one hundred dollars of assessed valuation in order for a school district to qualify for 'financial assistance'. The pertinent provision of the statutes is found in A.R.S. § 15--1221, subsec. 6 and reads as follows:

"District qualifying tax rate' means the tax rate of ten cents per one hundred dollars assessed valuation of property in each common school district and ten cents per one hundred dollars assessed valuation in each high school district, which was levied by the county board of supervisors for the year's maintenance and operational expenses of each such district as a condition the district must meet to be eligible for participation in the state school financial assistance monies for the current year. In elementary districts that are not in a high school district, the county board of supervisors shall have levied an additional ten cents levy in each such district, if the district is to qualify for financial assistance to pay tuition for high school pupils. The district tax rate used for determining eligibility for financial assistance shall be computed exclusive of any financial assistance received by the district.'

On question to be answered is whether the above statutory provision requires an Actual levy of a tax rate of at least twenty cents per one hundred dollars assessed valuation in order for a school district to qualify for state 'financial assistance'.

We must construe the meaning of that part of A.R.S. § 15--1221, subsec. 6 which reads, 'The district tax rate used for determining eligibility for financial assistance shall be computed exclusive of any financial assistance received by the district.' The sentence implies that a 'tentative' tax rate should be calculated for the current year exclusive of 'financial assistance'. Then the actual tax rate could be calculated based on the amount of 'financial assistance' to be received by the district. The above meaning is contradicted, though, by the mandate that the minimum qualifying tax rate be levied '* * * as a condition the district Must meet to be eligible for participation in the state school financial assistance monies for the current year.' (Emphasis added.) Also, elementary districts that are not in a high school district '* * * Shall have levied an additional ten cents levy in each such district, if the district is to qualify for financial assistance to pay tuition for high school pupils.' (Emphasis added.) See also A.R.S. § 15--1224.

In construing a revenue statute, this Court has said:

'If possible, meaning should be given to each word, clause or sentence considered in the light of the entire act itself and the purposes for which it was enacted into law. Webb v. Frohmiller, 52 Ariz. 128, 79 P.2d 510; Garrison v. Luke, 52 Ariz. 50, 78 P.2d 1120.

'Statutes relating to taxes should be given a liberal construction in order to effect the objects sought to be accomplished and promote justice; State v. McEuen, 42 Ariz. 385, 26 P.2d 1005. The aim of the court likewise should be to give it a sensible construction such as will accomplish the legislative intent and if possible avoid an absurd conclusion or avoid making the statute invalid. DeMund v. Meade, 13 Ariz. 236, 108 P. 479.' State v. Airesearch Mfg. Co., 68 Ariz. 342, 348, 206 P.2d 562, 567.

The conclusion, then, to be drawn from the above provisions is that a school district be required to pay either ten cents or, as in this case, twenty cents per one hundred dollars assessed valuation to qualify for 'financial assistance' in the current year. This interpretation is verified by reading the pertinent provision in A.R.S. § 15--1223, subsec. B 4:

'B. In computing the amounts of state financial assistance that each common and high school district shall receive, the following revenues shall be credited to the basic cost of education of each district:

'4. The district Tax yield from the levy of the District qualifying tax rate on the current year's assessed valuation * * *.' (Emphasis added.)

Obviously this can only mean that the minimum amount set forth in A.R.S. § 15--1221 must be levied and collected.

It is provided in A.R.S. § 15--1225 that:

'In no event shall any school district receive more financial assistance than it is entitled to receive as provided by this article and any overage shall be returned by the school district and credited to the state school financial assistance fund.'

This provision would be surplusage if it wasn't the legislative intent that the school districts share the burden of education by paying a minimal rate of tax and there could be no 'overage' if there was no limitation on the amount to be disbursed. Therefore, no matter what amount may be appropriated for any district, it is incumbent on the Superintendent to disburse no more than that amount which will reduce a district tax rate to the minimum set forth in A.R.S. § 15--1221.

This is made clear by a subsequent article of the Education Act which concerns 'state equalization aid'. In A.R.S. § 15--1228.01, prescribing the formula for distribution of equalization monies, we find the following provision:

'2. The equalization aid prescribed by the terms of this article shall be the amount specified by the terms of this article or a lesser amount sufficient to reduce the actual district tax levy for maintenance and operational purposes to an amount equal to a tax rate of ten cents for each one hundred dollars of assessed valuation.' A.R.S. § 15--1228.01, subsec. B 2.

We could hardly ascribe to the legislature an intent to limit state funds to an amount calculated to reduce the district tax rate to a 'floor' of ten cents per hundred dollars assessed valuation and simultaneously to give, under A.R.S. § 15--1221, state funds in such an amount as to 'wipe out' any tax responsibility by the school districts.

It is our construction that the statutes involved here were intended to raise the standards of education to an equal plane throughout the entire state and, similarly, to establish a uniform rate of tax in every school district in the state--ten cents per one hundred dollars assessed valuation in every 'common school district' and 'high school district' and twenty cents per one hundred dollars assessed valuation in every 'common school district not in a high school district that pays tution for high school pupils residing in such district.' Thus, it is the obligation of the Superintendent to distribute funds, under both Article 2.1 and Article 2.2 of Chapter 12 15 A.R.S., only in such amounts as to maintain the foregoing standard tax rates.

This construction requires a levy of ten cents for common school districts not in a high school district and an additional ten cents where such district pays high school tuition, which makes the total of twenty cents per one hundred dollars assessed valuation. This is proper for it places those taxpayers, such as in the Naco School District, on the same footing as taxpayers in a 'common school' and 'high school' district who pay ten cents on one hundred dollars assessed valuation to each district.

Thus, as we have stated, it is the administrative duty of the Superintendent to disburse 'financial assistance' and 'equalization' funds in a manner calculated to maintain the minimum tax obligations of the various school districts.

The question then is whether the Naco School Distrct should now be deprived of the benefits of the state funds when it fully complied with all the provisions of the act.

A.R.S. § 15--1201, as amended, provides:

'A. Not later than July 3 each year the governing board of each common or high school district shall prepare and furnish to the county school superintendent and the state superintendent of public instruction a proposed budget for the current fiscal year, which shall contain the information and be in form as follows: (Then follows an illustration of the form.)'

In accordance with A.R.S. § 15--1201, as amended, the Naco School District prepared, on the form furnished by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, a proposed budget for the current fiscal year, which contained all the information required by A.R.S. § 15--1201 and other information required for county, state and special assistance. This budget was presented to the taxpayers as provided for in A.R.S. § 15--1202, as amended, at a meeting of the board of trustees and, in accordance with § 15--1202, was adopted by the board of trustees before the 10th day of July and filed by...

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