Sanders v. Johnston

• Decision Date: 04 February 1947
• Docket Number: No. 11323.,11323.
• Parties: SANDERS v. JOHNSTON, Warden.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

159 F.2d 74 (1947)

SANDERS v. JOHNSTON, Warden.

No. 11323.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

January 7, 1947.

Rehearing Denied February 4, 1947.

Hilliard Sanders, in pro. per.

Frank J. Hennessy, U. S. Atty., and Joseph Karesh, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of San Francisco, Cal., for appellee.

Before DENMAN, HEALY, and BONE, Circuit Judges.

HEALY, Circuit Judge.

Appellant, an inmate of Alcatraz prison, sued to enjoin the warden from interfering with his use of the mails to write his attorney. The warden moved for a dismissal for failure of the bill to state facts entitling the complainant to relief. The appeal is from a judgment of dismissal responsive to the motion.

The pleading alleged that complainant has certain actions pending in the District of Columbia and in Georgia in which he is represented by one Laughlin, a member of the bar. On December 5, 1945, he placed a letter in the regular mail depository addressed to Laughlin, and the letter was returned by the warden with a notice that all of complainant's mailing privileges were suspended. In an amendment it was alleged that on December 13, 1945, complainant was notified that his mailing rights had been restored, but that four days later another letter to Laughlin was rejected and returned by the warden. Neither letter is set out in the complaint nor is the nature or substance thereof stated.

Counsel for the warden insists that under the provisions of 18 U.S.C.A. § 753a, the restriction of mailing privileges of prison inmates involves the exercise of administrative discretion with which the courts have no authority to interfere. So far as pertinent the statute reads: "The Bureau of Prisons shall have charge of the management and regulation of all Federal penal and correctional institutions and be responsible for the safe-keeping, care, protection, instruction, and discipline of all persons charged with or convicted of offenses against the United States * * *."

We need not inquire what if any authority the courts have in the premises. The complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state facts sufficient to entitle appellant to relief. The contents of the letters may have involved a gross breach of prison discipline — may, indeed, have been wholly unrelated to the cases in which Laughlin was acting as appellant's counsel; and in the absence of allegations showing the contrary we are obliged to assume that such was the case. Laughlin v. Cummings, 70 App.D.C. 192, 105 F.2d 71.

Affirmed.

DENMAN, Circuit Judge (dissenting).

I think the judgment in this case should be reversed. The court's disposition invites another petition for the writ in a district court in which in the fiscal year 1946 seventy-two of such petitions were filed — that is 14 for each of the five overburdened district judges.

As stated in Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U. S. 342, 350, 61 S.Ct. 1015, 1017, 85 L.Ed. 1392, "A petition for a writ of habeas corpus ought not to be scrutinized with technical nicety. Even if it is insufficient in substance it may be amended in the interest of justice." (Emphasis supplied.)

The allegation of the petition below may properly be construed to the effect that the petitioner's letter to his attorney is with respect to the pending litigation alleged in his petition. There is no presumption that such a letter contains material which "may have involved a gross breach of prison discipline." That is a matter for a defensive answer. In any event, under the statement of Holiday v. Johnston, supra, amendment should be allowed if the attempt to connect the letter pleaded with the litigation pleaded "Is insufficient in substance."

Indeed, this being an appeal in a proceeding in equity, summary in character, United States ex rel. Mensevich v. Tod, 264 U.S. 134, 136, 44 S.Ct. 282, 68 L.Ed. 591; Storti v. Massachusetts, 183 U.S. 138, 143, 22 S. Ct. 72, 46 L.Ed. 120, we should make an end of the litigation by requiring an amendment here if we were to deem it necessary. In view of the conduct of the warden and his opposing litigant, both below and here, in treating the petition as presenting solely the question of the power of the court to grant relief, amendment is not required.

The record shows that in the district court both the prisoner and the warden tried the case on the assumption that the petition for the writ otherwise stated a ground for its issuance and briefed and submitted the motion to dismiss as presenting the sole issue of the power of the court to grant any injunction for an alleged abuse of the warden in his prison administration.

The reductio ad absurdum of the warden's contention is that a prisoner may be hung up by his thumbs for a week for an infraction of prison discipline and yet the court could not enjoin such a cruel...