Sanders v. State

• Decision Date: 13 February 2003
• Docket Number: No. CR 01-95.,CR 01-95.
• Citation: 98 S.W.3d 35
• Parties: Raymond C. SANDERS Jr. v. STATE of Arkansas.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

98 S.W.3d 35

Raymond C. SANDERS Jr. v. STATE of Arkansas.

No. CR 01-95.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

February 13, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jeff Rosenzweig, for appellant.

Mark Pryor, Att'y Gen., by: Kent G. Holt, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.

DONALD L. CORBIN, Justice.

Appellant Raymond C. Sanders Jr. was convicted of two counts of capital murder in the Grant County Circuit Court and was sentenced to death. On appeal, this court affirmed his conviction, but reversed his death sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. See Sanders v. State, 308 Ark. 178, 824 S.W.2d 353 (1992) ("Sanders I".) Upon remand, Appellant was again sentenced to death, and this court affirmed. See Sanders v. State, 317 Ark. 328, 878 S.W.2d 391 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1162, 115 S.Ct. 1126, 130 L.Ed.2d 1088 (1995) ("Sanders II ".) Subsequent to this court's decision, Appellant timely filed a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R.Crim. P. 37. The trial court denied the petition without holding a hearing. We now reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Rule 37.

In light of the fact that there have been two previous direct appeals in this matter, it is not necessary to go into a lengthy recitation of the underlying facts. See Sanders I and Sanders II. Suffice it to say, Appellant was convicted of the murders of Nancy and Charles Brannon on February 28, 1991. Following his conviction, Appellant filed two petitions under Rule 37. The first petition was eleven pages long, with the eleventh page containing only the certificate of service. The second petition was a sixteen page "enlarged" version of the first petition.¹ In support of his petition, Appellant alleged that: (1) venue was changed without Appellant's consent and out of his presence; (2) several conflicts of interests precluded Appellant from receiving a fair trial; (3) Appellant's counsel was ineffective in both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial; and (4) the State improperly admitted a subsequent homicide as an aggravator during sentencing. Along with these petitions, Appellant also filed a motion seeking the court's permission to file the enlarged Rule 37 petition. He also filed a motion to supplement his petition on the basis that he had obtained newly discovered evidence regarding a criminal association between Dan Harmon, the prosecutor in his case, and William Murphy, one of his attorneys in this case.

The trial court concluded that both motions exceeded the ten-page limit set forth in Rule 37.1(e) and summarily dismissed both petitions. The trial court then denied Appellant's motion to file the enlarged petition. The court also denied Appellant's motion requesting permission to supplement his original Rule 37 petition. The trial court then went on to state, however, that even if he were to consider Appellant's substantive arguments, he still would not prevail under Rule 37. According to the trial court, there was no genuine issue as to any material fact in Appellant's petition; thus, the State's motion for summary judgment under Ark. R. Civ. P. 56 was proper. The trial court based this finding on his conclusion that the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable to Rule 37 proceedings.

The trial court also determined that Appellant's petition failed under Rule 37.3(a), because it contained only conclusory allegations that lacked any factual support and did not warrant an evidentiary hearing. The trial court acknowledged that Appellant attempted to set forth additional facts in support of his petition regarding the criminal association between Harmon and Murphy that led to their indictments and ultimate convictions in federal court. The trial court concluded, however, that these facts were irrelevant to Appellant's petition, because Appellant failed to tie the crimes of Murphy and Harmon to his prosecution for the Brannon murders. This appeal followed.

Appellant raises several arguments on appeal. First, Appellant contends that it was error for the trial court to dismiss his original Rule 37 petition on the basis that it exceeded the page limits of Rule 37.1(e). Next, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to file an enlarged Rule 37 petition and his motion to supplement the petition. Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in applying the principles of Rule 56 to a Rule 37 proceeding. Finally, Appellant contends that his Rule 37 petition demonstrates that he is entitled to a hearing. We agree that Appellant has set forth sufficient facts in support of his petition for postconviction relief to warrant an evidentiary hearing. Having so concluded, it is unnecessary for us to consider the merits of Appellant's remaining arguments on appeal. For purposes of clarity, however, we will address each of the points raised by Appellant.

For his first point on appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his Rule 37 motion on the basis that the motion was eleven pages long. According to Appellant, the petition's eleventh page contained nothing but the certificate of service, which is not even required under any provision of Rule 37. Thus, Appellant argues the trial court erred in dismissing his petition on this procedural basis.

Under Ark. R.Crim. P. 37.1(e), petitions for postconviction relief shall not exceed ten pages in length. This court has held that the rule limiting petitions to ten pages is an entirely reasonable restriction on petitioners seeking postconviction relief.

See Washington v. State, 308 Ark. 322, 823 S.W.2d 900 (1992); Maulding v. State, 299 Ark. 570, 776 S.W.2d 339 (1989). In fact, this court has stated that due process does not require courts to provide an unlimited opportunity to present postconviction claims or prevent a court from establishing limits on the number of pages in a petition. Id. Moreover, this court has held that any exhibits attached to a petition filed under Rule 37 are counted for purposes of determining whether the petition conforms to the ten-page limitation. Washington, 308 Ark. 322, 823 S.W.2d 900. This court has not, however, considered the issue of whether a page containing only a certificate of service should count towards that page limitation. We think that it should not. This court has repeatedly stated that, in death cases where a Rule 37 petition is denied on procedural grounds, great care should be exercised to assure the denial rests on solid footing. Echols v. State, 344 Ark. 513, 42 S.W.3d 467 (2001); Wooten v. State, 338 Ark. 691, 1 S.W.3d 8 (1999). In this case, the substance of Appellant's petition was concluded half-way through the tenth page. Appellant's counsel's signature followed on the remainder of the tenth page, with the certificate of service carried over to the next page. It is, therefore, unreasonable to dismiss a petition as too long under these circumstances. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in summarily dismissing Appellant's original Rule 37 petition because it exceeded ten pages.

With regard to Appellant's contention that the trial court erred in denying his motion to file an enlarged petition, we disagree. This court's Rules of Criminal Procedure do allow for the amendment of Rule 37 petitions, but only with leave of the court. Ark. R.Crim. P. 37.2(e). In Rowbottom v. State, 341 Ark. 33, 13 S.W.3d 904 (2000), the trial court found that the appellant failed to set forth any legitimate ground or justification for filing the enlarged petition. This court affirmed on appeal. Likewise, in the present matter, Appellant fails to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to file an enlarged petition. As the trial court pointed out, Appellant spent the majority of his motion attacking the page restrictions of Rule 37.1(e), rather than establishing a need to exceed that limitation. Accordingly, the trial court did not err on this point.

Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to supplement his Rule 37 petition so that he could raise the allegations regarding the criminal relationship between the prosecutor, Harmon, and his own defense counsel, Murphy. The trial court denied this motion on the ground that it was facially meritless. Specifically, the trial court stated that the motion failed to demonstrate any nexus between the criminal activities of Murphy and Harmon with the prosecution of Appellant for the Brannon murders. While we agree that there is a lack of proof of any such nexus, we think the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to supplement on this basis.

The motion at issue here set forth in detail the offenses that Harmon and Murphy were accused of, as well as the time periods in which these offenses allegedly occurred. The offenses included attempts to extort money from criminal defendants that occurred around the time that Appellant was represented by Murphy and prosecuted by Harmon. While it is not clear whether there is any nexus between the two, the facts alleged by Appellant in his petition raise more than the mere specter of an improper relationship between the prosecutor and defense counsel that may have prejudiced Appellant in his trial. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow Appellant to supplement his petition with this newly obtained information.

Appellant's next argument is that the trial court erred in granting the State's motion for summary judgment under Ark. R. Civ. P. 56, as that rule is not applicable in Rule 37 proceedings. The State counters that even if Rule 56 is not applicable, the trial court still based his denial of Appellant's claims under both Rule 56 and Rule 37.3; thus, Appellant's argument on this point is without merit. We agree with the State that the trial court's application of Rule 56 did not prejudice Appellant, because the trial court alternatively relied on Rule 37.3. Again, though, we address this...