United States v. Sanders

• Decision Date: 19 May 1955
• Docket Number: Crim. No. 19674.
• Citation: 138 F. Supp. 192
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Hilliard SANDERS.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

138 F. Supp. 192

UNITED STATES of America v. Hilliard SANDERS.

Crim. No. 19674.

United States District Court D. Maryland Criminal Division.

May 19, 1955.

George Cochran Doub, U. S. Atty., and William F. Mosner, Asst. U. S. Atty., Baltimore, Md., for the United States.

Eli Baer, Baltimore, Md., for petitioner.

THOMSEN, Chief Judge.

Hilliard Sanders, convicted of bank robbery by a jury in this court and sentenced by Judge Chesnut in 1942 to twenty years imprisonment, has made application for relief under 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1651 and 2255. A similar motion was heard and denied by Judge Chesnut in 1950, D.C., 92 F.Supp. 447, affirmed Sanders v. United States, 4 Cir., 183 F.2d 748. Judge Chesnut had previously denied release under a writ of habeas corpus in 1944, Sanders v. Brady, D. C., 57 F.Supp. 87, and other courts have considered various proceedings brought by Sanders either attacking the proceedings in which he was convicted or complaining of the conditions of his imprisonment. See Sanders v. Sanford, 5 Cir., 138 F.2d 415, certiorari denied 322 U.S. 744, 64 S.Ct. 1142, 88 L.Ed. 1576, rehearing denied 322 U.S. 773, 64 S.Ct. 1283, 88 L.Ed. 1593; Sanders v. Bennett, 80 U.S.App.D.C. 32, 148 F.2d 19; Sanders v. Johnston, 9 Cir., 165 F.2d 736; certiorari denied 334 U.S. 829, 68 S.Ct. 1328, 92 L.Ed. 1757, rehearing denied 335 U.S. 838, 69 S.Ct. 7, 93 L.Ed. 390; Sanders v. Johnston, 9 Cir., 159 F.2d 74; Sanders v. Swope, 9 Cir., 176 F.2d 311.

In its opinion affirming the conviction, Sanders v. United States, 127 F.2d 647, certiorari denied 317 U.S. 626, 63 S.Ct. 37, 87 L.Ed. 506, the Fourth Circuit said:

"The motion for new trial was a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Not only was there no showing of abuse of that discretion, but an examination of the affidavits offered in support of the motion convinces us that it was properly exercised. The sole question in the case was as to the identity of the defendants as the persons who committed the crime. They were identified by a number of witnesses and in addition strong circumstantial testimony connecting them with the crime was offered. Their defense was an alibi, and this was fully and fairly submitted to the jury. The questions are purely questions of fact; and there is no reason to think that the verdict of the jury or the judgment of the trial court should be disturbed."

On the appeal in 1950 from the denial of relief under section 2255, the Fourth Circuit considered Sanders' contentions (1) that he did not have the undivided assistance of counsel, and (2) that he was convicted on false testimony. The court said 183 F.2d 749:

"* * * The fact that Keefe admitted his guilt after conviction does not tend to establish any conflict of loyalties on the part of counsel at the trial, particularly as no evidence was offered in Keefe's behalf and it does not appear that he had any interest whatever opposed to the establishment of defendant's alibi. The petition does not allege what was false in testimony offered against appellant or that the United States Attorney had knowledge of any falsity therein, but merely that certain witnesses had been coerced into giving false testimony against appellant, without specifying what the testimony was, and that counsel for the prosecution knew that the testimony of these witnesses `had been elicited through suggestive interrogation'. The District Judge would not have been warranted in conducting a hearing to determine whether the judgment should be set aside on any such vague allegations, particularly in a case where the petitioner had been represented on the trial by counsel and the proceedings against him had been reviewed on a motion for new trial and on appeal to this court."

The present application for relief is based upon substantially the same grounds as the 1950 application, but alleges the facts in greater detail, and claims that Sanders is entitled a hearing at which he is present in person.

Section 2255 provides, inter alia:

"* * * Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the United States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.

"A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing.

"The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for

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