Sanders v. Oklahoma Employment Sec. Com'n
| Decision Date | 11 May 1948 |
| Docket Number | 32643. |
| Citation | 195 P.2d 272,200 Okla. 366,1948 OK 116 |
| Parties | SANDERS v. OKLAHOMA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied June 8, 1948.
Second Petition for Rehearing Denied July 13, 1948.
Appeal from District Court, Oklahoma County; A. P. Van Meter, Judge.
Action for injunction by Leo Sanders against Oklahoma Employment Security Commission. From a judgment of dismissal, the plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Objection to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of an action may be raised by motion to dismiss, at any stage of the proceedings.
2. 40 O.S.1941 § 224 gives the Oklahoma Employment Security Commission full power and authority to make and allow refunds or adjustments of overpayment of any contribution paid under the Oklahoma Employment Security Act, upon application made within three years after the payment of such contribution and also gives the Commission full power to determine the amount of any compensation due and to make assessments for delinquent contributions. Any employer, feeling aggrieved by the ruling or order of the Commission, may appeal to the district court where all questions of law involved may be determined.
3. Where an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be sought from the administrative body, and that remedy must be exhausted before the courts will act; exhaustion of the administrative remedy is a jurisdictional prerequisite for resort to the courts.
Gilliland Ogden, Withington, Shirk & Vaught, of Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error.
Bruton Wood, Burton Duncan and Gerald S. Tebbe, all of Oklahoma City, for defendant in error.
Plaintiff in error commenced this action against the Oklahoma Employment Security Commission to enjoin the Commission from enforcing certain tax liens represented by warrants issued against plaintiff for delinquent contributions assessed under the Oklahoma Employment Security Act. 40 O.S.1941 § 211 et seq., as amended.
Plaintiff further seeks a judgment fixing and determining the correct rate which should be used in computing the amount plaintiff as an employer, should contribute to the Unemployment Compensation Fund created by the Act; and a further judgment adjusting alleged overpayments by him; and a judgment to recover alleged overcontribution by him in the sum of $77,187.41, or for a mandatory injunction requiring defendant to allow plaintiff credit for the amount.
In his petition, plaintiff complains that in the early part of 1943 he received from the Commission a rating calling for contribution at 1% of his payroll; that he relied on that rate and made payment for the first quarter of 1943, which the Commission accepted; that thereafter the Legislature passed an act purporting to change and raise the rates of contribution for the year 1943 and subsequent years and that the Commission changed, or attempted to change, the rate of contribution and assessed contribution against plaintiff in excess of the amount theretofore fixed by the Commission for the year 1943. Plaintiff alleged that the act of the Legislature is unconstitutional and in contravention of the State and Federal constitutions; that the rate fixed by the Commission is unauthorized by law.
Plaintiff further alleged that the statute prior to 1942 and for the year 1943 fixed his rate of contribution at 2.7%; that plaintiff paid that rate until 1942; that for the year 1942 plaintiff was given a rate of 3.5% which he paid for the first three quarters of that year; that plaintiff paid the rate of 3.5% for the second and third quarters of 1942 under protest in that DuPont Powder Company, Kohler Construction Company, and others were given a rate of .5% and were allowed to pay at that rate, while plaintiff was required to pay at the rate of 3.5% which was a gross discrimination against plaintiff, but favorable to DuPont Powder Company, Kohler Construction Company, and others.
Plaintiff alleged that he had filed amended returns for the year 1942 wherein he set out that his rate should have been .5%, and sought an adjustment accordingly, but the Commission failed, neglected, and refused to allow plaintiff a rate in accordance with his amended returns; that the total amount overpaid by plaintiff for the year 1942, based upon the difference between a rate of .5% and that actually paid by plaintiff, with allowance for certain alleged errors in the wages reported, was $77, 387.54.
Plaintiff alleged that for the first quarter of 1943, he reported wages in the sum of $604,356.72, but that same was over-reported to the extent of $191,427.75, the correct amount being $412,928.97, and that proper tax thereon, computed at the rate of .5% would equal $2,064.64; that plaintiff paid thereon $604.36, leaving a balance due for that quarter of $1460.28; that for the second quarter of 1943, the correct tax, after allowance of certain errors in the wages reported, should have been $497.52, but that plaintiff paid for that quarter $1428.70, and overpaid for that quarter in the sum of $931.18; for the third quarter of 1943, plaintiff overpaid in the sum of $703.62; for the fourth quarter of 1943, the correct tax was $374.65 which plaintiff has not paid, thus leaving due from plaintiff, for the year 1943, the sum of $200.13.
The net claim is that plaintiff overpaid for the year 1942 in the sum of $77,387.54 and that he owed for the year 1943 the net sum of $200.13, leaving an overpayment for the two years in the sum of $77,187.41, for which he prays judgment.
Defendant Commission filed its special appearance and motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, based upon six separate grounds. The first ground is that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action. The second is that the court had no jurisdiction of the person of defendant in that defendant is an agency of the State, authorized to enforce the Employment Security Act; therefore this action is in reality a suit against the State and that the State has not given its consent. The third ground is that the court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter in that plaintiff is attempting to restrain, delay, and forestall the collection of the contributions in violation of the express prohibition of law that no suit shall be maintained for the purpose of restraining, delaying, or forestalling the collection of any such contributions. The fourth ground is substantially the same as the third. The fifth ground is that the court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action as to the refunds claimed since the plaintiff has an adequate and exclusive remedy at law by proceedings for refund before the Commission. The sixth ground is that the court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter as to the assessments set forth in petition because plaintiff has an adequate and exclusive remedy at law.
The trial court sustained the motion to dismiss; plaintiff appeals.
The question of the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of an action is properly raised by motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction; even in the absence of such a motion, it is the bounden duty of the court to inquire into its own jurisdiction. Fehr v. Black Petroleum Corp., 103 Okl. 241, 229 P. 1048, and many cases therein cited; Hamilton v. Browder, 176 Okl. 229, 54 P.2d 1025.
Jurisdiction of the subject matter is the power of the courts to take cognizance of and hear and determine the subject matter in controversy between the parties. Fehr v. Black Petroleum Corp., supra.
Objection to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter may be raised by motion to dismiss...
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