Sanders v. State

• Decision Date: 25 May 1983
• Docket Number: No. 39330,39330
• Citation: 251 Ga. 70,303 S.E.2d 13
• Parties: Lillian SANDERS v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 13

303 S.E.2d 13

251 Ga. 70

Lillian SANDERS v. The STATE.

No. 39330.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

May 25, 1983.

Stephen H. Andrews, Andrews & Seery, Walter E. Van Heiningen, Loftiss & Van Heiningen, Thomasville, for Lillian G. Sanders.

H. Lamar Cole, Dist. Atty. James E. Hardy, Asst. Dist. Atty., Thomasville, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for the State.

BELL, Justice.

Lillian Sanders appeals her conviction and life sentence for the murder of her infant daughter, Cassandra Denise Sanders. There was evidence at trial showing that Cassandra was born September 11, 1981. She was twelve weeks premature and had a low birth weight, a hernia, and anemia. She was hospitalized for treatment of these ailments and was discharged November 6. On November 17 she was treated at a pediatric clinic for fussiness stemming from a suspected allergy, and on November 30 for a cold and a fungus infection. The clinic's record of the November 30 examination had a notation that Cassandra had gained weight, but did not indicate that bruises or other injuries had been found.

At about three p.m. on December 3, 1981 appellant used a neighbor's phone to call the police. She told the police dispatcher her baby was sick, and asked for an ambulance. The dispatcher later said appellant was not sobbing, and her voice seemed normal; appellant's neighbor testified she seemed worried. After making the call Sanders returned to her own home, from which the neighbor then heard crying and hollering. When the county emergency medical service arrived at appellant's residence a few minutes later, the technicians found her holding Cassandra in her arms. One technician asked what the trouble was and she replied the baby had been crying and had just stopped. She also repeatedly told them, "Please don't let my baby die." The technicians gave Cassandra a quick examination and found multiple bruises on her face, neck, chest and abdomen. A patch of skin was missing from her neck, and one side of her head was mushy due to blood and fluid under the skin. The child was gasping for breath, had a high pulse and low respiration, and appeared unconscious. The technicians then took Cassandra and her mother to the emergency room of Archbold Hospital, arriving about 3:20 p.m. At the emergency room Dr. Randolph Malone examined the infant, who had stopped breathing and was being given artificial respiration. At that point she was unconscious and appeared dead. Because she had suffered a severe head injury and had unusual bruise marks around the neck he had the police notified, and he questioned Lillian about what had happened. She told him she didn't know, even though she had been with the baby right until she left to call the ambulance.

Forest Roberts, a child protective services worker with the Thomas County Department of Family and Children Services, was summoned to the hospital and was told that Sanders was suspected of child abuse. She questioned appellant, who first told her that she didn't know what had happened to the baby, that there had been nothing wrong with her earlier, and that she had gone in to check on her and found her like that. She said she might have "popped" her to make her stop crying, but insisted she hadn't hurt her. However, Sanders admitted after more questioning that she hadn't felt well that morning and had been depressed. She had been alone with Cassandra and her older child, Chrishenbo Lashan, that afternoon. The baby had begun to cry so she changed her and gave her some milk. When Roberts asked how the child had gotten its neck bruises appellant maintained she didn't know, but then a few minutes later she said some milk had dried and caked around Cassandra's neck, and that she had scrubbed her neck to remove the milk, and might have bruised and scratched her in the process. Roberts left the room, then returned and told her the child was seriously ill, that it didn't appear she'd gotten that way by herself, and appellant needed to tell her what happened. Lillian said she may have dropped the baby but didn't remember, then she said the baby cried all the time and she must have dropped it. Sanders appeared upset and nervous during this interrogation, but was not hysterically crying or otherwise showing a lot of emotion. While Roberts was questioning Sanders the police arrived. They were present during some of the questioning, and at some point read Sanders Miranda warnings. In the course of their interrogation she told them that the child had fallen out of her hands when she reached for something on a table or chest of drawers in the bedroom. She was asked if the child had struck anything except the floor, and she said she hadn't. Her demeanor during this inquiry was confused but otherwise normal, except that a few minutes later she cried. ¹

The baby was pronounced dead at 5:30 that afternoon. Appellant was taken to the police station where shortly after seven that evening she was again questioned after being given Miranda warnings, and again she said she'd dropped the baby, that it hadn't hit anything except the floor, and she didn't know how she had been that badly injured. During this interrogation Sanders expressed concern about what would happen to her and asked if she told the truth she would still have to go to court or jail. The police told her they couldn't promise anything, whereupon she volunteered she'd been upset, was pregnant, and didn't want another baby. Sanders consented to a search of her house, during which she pointed out the spot where she claimed the baby had fallen and again denied the baby had hit anything except the floor. Sanders was allowed to go home for the night, but was questioned again at the police station shortly after six p.m. the next day. After being advised a third time about Miranda rights, she told the police she'd gone downtown the previous day, leaving Cassandra in her sister's care. When she returned the child had no scratches, bruises, or other apparent injuries. After she related this story, the police then told her she was being charged with murder, and she asked them about securing bond. When queried about Cassandra's head injury, she said she may have mashed her head while picking her up.

Dr. Larry Howard, forensic pathologist and Director of the State Crime Laboratory, performed the autopsy. He testified that the primary cause of death was a severe crushing type head injury which consisted of a circular skull fracture on the right side of the head. There was severe damage to the brain, including much bleeding into the brain tissue and laceration of the brain by the edges of the skull fracture. There were numerous bruises on the face, chest, and abdomen. The neck had considerable bruising and abrasions which were possible fingernail marks, indicating pressure may have been applied to the neck with a hand. Similar possible fingernail abrasions were found on the chest and the back of the right hand. The upper right arm was broken, probably by someone placing tension on it until it snapped. The liver had been split, which was an injury consistent with a blow to the front of the chest. This injury was at least four and possibly twelve hours older than many of the others, which appeared fresh. Some of the bruises were lined up as if caused by a blunt instrument with several projections, which would have been consistent with the child having been struck by the knuckles of a hand. In his opinion these injuries were not consistent with the child having been dropped on a floor, and he described them as evidencing a typical battered child syndrome. Moreover, he testified they would have been impossible for another young child to inflict.

The defense rested without introducing evidence, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty. Sanders was sentenced to life imprisonment and appealed without having moved for a new trial.

1) Although appellant has not raised the general grounds we have nevertheless reviewed the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See Payne v. State, 249 Ga. 354(1), 291 S.E.2d 226 (1982). We conclude that a rational trier of fact could reasonably have found Sanders guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2) In her first enumeration of error appellant complains that the trial court should not have admitted into evidence the state's thirteenth exhibit, which was an autopsy photograph of the victim with her scalp reflected to show the fractured skull, lacerated brain, and blood from hemorrhaging, on the ground that it was an intentional distortion of the original evidence and was gruesome and inflammatory. Although the photograph is gruesome, we find its admission was necessary to show the cause of death, which had become apparent only because of the autopsy. Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 862(5), 302 S.E.2d 347 (1983).

3) In her second enumeration Sanders claims the state impermissibly placed her character in issue. The record shows that three employees of the Department of Family and Children Services ("the Department") testified for the prosecution. Their combined testimony established certain aspects of appellant's personal history and the fact that appellant had sought the Department's help on several occasions. Specifically, they testified that during the period 1976-81 Sanders had moved several times and had asked the Department for help in locating housing; that she had sought food stamps; that both her children had been problem pregnancies; that appellant's mother had contacted the Department and complained about the quality of care Chrishenbo was receiving and about appellant's attitude toward the child; that Lillian was counseled about child care and a stable living environment; and that appellant's mother's own family had been supervised by the Department for several years. Following this testimony about appellant's background, Dr. Wallace Kennedy, a clinical...