Sanders v. McCulloch
| Decision Date | 24 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | 12-cv-230-wmc |
| Parties | PASCHALL L. SANDERS, Petitioner, v. DEBORAH McCULLOCH, Director, Sand Ridge Secure Treatment Center, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Wisconsin |
Petitioner Paschall L. Sanders is currently in state custody at the Sand Ridge Secure Treatment Center in Mauston, Wisconsin. He petitions this court to issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to challenge his involuntary civil commitment under the Wisconsin Sexually Violent Persons Act, Wis. Stat. ch. 980. The respondent has filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing that review is barred by the doctrine of procedural default. For the reasons set forth below, the court will grant that motion and dismiss this case.
Sanders has a lengthy criminal record dating back to the early 1970s. Following his conviction for repeated sexual assaults of two women at gun point, Sanders was sentenced to twenty years in 1975, but then released from prison on parole in 1976.After having his parole revoked in January of 1976 for driving a car without the owner's consent, Sanders was again released only to arrested and returned to prison some two years later for two counts of armed robbery. Paroled again in 1986, Sanders absconded. This parole was eventually revoked in 1993, following his conviction for second-degree sexual assault of a child.
Anticipating his next release from the penitentiary, the State of Wisconsin filed a petition seeking Sanders' involuntary civil commitment as a "sexually violent person" pursuant to Chapter 980 of the Wisconsin Statutes. Under the current version of Chapter 980, the state may commit indefinitely "a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense . . . and who is dangerous because he or she suffers a mental disorder that makes it likely that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence." Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7). In Sanders' case, the state undertook to prove that: (1) Sanders was convicted of a "sexually violent offense"; (2) Sanders suffered from a "mental disorder"; and (3) Sanders was "dangerous" because his mental disorder makes it more likely than not that he will engage in one or more future acts of sexual violence. Wis. J.I.-Criminal 2502, at 1-2 (footnotes omitted).
Sanders' commitment proceeding was tried before a jury in 2009 and focused on whether he suffered from a "mental disorder" as defined by Chapter 980. A mental disorder is defined as "a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in acts of sexual violence." Wis. Stat. § 980.01(2). Consistent with this definition, the circuit court gave the followingjury instruction for this element at trial:
"Mental disorder" means a condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in acts of sexual violence and causes serious difficulty in controlling behavior. Mental disorders do not include merely deviant behaviors that conflict with prevailing societal standards. Not all persons who commit sexually violent offenses can be diagnosed as suffering from a mental disorder. Not all persons with a mental disorder are predisposed to commit sexually violent offenses or have serious difficulty in controlling behavior. You are not bound by medical opinions, labels, or definitions.
This instruction was based on the pattern jury instruction found in Wis. J.I.-Criminal 2502, at 2 (footnotes omitted).
As proof that Sanders suffered from the requisite mental disorder, the state presented testimony from a psychologist who diagnosed Sanders with "paraphilia" and "antisocial personality disorder."2 The psychologist elaborated further that both of these mental disorders constituted volitional impairments, which predisposed Sanders to "engage in future acts of sexual violence." On December 15, 2009, the jury found that Sanders was a sexually violent person as defined by Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7). Therefore, the circuit court entered a judgment committing Sanders to the Wisconsin Department of Health Services "for control, care and treatment" for an indefinite period until such time that he no longer qualifies as a sexually violent person.
Sanders filed a post-judgment motion for new trial, arguing that the pattern juryinstructions (Wis. JI-Criminal 2502) incorrectly stated the law regarding what constitutes "serious difficulty in controlling behavior." In particular, Sanders argued that the definition of mental disorder contained "internally inconsistent" language that misled the jury about whether it could find him to be a sexually violent person even if he did not have a mental disorder that caused him serious difficulty in controlling behavior. Sanders argued, therefore, that he was entitled to a new trial "in the interest of justice" pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 752.35 because "the real controversy was not fully tried."3 The circuit court denied Sanders' post-conviction motion following a hearing on October 14, 2010.
On direct appeal, Sanders raised the identical issue in his post-judgment motion. Noting that Sanders' counsel did not object to the instruction given by the circuit court, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected Sanders' argument and affirmed the commitment order on August 23, 2011. See In re Commitment of Sanders, 2011 WI App 125, 337 Wis. 2d 231, 806 N.W.2d 250. In doing so, the court of appeals also found that the jury instruction was not incorrect or misleading for purposes of the relief soughtunder Wis. Stat. § 752.35. The Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed and summarily denied Sanders' petition for review on December 1, 2011. See State v. Sanders, 2012 WI 2, 338 Wis. 2d 322, 808 N.W.2d 714 (2012) (unpublished).
Sanders now seeks habeas relief from the circuit court's commitment order, invoking 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In four overlapping grounds for relief, Sanders contends that he was denied substantive due process for reasons outlined in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), and Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002), because the pattern jury instruction given at his trial was inadequate to require a finding that he had serious difficulty controlling his behavior as the result of a mental disorder. The respondent notes that the claim presented during Sanders' direct appeal involved an issue of state law under Wis. Stat. § 752.35, which governs the discretionary authority to reverse where the interest of justice requires. Because Sanders did not present a federal constitutional claim in state court when he had the opportunity to do so, the respondent argues that habeas review is barred by the doctrine of procedural default.
OPINIONA. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies
Typically, a federal court may not entertain a state prisoner's petition for habeas corpus relief unless he has first exhausted all remedies available in state court.4 28 U.S.C.§ 2254(b)(1)(A); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999). The doctrine of exhaustion serves the interests of comity between federal and state sovereigns by giving state appellate courts a meaningful opportunity to consider and correct any alleged constitutional violation. See Lieberman v. Thomas, 505 F.3d 665, 670 (7th Cir. 2007). Inherent in the exhaustion requirement is the habeas petitioner's duty to present his federal claims to the state courts "fully and fairly." See Malone v. Walls, 538 F.3d 744, 753 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). To "fairly" present a claim, a petitioner must raise the same operative facts and controlling legal principles before the state courts in a procedurally proper manner. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971); see also Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004). In other words, a petitioner is required to present the state courts with "the same [substantive] claim that he urges upon the federal courts." Picard, 404 U.S. at 275-76. To "fully" present a claim, the petitioner must complete one round of state court review of a fairly presented claim, including seeking discretionary review before the state supreme court. McAtee v. Cowan, 250 F.3d 506, 508-09 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845-48).
As discussed above, Sanders argues that he was denied substantive due process at his trial because the pattern jury instruction given by the circuit court did not comply with the legal standard articulated in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), and Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002). In Hendricks, the United States Supreme Court again held that the criteria for confinement found in the Kansas Sexually Violent PredatorAct satisfied substantive due process requirements because the statute required a finding of dangerousness to one's self or others and "link[ed] that finding to the existence of a 'mental abnormality' or 'personality disorder' that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior." 521 U.S. at 358. Reviewing the same Kansas statute five years later in Crane, the Supreme Court found that due process is satisfied if there is proof that the offender has "serious difficulty in controlling behavior," explaining that such a showing was necessary to "distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case." 534 U.S. at 413 (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357-58).
The parties dispute whether the substantive due process theory raised by Sanders on habeas review here was fairly presented in state court. In deciding whether a claim was fairly presented, a federal court must inquire into: (1) whether the petitioner has framed his claim in the state proceedings in a way that "brings to mind a specific constitutional right"; and (2) whether he has alleged a set of facts that are "well within the mainstream of constitutional litigation." Lieberman...
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