Sanders v. State, CR

Decision Date18 September 1989
Docket NumberNo. CR,CR
Citation776 S.W.2d 334,300 Ark. 25
PartiesRoyse Nathaniel SANDERS, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. 89-59.
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

Daniel D. Becker, Hot Springs, for appellant.

Lynley Arnett, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

GLAZE, Justice.

This is an appeal from the appellant's conviction of robbery and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He received a sentence of fifty-five years. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying the appellant's objection that the jury panel had no black members. We find no error.

The appellant, a black male, was convicted of robbing a white man. At trial, he asserted that the jury panel in Garland County, from which the appellant's jury was picked, did not contain any black members. Appellant objected to the panel alleging that it would be highly prejudicial to have an all white jury. The trial court denied his challenge to the jury panel and entered an order stating how the jury panel had been selected. According to that order, the jury panel was selected by the use of a computer using random numbers to select names of qualified voters of Garland County. A master list of 2,065 names of qualified voters was prepared by computer. From that list, or the jury wheel, the court drew four hundred names to serve as jurors for the July 1988 term of court. There were four panels with one hundred jurors each. The members of the appellant's jury were randomly selected from three of the four panels.

The selection of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the community is an essential component of the sixth amendment right to a jury trial. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). But, there is no requirement that the petit jury actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population. Id., see also Mitchell v. State, 299 Ark. 556, 776 S.W.2d 332 (1989). A defendant in a criminal case is entitled to require that the state not deliberately or systematically deny to members of his race the right to participate, as jurors, in the administration of justice. See, e.g., Waters v. State, 271 Ark. 33, 607 S.W.2d 336 (1980). It is the state's purposeful or deliberate denial to blacks, on account of race, of participation in the administration of justice by selection for jury service that violates the equal protection clause. Id.

In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the appellant must show that (1) the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) the representation of this group in venires from which the juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979). Once the appellant makes a prima facie showing of racial discrimination in the jury selection process, the burden shifts to the state to justify its procedure.

Here, the appellant clearly did not meet his burden of proof. The record is void of any statistical information to show the racial make-up of the community or of the 400 jurors on the four jury panels. See Thomas v. State, 289 Ark. 72, 709 S.W.2d 83 (1986). In addition, the record neither reflects that the appellant ever asserted below that there was a systematic exclusion of blacks from the jury nor indicates he wanted to investigate that such an exclusion occurred. Id.

From our review of the record, there is a lack of proof as to the racial make-up of the community and the jury panels, and in addition, there is simply no showing that the underrepresentation of blacks in the appellant's jury panel is due to systematic exclusion in the jury selection process. ...

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16 cases
  • Price v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • 21 Febrero 2002
    ...of a defendant's race the right to participate, as jurors, in the administration of justice. Davis v. State, supra; Sanders v. State, 300 Ark. 25, 776 S.W.2d 334 (1989). In order to establish a prima facie case of deliberate or systematic exclusion, a defendant must prove that: (1) the grou......
  • Lee v. State, CR
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • 24 Marzo 1997
    ...of a defendant's race the right to participate, as jurors, in the administration of justice. Davis v. State, supra; Sanders v. State, 300 Ark. 25, 776 S.W.2d 334 (1989). In order to establish a prima facie case of deliberate or systematic exclusion, a defendant must prove that: (1) The grou......
  • Cleveland v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • 15 Noviembre 1993
    ...representative cross-section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Sanders v. State, 300 Ark. 25, 776 S.W.2d 334 (1989). There is, however, no requirement that the petit jury actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the variou......
  • Sheridan v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • 3 Mayo 1993
    ...does not violate the requirement that the jury be selected from a representative cross-section of the community. Sanders v. State, 300 Ark. 25, 776 S.W.2d 334 (1989); Mitchell v. State, 299 Ark. 566, 776 S.W.2d 332 (1989). Appellant argues that the jury was partial because it was composed o......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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