Sanders v. Kerry

• Decision Date: 16 March 2016
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 15-534 (RBW)
• Parties: Trudi T. Sanders, Plaintiff, v. John F. Kerry, Secretary of U.S. Department of State, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

180 F.Supp.3d 35

Trudi T. Sanders, Plaintiff,

v.John F. Kerry, Secretary of U.S. Department of State, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 15-534 (RBW)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed March 16, 2016

Jerry Robert Goldstein, Jerry R. Goldstein, Silver Spring, MD, for Plaintiff.

Carl Ezekiel Ross, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

ORDER

REGGIE B. WALTON, United States District Judge

The plaintiff, Trudi T. Sanders, filed this civil suit against the defendant, John F. Kerry, in his official capacity as the Secretary of the United States Department of State, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2012), the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 -718b (2012), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 -634 (2012). Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 1, 4, 5. Currently before the Court is the Defendant's Motion for Partial Dismissal (“Def.'s Mot.”). After careful consideration of the parties' submissions,¹ the Court must grant in part and deny in part the defendant's motion for the reasons stated below.

I. BACKGROUND

The following allegations are derived from the plaintiff's complaint. The plaintiff is a “52-year-old[,] ... African-American female ....” Compl. ¶ 4. She “has diminished lung capacity, which affects her ability to breathe and, therefore, to walk.”²

Id.¶ 8. “In addition, as a result of multiple cancer surgeries and radiation treatments, [the plaintiff] has lost all or parts of her liver, pancreas, spleen, gallbladder, bladder, and colon, which affects her genitourinary, immune, and cardiovascular systems, among other things, and causes her to have discomfort, pain, and fatigue when walking and doing other tasks, and also affects the frequency and time she needs to use the restroom.” Id. The plaintiff alleges that, since 2011, her medical condition has been known by her employer, the Department of State—more specifically, the Management Analysis Section (“MAS”) of the Messaging Systems Office (“MSO”), which is in the Information Resource Management Bureau (“IRM”). Id.¶¶ 4, 9, 10, 14.

Between 2011 and 2013, the plaintiff has “discussed her medical conditions” and “her need for reasonable accommodations” in light of these conditions with her employer “[o]n many occasions.” Id.¶ 15. For example, accommodations that the plaintiff requested include “parking” at her office, “telework[ing]” from home, “flexible work hours” and/or an “alternate work schedule.” Id.; see also id.¶¶ 16-17. But her employer was, for the most part, unresponsive to the plaintiff's alleged need for such accommodations. See id.¶¶ 16-18, 27(a)-(b) (alleging that her employer “did not engage in the interactive process” required under the Rehabilitation Act). The alleged failures to accommodate have caused the plaintiff to arrive at work “late many times” and forced her “to use leave frequently ....” Id.¶ 20. In this same time frame, the plaintiff has also repeatedly requested that her employer evaluate her work performance biannually. See id.¶ 12; see also id.¶ 13. It was not until 2013 when she began to receive any performance evaluations. See id.¶ 12.

Finally, the plaintiff asserts that for “discriminatory and/or retaliatory reasons,” she “has been relentlessly harassed by” her employer and others associated with her employer. Id.¶ 21. According to the plaintiff, examples of this harassment include without limitation: “an unwarranted Letter of Warning on or about March 7, 2014.”³ Id.¶ 21(c). As a result of this alleged conduct, the plaintiff has had to file three complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). See id.¶ 22.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Federal Rule Of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

Rule 12(b)(1) permits a party to move to dismiss for “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). When a defendant moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), “the plaintiff[ ] bear[s] the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Court has subject[-]matter jurisdiction ....” Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self – Gov't Auth., 310 F.Supp.2d 172, 176 (D.D.C.2004) (citation omitted). A court considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion must “assume the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and ‘construe the complaint liberally, granting [a] plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’ ” Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C.Cir.2011) (quoting Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C.Cir.2005) ). However, because the plaintiff has the burden of establishing jurisdiction, a “court must give [a] plaintiff's factual allegations closer scrutiny when resolving a Rule 12(b)(1) motion than would be required for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.” Byrum v. Winter, 783 F.Supp.2d 117, 122 (D.D.C.2011) (citing Macharia v. United States, 334 F.3d 61, 64, 69 (D.C.Cir.2003) ).

“Although ‘the [d]istrict [c]ourt may in appropriate cases dispose of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject[-]matter jurisdiction under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(1) on the complaint standing alone,’ ‘where necessary, the court may consider the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.’ ” Coal. for Underground Expansion v. Mineta, 333 F.3d 193, 198 (D.C.Cir.2003) (quoting Herbert v. Nat'l Acad. of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C.Cir.1992) ). Thus, “the district court may consider materials outside the pleadings in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.” Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C.Cir.2005).

B. Federal Rule Of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests whether the complaint “state[s] a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6) ], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). Moreover, a plaintiff receives the “benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Am. Nat'l Ins., 642 F.3d at 1139 (quoting Thomas, 394 F.3d at 972 ). However, raising a “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” fails to satisfy the facial plausibility requirement. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Rather, a claim is facially plausible only “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw [a] reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). While the court must “assume [the] veracity” of any “well-pleaded factual allegations” in the complaint, conclusory allegations “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

“In determining whether a complaint states a claim, the court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached thereto or incorporated therein, and matters of which it may take judicial notice.” Abhe & Svoboda, Inc. v. Chao, 508 F.3d 1052, 1059 (D.C.Cir.2007) (citation omitted). And among the documents “subject to judicial notice on a motion to dismiss” are “public records.” Kaempe v. Myers, 367 F.3d 958, 965 (D.C.Cir.2004). Thus, the “court may consider [documents, such as] an EEOC complaint and Notice of Charge[,] without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment because such records are ‘public document[s] of which a court may take judicial notice.’ ” Ndondji v. InterPark Inc., 768 F.Supp.2d 263, 272 (D.D.C.2011) (quoting Ahuja v. Detica Inc., 742 F.Supp.2d 96, 101–02 (D.D.C.2010) ).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Exhaustion Of Administrative Remedies

The defendant moves to dismiss the plaintiff's disparate treatment, retaliation, and hostile work environment claims under Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act, and the ADEA “because she has failed to meet her exhaustion requirements” under each statute, Def.'s Mem. at 5, 7, to the extent these claims are based on “her allegation that the March 7, 2014 Letter of Warning was an act of discrimination and/or retaliation,”⁴ id. at 6. The record demonstrates otherwise.

“Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional requirement for claims arising under the Rehabilitation Act.” Koch v. Walter, 935 F.Supp.2d 143, 149 (D.D.C.2013) (citations omitted); see also Latson v. Holder, 82 F.Supp.3d 377, 385 (D.D.C.2015) (Walton, J.). Thus, the burden is on the plaintiff “to show that [she] has exhausted [her] claims under the Rehabilitation Act.” Koch, 935 F.Supp.2d at 150 ; see also Latson, 82 F.Supp.3d at 385. “In contrast, failure to exhaust under the ADEA and Title VII is an affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional requirement.” Koch, 935 F.Supp.2d at 150 (citations omitted); see also Latson, 82 F.Supp.3d at 386. And so the burden of showing failure to exhaust under these two statutes, instead, lies with the defendant. Koch, 935 F.Supp.2d at 150 ; see also Latson, 82 F.Supp.3d at 386. A court must be mindful that a plaintiff should not be deprived of judicial review based on failure to follow procedural technicalities of the exhaustion requirement, so long as the defendant has been “put on notice” of the plaintiff's claims. See Brown v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 8, 13 (D.C.Cir.1985) ; President v. Vance, 627 F.2d 353, 362 (D.C.Cir.1980) ; see also Parker v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 960 F.Supp.2d 235, 238 (D.D.C.2013) (“In deciding whether plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, it is important to remember that the principal functions of the EEOC filing requirement are to enable the EEOC to provide the alleged wrongdoer with notice and to...