Sanders v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.
| Decision Date | 07 April 1936 |
| Docket Number | 14273. |
| Citation | 185 S.E. 180,180 S.C. 138 |
| Parties | SANDERS v. GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Barnwell County; Hayne F Rice, Judge.
Action by J. W. Sanders against the General Motors Acceptance Corporation. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals .
Affirmed on condition of remittitur, otherwise new trial granted.
Adam H Moss, of Orangeburg, for appellant.
Blatt & Fales, of Barnwell, for respondent.
This action was brought by the plaintiff against the defendant for damages, actual and punitive, for the unlawful and wanton seizure and conversion of an automobile, and of certain personalty which was in the automobile at the time of the seizure by the defendant. The action sounds in tort, and is based upon the alleged willful invasion of the plaintiff's property rights.
On February 26, 1934, the plaintiff, who is a citizen of Barnwell county, traded his automobile to the Grubbs Chevrolet Company, of Barnwell, for a new Chevrolet coach automobile, and executed a conditional sales contract or chattel mortgage covering the new car and securing the credit portion of the purchase price, payable in twelve monthly installments. On the same day, the chattel mortgage was assigned by the Grubbs Chevrolet Company to the General Motors Acceptance Corporation. The plaintiff paid one installment on his contract, and by reason of some controversy between him and the defendant about the car declined to make further payments, and refused to surrender possession of the car.
The defendant answered the complaint, setting up that it peaceably took possession of the car under its past-due chattel mortgage; that the articles of personal property stored in the car were temporarily held for plaintiff by the defendant, and all of said articles were returned to the plaintiff at the earliest possible time.
Trial of the case resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $231 actual damages, and $1,065 punitive damages.
The appeal here alleges error in the trial judge's rulings with reference to the construction of the contract, and especially that provision of the contract which reads "Seller may take possession of any other property in the above described motor vehicle at time of re-possession, and hold same temporarily for purchaser, without liability on the part of the seller;" also alleges error in refusing defendant's motion for a directed verdict as to punitive damages; in refusing defendant's motion for a new trial as to actual and punitive damages; and also alleges error in his instructions to the jury.
In order to obtain an understanding of the issues involved in the appeal, it is necessary to give a statement of the testimony.
The plaintiff at the time of the seizure of the car and the other personal property was one of the magistrates in Barnwell county. He was also engaged in farming, and in addition to this, was employed by Clemson College in obtaining and transmitting various samples of soil. On the day the car was seized the plaintiff had driven to the town of Barnwell, and had parked his car on the public square in front of a drug store. According to his testimony, and that of a companion, before leaving the car, he raised all the glasses in the doors, locked the motor, locked the car doors, and then entered a nearby restaurant for dinner. He testified that he left in the car numerous samples of soil in containers, a hole digger, a sheepskin overcoat, a map of the county, a .38 pistol, a pair of handcuffs, all the records of his week's work, a farm account book, a pasteboard case containing warrants, a small locked box containing his pocketbook and his money, and other things; that in the locked box were two $50 bills in a pocketbook. The locked box, 8X10 inches in size, was made of tin, and is described as being similar to a fish box. This box was left on the front seat.
When the plaintiff returned from the restaurant, having finished his dinner, the car was nowhere to be seen. Thinking that it had been stolen, he went to the sheriff's office to report the loss, and then called up the state highway department in Columbia, and reported that his car had been stolen. Later, he was told by the deputy sheriff of Barnwell county that the car had been seized by an agent of the defendant. Five days later, the defendant delivered to the plaintiff all of the articles mentioned above, except a part of the Clemson College records, the farm account book, and the locked box containing his pocketbook and his money. The property which was returned was carried to his home and delivered to his wife.
The car was seized by an agent of the defendant under the following circumstances:
On the day in question, the defendant, through its office in Atlanta, furnished its field representative with a key to the plaintiff's car, and instructed him to go to Barnwell and seize the plaintiff's automobile under its chattel mortgage, which was past due. Arriving in Barnwell, the agent went to the garage of the Grubbs Chevrolet Company. Jeff Black, a local constable, who was a witness for the defendant, testified that he was with the agent of the defendant at the Grubbs Chevrolet Company, and saw the plaintiff drive the car into this garage, and then saw him drive to the drug store and park and leave it. No demand was made upon the plaintiff while he was in the garage for the possession of the car, nor did the agent have any conversation there with the plaintiff with reference to the matter. This witness is a brother-in-law of Mr. Grubbs, and was employed, from time to time, by the defendant in accompanying its agents while out collecting. He witnessed the actual seizure and repossession of the car by the agent.
The defendant's agent testified that he had specific orders to seize and repossess the car without legal process; that he had the chattel mortgage in his possession, and was instructed to take the car under the mortgage. He stated that the doors of the car were not locked, and that in starting the motor he used the key furnished him by his superiors; that he made no effort to locate the plaintiff, because his superiors had instructed him to take the car any way he could; that when he entered the automobile he "got a quick glance" at the car and the various things in the back of the car, and that he then, with the car and its contents, "made for the state of Georgia as quick as he could"; that he reached Atlanta without being apprehended for speeding; that in his headlong departure from Barnwell he did not stop at the sheriff's office for the purpose of checking the personal property found in the car, but that he drove straight to Atlanta, as stated. This witness admitted that he found the following items of personal property in the car when they were checked in Atlanta: A pair of handcuffs, a package of forms, one .38 caliber pistol, five cartridges, about 50 cartons of dirt, a hole digger, one county map, and a warrant or bill of sale. He denied that anybody else had had an opportunity to get to the personal property before he checked it, because he did not leave the car out of his sight until he reached Atlanta. He stated that he did not look for a money box in the car, nor did he see any money box, but that he turned over everything that was in the car to his superiors. He knew that the defendant's mortgage did not cover any of the personal items referred to.
The following testimony taken verbatim from the record discloses the nature of the defendant's instructions to this witness, and his mode of action in executing them:
"Q. You were sent here to take that car under the conditional sales contract put in evidence? A. Yes, sir.
Q. You took it where you found it? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Without saying anything to anybody? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Nobody was present to interfere with you? A. No, sir.
Q. How did you take it? A. I had no trouble at all, but I had my key in there and I drove it away."
Recross Examination.
"Q. You followed the instructions of your superior officers of the General Motors Acceptance Corporation? A. Yes, sir.
Q. In taking the car as you did take it? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And without saying anything to Mr. Sanders? A. Yes, sir."
Several questions are raised by this appeal. We shall first discuss and dispose of what we deem to be the major issue: Did the trial judge place the proper and reasonable construction on the provision of the conditional sales contract or chattel mortgage, reading as follows: "Seller may take possession of any other property in the above described motor vehicle at time of repossession, and hold same temporarily for purchaser without liability on the part of the seller"?
The decision of this question will be largely determinative of the appeal.
The trial judge instructed the jury that the defendant had a right to seize and repossess the car, because legal title had passed to it by nonpayment of the debt, which was long past due, but that the defendant had no right to take the plaintiff's personal property found therein. In construing the provision of the contract just given, he charged the jury as follows:
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